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 Honor was the core motivating factor for Colombians who participated in the Thousand 
Days’ War. It transcended racialized, gendered, and class-based societal boundaries. But these 
boundaries nevertheless determined how different elements of Colombian society at the turn of 
the twentieth century perceived honor. They also determined how these elements of Colombian 
society perceived justice and what constituted a reparation of injured or affronted honor.  
 My analysis of honor in Colombian society during the Thousand Days’ War considers the 
perspectives of the generals, the clergy, and the soldiers. Their writings, publications, and 
memories reveal how their wartime activities revealed intense anxieties over their reputation and 
identity in their communities. They also reveal what constituted justice in their minds, and the 











The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be 
retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will 
suffer defeat: let such a one be dismissed! 
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
 
 Battlefield Colombia is my first project as a professional historian-in-training and the 
culmination of my first two years in graduate school at UNC Chapel Hill. It is a labor of love, 
and I mean that both in the sense of the time and energy I poured into this thesis, and with 
regards to the fantastic network of unfailing support, enthusiasm, and encouragement that my 
mentors, colleagues, friends, and family offered me throughout my work. It is not an 
exaggeration to affirm that without their guidance, patience, and criticism, I would have been 
plainly unable to craft and refine my thesis into its current form. 
 I would like to first acknowledge Mr. Dustin Fitzpatrick, my high school history teacher, 
and Dr. Robert Niebuhr, my undergraduate thesis advisor at Arizona State University. They 
encouraged me to follow my ambitions and dive headfirst into my academic projects, and I am 
sure they can note with some sympathy what my MA committee must have gone through 
supervising this 121-page monstrosity. Both of these individuals did so much to lay the 
groundwork for my entry into graduate school and the field of history, and for that I will always 
be grateful. Two other former professors of mine from ASU, Dr. Andrés Ruiz Olaya and Dr. 
Alexander Aviña, have also been extremely kind in staying in contact with me and offering 
words of support and encouragement during my time so far at UNC.
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My parents have endured their fair share of my ramblings, ravings, and rabbit holes. I am 
grateful to my mom Theresa for patiently hearing out the various iterations of my main 
argument, as she was always willing to serve as a sounding board and tell me if what I was 
saying made any sense at all to my readers. My dad, Carlos Julio, a proud colombiano, took 
special interest in reading one of my drafts all the way through, and was always happy to 
comment on what he found particularly interesting or unusual about my findings. He was 
extremely helpful in guiding my translation with Spanish-language sources whenever I came 
across a term or phrase too archaic to show up in a dictionary. He workshopped various 
translations that I proposed, to help my English reproductions sound more organic and true to the 
spirit of what was being said in the original Spanish source. (I should also commend my sister, 
Jane, who has absolutely no interest in history beyond that required of a responsible and 
informed citizen, but who nonetheless paid enough attention to me to remember—wearily—that 
the Battle of Palonegro started on May 11.) My family in Colombia was similarly supportive and 
encouraged my interest in the history of their homeland. Of special note are my dad’s cousins—
who I also call primos—José Aldemar and Didier, who were happy to chat with me about their 
own experiences as educators and soldiers in Colombia. 
 I am thankful to Iván D. Gaona, screenwriter and director, who very graciously shared 
with me his miniseries Adiós al amigo, which would have been otherwise unavailable to me 
online in the United States. His six-episode series chronicles an intimate dive into the mentality 
of everyday Colombians at the end of the Thousand Days’ War, and he addresses the trauma and 
the absurdity of the war with equal parts wit and compassion. It was refreshing to be able to take 
a break from my research with the literature and primary sources, and simply sit back and enjoy 
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a contemporary Colombian artist’s take on the time period that I have grown to love—and that 
few others have deemed worthy of portrayal on screen. 
 Dr. Eduard Esteban Moreno Trujillo, of the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, 
deserves special recognition as a de facto fourth committee member. He had absolutely no 
obligation whatsoever to devote so many hours in Zoom calls with me, reviewing drafts that I 
sent his way, and suggesting Colombian literature to challenge my understanding of the 
historiography. But he did it all anyway, and I think my thesis is that much the stronger because 
of it. Because of the travel restrictions due to the ongoing pandemic, I was unable to ever meet 
with Dr. Moreno in person while working on this thesis, but I very much look forward to doing 
so as soon as I can finally get to Bogotá.  
 I owe so much to my committee members at UNC. Dr. Ana María Silva Campo, my third 
reader, very graciously agreed to join my committee and wholeheartedly embraced my 
fascination with the Thousand Days’ War and, especially, Rafael Uribe Uribe. She pointed me 
toward the ArchiDoc tool on the Archivo General de la Nación’s website, and she recommended 
me the amazing novel The Shape of the Ruins, which deals extensively with Uribe’s 1914 
assassination. (Suffice it to say I devoured it in short order, especially since there aren’t too many 
Rafael Uribe-themed novels out there.) I can only hope that I have repaid her interest in my work 
in kind. It is one of my great regrets that I only came across a memoir of a veteran of the 
Thousand Days’ War from Cartagena—one of her geographic areas of interest in Colombian 
history—well after my final draft had been written. 
 Dr. Joseph T. Glatthaar, one of my co-advisors, has been a fantastic mentor and, I dare 
say, a “great guy.” I had the good fortune to get my feet wet in graduate school as his assistant 
TA my first semester, and since then, I’ve been able to TA for two more of his courses. I have 
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learned the importance of having a sense of humor as an educator in the college classroom under 
his tutelage. He has always made himself available at the drop of a hat throughout this project. 
Additionally, his recommendations for literature on honor and the military were particularly 
helpful—as was his insistence that I pivot away from the work of a particular political scientist 
who shall not be named. 
 Dr. Miguel La Serna, also my co-advisor, has likewise been extremely supportive and 
unafraid to hit me with reality checks during this project—both when I needed to reel it in and 
make serious edits, and when I needed to be less harsh on myself and have faith in my own 
capabilities as a researcher, writer, and storyteller. Both of those types of reality checks were of 
supreme importance. His “leaves in the forest” metaphor really helped me understand what I had 
accomplished in accumulating my source base and conducting research, while also very clearly 
pointing out what needed to be done moving forward as I wrote this thesis. In many ways, he has 
helped me grow in confidence as a professional academic. He welcomed me into graduate school 
by giving me the opportunity to work as his research assistant, collecting audiovisual materials 
on modern Latin American insurgencies for one of his courses. And he was willing to take a 
chance on me by taking me on as his student for the MA thesis. I hope that this has paid off for 
him, as well as for everyone in my committee. 
 Of no less importance, some other professors and mentors in the history department at 
UNC worthy of mention include Dr. Kathryn Burns and Dr. Wayne Lee. They were not on my 
committee, but their willingness to simply have me around and engage with my interests on a 
personal level were just as important in keeping my spirits up during the tougher days of my grad 
school experience thus far. And I couldn’t have stayed sane without the friendship and support of 
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my fellow graduate students and amazing friends, the “Lat Ams,” Emily Taylor and Dani 
McIvor.  
It really takes a lot of community care to make a thesis like this come together. Everyone 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“¿Tú vas a la guerra, Juan? 
De la guerra pocos vuelven 
¡y a la guerra muchos van!” 
— Ventura Ruiz Aguilera, quoted in Max Grillo, Emociones de la guerra1 
 
Strange Bedfellows: Two Visions of Wounded Honor 
 
 Sometime between 1899 and 1902, when the Thousand Days’ War raged between the 
Conservative and Liberal2 parties in Colombia, the Liberal general Rafael Uribe Uribe sent an 
undated letter to U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, asking for diplomatic assistance. Uribe 
praised the American president, writing, “We revere you as a soldier,” before trying to establish 
a personal connection by pointing out that Uribe himself “[served] in the field of South America 
as you did in Cuba.”3 This was not the cloying attempt at currying favor that it might seem—at 
least, not exclusively. For Uribe, a Liberal rebel leading a political revolt against the heavy-
handed Conservative administration in Bogotá, his honor and reputation were at stake. “I dare 
address you my equal without detriment to my admiration for your exalted post as President of 
 
1 Max Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 3a ed. (Bogotá: Editorial Incunables, 1984), 43. 
 
2 I follow Charles W. Bergquist’s example in capitalizing “Liberal” and “Conservative” in the context of Colombian 
politics and the Thousand Days’ War, referring to “the Colombian Liberal and Conservative parties, their members, 
and their programs.” See footnote 1 in Charles W. Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1978), 3. 
 
3 Rafael Uribe Uribe, Letter from Rafael Uribe Uribe to Theodore Roosevelt (Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division, Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library, Dickinson State University), 1. It does not 




the greatest nation of the Americas,” he continued boldly. “Let Your Excellency be assured our 
revolt is not one of those vulgar revolutions that so often disgraced South America for sole 
gratification of one man’s ambicion [sic] or desire for anarchy, but this is a serious civil war for 
most cherished ideals.”4  
 How had Uribe’s honor, and his Liberal party’s honor, been so besmirched that civil war 
was the only recourse? He explained to Roosevelt that: 
 
Now we are exiles or rebels. Our families must suffer for us. Our property is confiscated. 
Our citizens must pay cruel taxes without parliamentary representation. Our peons are 
seized from the fields to serve as soldiers against us. Our sympathizers are punished 
without legal trial. Even the sacraments of the Holy Church are denied to those who do 
not curse us. In brief our civil war, in which I first drew sword since 15 years [sic], is 




Uribe did not use the word “honor” when he explained his grievances. Nevertheless, the affronts 
to Liberal honor were extensive, ranging from attacks on the family, to property, to civic 
participation, to the Church and religion. There was hardly a facet of Liberal public life that had 
not been infringed upon by the Conservative government under Manuel Antonio Sanclemente 
and his predecessors. According to Uribe, it was only because of these outrages that the Liberals 
chose war as the way to seek justice for these serious grievances. Here was one Liberal who saw 
his honor gravely wounded, and took to battle as a means to restore it. 
Cantalicio Reyes was a fellow Liberal, one who had a markedly different experience in 
the Thousand Days’ War than Uribe but who was ultimately motivated to fight for similar 
reasons. Reyes was a humble farmer from coffee-growing Tolima, a department in central 
 
4 Uribe, Letter from Rafael Uribe Uribe, 1-2. 
 





Colombia nestled between the central and oriental cordilleras of the Andes (see map on page 29). 
In the words of Gonzalo París Lozano, historian and future governor of Tolima, Reyes was “a 
pacifist, hard-working man, devoted to his family and his fields. Although he was Liberal, he had 
not wanted to take part” in the war.6 He spent his time tending to his crops and hiding out in the 
hills whenever soldiers passed through—to be caught at home would mean to be pressed into 
service by whichever army happened to seize him first. Taking advantage of his absence, the 
soldiers would plunder his family’s belongings—food, clothing, and chickens—and torment the 
women in his family. Still, París notes, the long-suffering Reyes “hacía al mal tiempo buena 
cara.” That is, he put on a brave face before the stormy weather.7 
Although Cantalicio Reyes tried his best to keep the war away from home, the violence 
continued to escalate. One day, while he was out tending his fields, a Conservative army column 
stopped at his home for more plunder. This time, though, they took it too far. When Reyes came 
home at the end of his workday, he found that the Conservatives had trapped his family inside 
their thatched house, barricaded it from the outside, and set fire to the dwelling. Among the dead 
was his mother. The only survivor was a young girl, about five years old. It was too much for the 
pacifist to bear, and he salvaged a machete from the charred remains of his home as his personal 
weapon to carry to battle against the Conservative foe. When he arrived at the encampment of 
the Liberal general Ramón “El Negro” Marín, he pledged his allegiance to the cause with a 
 
6 Gonzalo París Lozano, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 2nd ed. (Bogotá: El Áncora Editores, 1984), 94. Original Spanish: 
“Era un hombre pacífico, trabajador, apegado a su familia y a sus sembrados. Aunque liberal, no había querido 
tomar parte en la revolución”. All translations are by the author, Marlon Londoño. 
 





simple, brutal phrase. “Vengo a matar godos,” he said, using the derogatory nickname given to 
the Colombian Conservatives by their Liberal enemies. “I come to kill godos.” 8  
“And he was, from that moment, the most implacable, the fiercest of the macheteros 
[soldiers who fought principally at close range with machetes] in northern Tolima,” wrote París.9 
Reyes left behind no written manifesto like Uribe—his story survived only through París’ work. 
But what transformed the pacifist into a feared machetero? He was but one of the many 
dishonored Liberals to whom Uribe made reference in his letter—Colombians who had seen 
their honor violently affronted, and who had in frustration decided that only war could restore 
injured or lost honor. Like Uribe, Reyes did not explicitly speak to his injured honor, but his 
professed desire for vengeance made clear that the war against the Conservatives was now 
personal. As J. Glenn Gray, a World War II veteran and philosopher, would write about revenge: 
“When the soldier has lost a comrade to this enemy or possibly had his family destroyed by them 
through bombings or through political atrocities . . . his anger and resentment deepen into hatred. 
Then the war for him takes on the character of a vendetta. Until he has himself destroyed as 
many of the enemy as possible, his lust for vengeance can hardly be appeased.”10 Vengeance was 
just one facet of honor, but for Reyes and many other Liberals, it was a particularly powerful 
one. 
Rafael Uribe Uribe and Cantalicio Reyes made for strange bedfellows—an educated 
statesman from Bogotá and a peasant coffee farmer from Tolima. They expressed their 
motivations to fight differently, in different languages and for different audiences, but their 
 
8 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 94. 
 
9 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 94. Original Spanish: “Y fue desde entonces el más implacable, el más feroz de los 
macheteros en el Norte del Tolima.”  
 





motivations ultimately stemmed from feelings of outrage and offense. Their honor had been 
damaged by the Conservative enemy. Their responses, just like the provocations, were deadly 
serious. And, as we shall see, they both acted out of a profound desire for justice. 
Defining Honor in Peace and Wartime 
Honor was at the core of the Thousand Days’ War. It informed why the war’s participants 
fought, and it informed what outcome they hoped to influence by the war’s end. These cultural 
concepts of honor were profoundly shaped by social identity markers like class, race, and 
gender—the white, educated generals negotiated honor between friends and adversaries in 
distinctly different ways than the mostly mestizo, illiterate peasant soldiers (who, unlike the 
generals, included many women in their ranks—see Chapter IV). Their visions of justice to 
restore their honor similarly differed, based on class, race, and gender. These quests for honor 
spoke volumes to what was important for Colombians during the war—namely, a desire to see 
justice done. They dealt variously with issues as consequential as “sense[s] of bonding, duty, or 
obligation,” that “framed the dynamics or context of male [and female] interaction and 
violence,” as Steve J. Stern puts it.11 They represented strategies of belonging and exclusion that, 
in turn, informed relationships between members of a family, members of a community, or 
members of an army. But they also dealt with strategies of emotional reckoning in a war that 
rocked the foundations of Colombian society and ended with the loss of one of its departments, 
Panamá. 
 
11 Steve J. Stern, The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 157. Stern’s analysis here is concerned with male peasant violence in 
Mexico, but the same broad categories of “masculine valor” and “gendered bonding” that he considers in Mexico 





I propose to emphasize the centrality of honor in sustaining the violence of the Thousand 
Days’ War, as well as the ultimate goals of justice to which the participants aspired. I will trace 
these patterns of honor, justice, and wartime violence along several broad strokes of Colombian 
society at the end of the nineteenth century: especially those that spoke to political, religious, and 
familial identity. There exist further nuances within each of these three categories, but I use them 
to analyze the generals, clergy, and soldiers—three clearly identifiable groups of Colombians 
who strove to protect their honor during the Thousand Days’ War. By doing so, I intend to 
indicate the variety of ways that the participants of the war reacted to affronts to honor, but also 
the variety of ways that they gestured toward justice and an end to the cycle of violence. These 
gestures were often imprecise and sometimes directly provoked further challenges that sustained 
violence instead of ending it. In essence, my analysis will demonstrate how honor in the 
Thousand Days’ War determined how provocations to violence were initially triggered, but also 
how the subsequent violent (and non-violent) responses pointed toward visions of justice and an 
end to the fighting.  
Scholars have written much about honor, particularly in the context of Latin America. In 
their edited volume on honor in colonial Latin America, Lyman L. Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-
Rivera invoke William Ian Miller’s definition of honor as “the keen sensitivity to the experience 
of humiliation and shame…[and] the desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the 
success of others. To simplify greatly, honor is that disposition which makes one act to shame 
others who have shamed oneself, to humiliate others who have humiliated oneself.”12 Honor was 
 
12 Lyman L. Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, “Introduction,” in The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in 





transactional and something that had to be actively defended. If shame and humiliation were 
positioned as opposites to honor, then virtuousness was positioned as its corollary.13 
Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera note that “[i]n colonial Latin America, honor had many faces; 
that is to say, social context, geography, and chronology all influenced its definition…Yet 
despite these varied meanings, individual and family honor always reflected public judgment.”14 
The honor examined in this thesis wore a wartime face, influenced by the social and political 
contexts of late nineteenth-century Colombia, but the public values imposed on wartime honor in 
Colombia nevertheless remained paramount. The generals, clergy, and soldiers always defended 
their honor in front of various audiences of peers, superiors, or subordinates. 
Mark A. Burkholder argues that honor survived the transition from Iberia to America and 
thrived in the more heterogeneous colonial society by imbuing the racial stratification of a 
society structured around class with racialized notions of “Spanish honor and the dishonor or 
infamy associated with persons of mixed racial background.”15 Honor was racialized, gendered, 
and class-based. Consequently, those who benefited from claims of blood purity, limpieza de 
sangre, used honor as a tool to enforce “discriminatory racial and cultural exclusions” to 
categorize people in “new groups of presumed social inferiors—Indians, Africans, and later, 
mixed populations.”16 Honor was also “predicated on a set of assumptions regarding appropriate 
masculine and feminine behavior,” as Geoffrey Spurling puts it, and Johnson argues that “by the 
late eighteenth century, the culture of honor had penetrated every level of masculine society and 
 
13 Sarah C. Chambers, “Private Crimes, Public Order: Honor, Gender, and the Law in Early Republican Peru,” in 
Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 29. 
 
14 Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera, “Introduction,” in The Faces of Honor, 15. 
 
15 Mark A. Burkholder, “Honor and Honors in Colonial Spanish America,” in The Faces of Honor, 18, 42. 
 





informed nearly every male interaction.”17 Honor may have therefore been rigid, but it was not 
impermeable. Ann Twinam notes that, “[u]nlike English America, where a person’s race and 
birth tended to be sharply defined and permanently fixed, in Hispanic America both variables 
had in-between categories, and an individual might have more than one racial or birth status at 
the same time.”18 
The colonial legacies of birthright, honor, legitimacy, and authority did not go away with 
independence, as Sueann Caulfield, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam note in the 
introduction to their edited volume Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America. Honor 
“[mediated] liberalism’s competing commitments to individual equality and social order,” and it 
“did not erase social hierarchies based on perceived biological differences, nor did [it] end social 
or legal practices of discrimination.” Rather, they suggest, “honor continued to mark social 
differences in ways that affected both the codification and practice of liberal law.”19 Therefore, 
even in post-independence Latin America, honor continued to be racialized, gendered, and class-
based. The key difference was its attachment to notions of citizenship, equality before the law, 
and civic belonging.  
Other scholars write about honor in the context of wartime, not necessarily specific to 
Latin America. “Honor and war are inseparable,” as Paul Robinson puts it.20 For him, the 
 
17 Geoffrey Spurling, “Honor, Sexuality, and the Colonial Church, in The Faces of Honor, 45. Lyman L. Johnson, 
“Dangerous Words, Provocative Gestures, and Violent Acts: The Disputed Hierarchies of Plebeian Life in Colonial 
Buenos Aires,” in The Faces of Honor, 129-130. 
 
18 Ann Twinam, Public Secrets, Private Lives: Gender, Honor, Sexuality, and Illegitimacy in Colonial Spanish 
America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 25. 
 
19 Sueann Caulfield, Sarah C. Chambers, and Lara Putnam (eds.), “Introduction: Transformations in Honor, Status, 
and Law over the Long Nineteenth Century,” in Honor, Status, and Law in Modern Latin America (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 2, 9. 
 






“unchanging core of military honor” consists of the “four virtues of prowess, courage, loyalty, 
and truthfulness,” though he does make allowances for additional virtues influenced by time and 
region.21 The U.S. Civil War is a particularly illustrative case study, as it demonstrates that honor 
was not something inherent to Latin America, nor was it indicative of some sort of moral failure 
or myopic addiction to violence on the part of its adherents. Joseph T. Glatthaar writes of 
Confederate soldiers who “inherited [from society] Southern honor, an overarching concept that 
embraced powerful perceptions of manhood, integrity, independence, valor, kinship, and esteem, 
and among the elite both luxury and generosity.”22 The faces of honor are different here—a 
different “social context, geography, and chronology” than Colombia during the Thousand Days’ 
War, to be sure—but honor was still racialized, gendered, and class-based. In the context of a 
civil war, notions of honor had a significant impact on the participants’ wartime experiences. 
Glatthaar notes in the case of the U.S. Civil War: 
 
In times of war, a wholehearted allegiance to the spirit of honor would serve its soldiers 
well. But Southern society also promoted certain qualities that did not benefit the 
Confederate nation in a war against the better-resourced Union. A lack of discipline and, 
particularly among the well-to-do, a spirit of profligacy and self-indulgence were 
acceptable modes of conduct before the war. Closely related to one another, these three 
behaviors elevated the individual over the group and tolerated conduct in uniform that 
was not conducive to effective military service. More than simply a spirit of 
individualism, which the army could harness and convert to military purposes, these 
qualities diminished the usefulness of the soldier. . . Southerners, particularly males, 
aspired to fulfill their every impulse and desire, and society tolerated and often 
encouraged indulgence. Attention to administrative detail and other mundane matters 
were beneath many of them. Undisciplined conduct, an open expression of passion or a 
ready resort to violence, was not necessarily considered unbecomingly in the prewar 
South. After all, to adhere to a code of discipline meant that others imposed their will on 
an individual. Such dominance of the individual smacked of slavery, and Southern whites 
were extremely sensitive to it. Even in the realm of laws and codes of moral conduct, 
Southern males abided by them voluntarily, not out of compunction. If society compelled 
 
21 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, 3. 
 




them to obey, then it dominated the individual and deprived him of his manhood, and no 
self-respecting white southerner could endure that.23 
 
 
Nor was preoccupation with honor unique to the Confederates. James M. McPherson notes that 
“[d]uty and honor were closely linked to concepts of masculinity in Victorian America.”24 This 
meant that “[w]hat really counted were not social institutions, but one’s own virtue, will, 
convictions of duty and honor, religious faith—in a word, one’s character.”25  
Challenges to character—to the “virtues” celebrated by one’s society, as Robinson puts 
it—carried the threat of humiliation.26 Bertram Wyatt-Brown sees humiliation as a crucial 
corollary to honor not only in the American cultural experience, but in many other cultures and 
societies, where it is as painful as it is recognizable. He argues: “Humiliation can have a 
devastating effect on the psychological well-being of anyone. It may be imposed by an 
unthinking individual seeking to ridicule or by a powerful authority or massive group regardless 
of any violation against themselves personally, real or imagined, in order to humble, scarify, or 
even incite the death of the victim. . . . Humiliation can also lead to fierce revenge.”27 The 
Colombian guerrillas who plundered political opponents and nursed blood feuds across decades 
certainly expressed some similar values and concerns. But they must be understood in the 
 
23 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 176. 
 
24 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 25. 
 
25 McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 61. 
 
26 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, 3. 
 
27 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, A Warring Nation: Honor, Race, and Humiliation in America and Abroad 





context of their particular faces of honor—the particular social contexts, geographies, and 
chronologies that existed for them in the Thousand Days’ War.  
The racialized, gendered, class-based variations on honor and justice made clear what 
Gonzalo Sánchez Gómez and Mario Aguilera Peña note in the introduction to their edited 
volume Memoria de un país en guerra as the three “orders” of war in the Thousand Days’ War. 
These can be understood as the Colombian faces of honor. The first order, “guerra y orden 
político” (war and political order), the political face of honor, was especially sensitive to class, 
race, and access to power. It also spoke to the “transformative capacity” that war could have on 
Colombia’s politics.28 The Liberal rebels ended up losing the war, but negotiated certain 
concessions in doing so, and redefined what political inclusion could mean in a government that 
had previously excluded the opposition from meaningful participation. It was partially through 
this process that the Liberal party elites (the generals) felt their grievances had been addressed 
and their honor restored—it meant that their efforts, wrought through the force of arms, 
ultimately produced meaningful change and with it, justice. 
The second order, “guerra y orden cultural” (war and cultural order), the cultural face of 
honor, was especially sensitive to the gendered order of society. During the Thousand Days’ 
War, it was largely related to the Conservative government’s efforts toward the “Christianization 
of the Republic,” a forceful, institutionalizing response to a decades-long question about the role 
of the Church in Colombian society.29 Vindictive sermons and outright battlefield participation 
 
28 Gonzalo Sánchez and Mario Aguilera, “Introducción,” in Memoria de un país en guerra: los Mil Días, 1899-1902 
(Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001), 20-21.  
 
29 Sánchez and Aguilera, “Introducción,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 21. The conservative Regeneration 
movement (see Chapter I) sought the “cristianización de la República” in such a way “que el orden político estaba 
subordinado a la hegemonía cultural de la Iglesia, control que se materializó en normas que regulaban tanto la vida 





by the Colombian clergy suggested the extreme threat the Church perceived in the Liberal 
rebellion. The clergy felt particularly vulnerable to Liberal projects of secular modernization, 
ones that shifted hierarchical power away from the Church. The active role the clergy played in 
the Thousand Days’ War saw them mobilize to protect their institution’s honor as capable of 
“exemplify[ing] and uphold[ing] the social order,” and levy charges against the Liberals that 
branded them as dishonorable threats to society.30 For the Conservative-Church alliance, justice 
was strongly linked to obedience and protecting the status quo as understood by a patriarchal 
institution that presented itself as the moral guardian of Colombian society.  
Lastly, the third order, “guerra y orden social” (war and social order), the social face of 
honor, was concerned with all three of the racialized, gendered, and class-based components of 
society. It had to do with the manifestations of honor characterized by the poor soldiers of 
Colombian society—struggles for “local or regional social recognition,” familial obligations, and 
deadly serious questions about revenge and settling scores.31 Their beliefs on honor may have 
differed from those of the upper class, but the concept of honor was just as potent among poor 
soldiers. It merely appeared in different forms. As Johnson argues, they “demonstrated a 
fundamental concern with the values of the culture of honor and a willingness to defend their 
reputations against insult.”32 This was especially evident in the low-intensity guerrilla campaigns 
waged away from the main campaigns, where the combatants were locals and probably knew 
one another personally. It was here where the struggle to reassert lost honor could prove to be the 
most difficult to accomplish in a way that did not demand further retaliation and a perpetual 
 
30 Geoffrey Spurling, “Honor, Sexuality, and the Colonial Church,” in The Faces of Honor, 63. 
 
31 Sánchez and Aguilera, “Introducción,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 22. 
 





cycle of violence. Soldiers nursed much of their anger and resentment even after the war had 
ended. The question of justice for the soldiers proved to be a significant problem for a lasting 
peace in Colombia after the Thousand Days’ War. 
Therefore, for the purposes of my argument and in the context of Colombian society 
during the Thousand Days’ War, I define honor as the recognition of one’s character and 
reputation, particularly as it is validated by members of one’s community. Honor therefore had 
much to do with social stability, a sense of belonging, and, crucially, identity. As Robinson 
notes, “Questions of honor strike at one’s very identity, and this is why they are so important. If 
honor is lost, identity is annihilated.”33 Naturally, the communities that recognized people’s 
honor differed greatly depending on their social context, informed by race, gender, and class—as 
well as the social disruptions and reorganizations that were inherent in mobilizing large numbers 
of people for war. Consequently, the expectations for character and reputation differed 
substantially for the generals, the clergy, and the soldiers. Even within those broadly defined 
categories, honor could mean different things for different people. But it remained firmly 
grounded in the individual’s community, and explains why honor was a deeply personal and 
deadly serious affair. 
The generals, clergy, and soldiers left behind records that did not always speak in concert 
with one another. They did not always perceive the same threats to their honor, nor did they 
always react to perceived threats in similar ways. But their responses retained a crucial concern 
with restoring justice for honor wrongly taken. It was through this process of negotiating 
demands over honor that the wartime violence defied military, political, and economic logic that 
might otherwise have ushered the Thousand Days’ War to a conclusion much earlier. As events 
 





played out, however, they did not bring the war to an earlier end. The Thousand Days’ War 
actually lasted for 1,130 days (October 17, 1899 to November 21, 1902), and neither battlefield 
victories, nor presidential coups, nor rampant inflation could temper the war’s intensity. 
Historiography of the War 
The literature on the Thousand Days’ War emerged from the memoirs and pamphlets that 
the generals and soldiers published. The earliest secondary literature appeared in the late 1930s 
and 1940s. Gonzalo París Lozano’s Guerrilleros del Tolima (Manizales: Editorial Arturo Zapata, 
1937) is a history of the war in the department of Tolima. Compiled from interviews from 
veterans of the rebel Ibagué Column, it tends toward the bullish with regards to its treatment of 
the violence. París, the future governor of that department, writes in his introduction that it was 
through the violence of the Thousand Days’ War that “the outline of nationality that we have was 
formed, and it was in the frequent warfare that the [human] race acquired the mettle that has 
sustained it in the work of advancing the development of the republic.”34  
París’ book demonstrates a key historiographical gap that largely remains to be 
addressed: an analysis of the motivations and experiences of the participants of the war. He is 
dismissive of who he calls the “greater majority of the revolutionaries who lacked the capacity to 
understand the principal fundamentals of the doctrine for which they believed themselves to be 
fighting,” and suggests that the rebels only dimly grasped “the predominance of liberal ideas.”35 
Joaquín Tamayo’s La revolución de 1899 (Bogotá: Editorial Cromos, 1938) challenges some of 
 
34 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 9. Original Spanish: “Al calor de esas hogueras se forjó el esbozo de nacionalidad 
que tenemos y fue en el frecuente guerrear donde la raza adquirió el temple que la ha sostenido en el trabajo de 
adelantar el desarrollo de la república.” The version I consulted was the second edition, published in Bogotá in 1984. 
 
35 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 68-71. Original Spanish: “la mayor parte de los revolucionarios no estaban en 






París’s claims. He argues that, rather than the basis for civic participation in the republic, the 
violence makes for a “serious and delicate . . . historical examination,” because of “the morbid 
development of political passion.”36 Tamayo’s work largely succeeded in setting the tone for the 
works that would follow. The violence was not to be celebrated. But he, too, paints an image far 
too reductive of the participants, especially the soldiers and guerrillas from the lower classes: 
 
Of the lower class, the peasant, those that suffered the most from the misfortunes of a 
civil war, nothing is spoken. A passive mass that bled itself dry and ripped itself to pieces 
with impunity, it went to the slaughter without protest, in defense of a red [Liberal] or 
blue [Conservative] flag, symbol of ideals that were foreign to its mentality. The people’s 
intervention in the struggle was limited to noisily expressing their enthusiasm when they 
emerged alive after risking their lives in hours of mortal anguish; the soldier of the 
Liberal or government armies never knew why he killed, why he fled, why he advanced. 
Resigned and submissive with a rifle on the back, a machete at the belt, barefoot, with 
neither food nor medicine, along impassable paths, in pursuit of their leaders they 
satisfied their ambitions to live in a primitive manner: a woman, a shirt, a bottle of beer, 
the pleasure of stealing a chicken, constituted the coveted plunder of these youths of 
audacious blood [mozos de sangre arriscada].37 
 
 
Of course, the soldiers knew plainly well why they fought, killed, or did whatever else they did 
during the war, but Tamayo reduces them to a singular mass. Future historians would temper this 
attitude, but the earliest works on the Thousand Days’ War established a pattern of treating the 
 
36 Joaquín Tamayo, La revolución de 1899, 2a ed. (Bogotá: Editorial Cromos, 1940), 10. Original Spanish: “Grave y 
delicado se presenta el examen histórico,” “el desarrollo morboso de la pasión política”. 
 
37 Tamayo, La revolución de 1899, 47. Original Spanish: “Del pueblo bajo, del campesino, que era el que más sufría 
de las desdichas de una guerra civil, no se habló. Masa pasiva a la que impunemente se estrujaba y desollaba, iba al 
matadero sin protestar, en defensa de una bandera roja o azul, símbolo de ideales extraños a su mentalidad. La 
intervención del pueblo en la contienda se limitaba a expresar bulliciosamente su entusiasmo cuando salía con vida 
luégo de arriesgarla en horas de mortal angustia; el soldado de los ejércitos liberales o gobiernistas nunca supo por 
qué mataba, por qué huía, por qué avanzaba. Resignado y sumiso con un rifle a la espalda, el machete a la cintura, 
descalzo, sin alimentos ni medicinas, por senderos intransitables, en pos de los jefes satisfacía su ambición de vivir 
en forma primitiva: una mujer, una camisa, una botella de cerveza, el goce de hurtar una gallina, constituían el botín 





people who fought in the war as “the anonymous hero; also the victim,” without probing 
deeper.38 
Colonel Leónidas Flórez Álvarez’s Campaña en Santander (1899-1900) (Bogotá: 
Imprenta del Estado Mayor General, 1939) was particularly consequential for the chronological 
organization of the war in the historiography. This was one of the first major efforts at a detailed 
military history of the war and was planned as the first in a four-volume series. However, only 
the first volume was published, and consequently, “it had the unintended consequence of 
misleading later writers into believing that the important battles took place only in Santander,” as 
René de la Pedraja would write in 2006.39 A similar pattern unfolded with Jorge Martínez 
Landínez’s Historia militar de Colombia, tomo I (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1956). Martínez 
devotes much of this 415-page history with defining what constitutes “military history” and 
conducts analyses of Napoleon’s Russia campaign and the Nazi campaigns of World War II 
before returning to Colombia. The book concludes its history of the Thousand Days’ War with 
the presidential coup of July 31, 1900. Nor is there a follow-up to this volume. This is perhaps 
the origin of the historiographical definition of the war’s two distinct phases, the “Gentlemen’s 
War” and the “Guerrillas’ War” (see Chapter I)—small wonder that the former ends and the 
latter begins precisely where Flórez’s and Martínez’s first and only volumes conclude. The 
substantial emphasis on the battles of Peralonso and Palonegro, and the general tendency to 
compress the events after July 1900, likely stem from these incomplete volumes.  
 
38 Tamayo, La revolución de 1899, 13. Original Spanish: “el héroe anónimo; también la víctima”. 
 






It was not until the late 1970s that substantial historiographical shifts began to surface in 
the literature on the Thousand Days’ War. Charles W. Bergquist’s Coffee and Conflict in 
Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), remains one of the most 
comprehensive and influential books on the war even today. He argues “that investigation of 
basic economic trends and analysis of elite ideological and economic interests provide the most 
fruitful point of departure for an understanding of Colombian political history at the turn of the 
century.”40 His work situates the Thousand Days’ War in the context of a coffee boom that 
catastrophically collapsed in 1898, and the postwar recovery of the coffee economy that he sees 
as responsible for “winning the peace” and consolidating political stability.41 This text became 
hugely influential both for Colombian and American historians interested in the topic, even 
though most authors continue to regard the political context as more consequential for the 
outbreak of war than the economic factors. Bergquist bases his argument on the vacillating 
“success and failure of export agriculture in nineteenth-century Colombia” as the principal 
destabilizing agent in Colombian society.42  
As convincing as the economic component of Bergquist’s argument is, his analysis fails 
to seriously consider the social factors that compelled the participants to fight in the war. He 
writes: “The motivations of lower-class volunteers in joining the war effort are difficult to 
deduce from the historical record.” For Bergquist, it is “the tremendous economic power at the 
heart of this relationship [between landowners and workers]” that suffices to explain the soldiers’ 
 
40 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, vii. 
 
41 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, vii. 
 
42 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 8. According to Bergquist, while such an economic system 
flourished, it granted its Liberal proponents the resources to maintain their power, while during its decline, the 





involvement in the war.43 This analysis certainly possesses some explanatory truth to it, but 
ultimately represents the entirety of the cursory extent to which Bergquist considers the agency 
of the Colombians who fought in the Thousand Days’ War.  
Bergquist greatly influenced Jorge Villegas’ and José Yunis’ La guerra de los mil días 
(Bogotá: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1979), which mostly strengthens Bergquist’s stake in Spanish 
for Colombian audiences and substantiates his analysis of the political fissures that split 
Colombian society, as well as the cracks that ran within the parties themselves. The latter half of 
this work is a compilation of historical documents such as telegrams and maps, as well as a 
detailed timeline of the major events of the war. Their treatment of the military campaigns in the 
first half reflects a considerable improvement over Bergquist’s analysis, in that Villegas and 
Yunis consider the social and cultural impacts that the war had on Colombians of the time: they 
devote a subsection of their chapter on the war to “Everyday life.”44 But this section is much too 
brief—a mere fifteen pages that offer no substantial correction for the sneers that París and 
Tamayo directed toward the war’s participants or the shrug that Bergquist offered them. 
Furthermore, although Villegas and Yunis rightfully note that it is “difficult to make a 
generalization” about the guerrillas, they ultimately suggest that the combatants understood only 
“vague aspirations and claims to freedom.” Taking Bergquist’s lead, they also point to “the 
classic groups of landowner-generals who lead their peasants to fight in battle” and mere bandits 
who “take advantage of the war situation, [and] raise a flag to mask their pillage” as motivating 
 
43 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 136-137. 
 






factors to join the fighting.45 Their assertions are not untrue, but do not challenge questions of the 
historical identity, motivation, or world views of the participants. They produce no serious 
analysis of the participants or their circumstances beyond the reductive and generalized.  
Colonel Guillermo Plazas Olarte’s La Guerra Civil de los Mil Días: estudio militar 
(Tunja: Academia Boyacense de Historia, 1985) offers a much more thorough analysis of 
military aspects, like orders of battle, tactical maneuvers, and the armament and equipment 
carried by the soldiers of each side. Plazas’s elaboration on such technical details contributes 
significantly to the military history of the war, but his analysis does little to contribute to a 
broader understanding of the war itself in Colombia’s wider political history. Additionally, he 
does not mask his favoritism for the Conservative forces over the Liberals. While Plazas does not 
devote considerable space to a dedicated analysis of the participants and their motivations or 
their social environments, he does present one of the first shifts in tone that treats the participants 
as “volunteers, people who sought through battle the defense of their political ideals.”46 
The next major historiographical shift happened in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as a 
renewed interest emerged in time for the war’s centenary. Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo Castillo 
contributed a chapter about the participation of Colombian women in the Thousand Days’ War to 
the edited volume Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia, tomo II: Mujeres y sociedad (Bogotá: 
Grupo Editorial Norma, 1995). Jaramillo gives female soldiers and participants the recognition 
that earlier works largely denied them. His purpose, explicitly stated, is to “draw a profile of 
 
45 Villegas and Yunis, La guerra de los mil días, 71. Original Spanish: “Es difícil hacer una generalización de las 
guerrillas,” “vagas aspiraciones libertarias y de reivindicación,” “los clásicos grupos de terratenientes-generales que 
llevan a la brava a sus peones al combate”, “aprovechando la coyuntura guerrera, izan una bandera para escudar su 
pillaje.” 
 
46 Guillermo Plazas Olarte, La guerra civil de los Mil Días: Estudio militar (Tunja: Publicaciones de la Academia 
Boyacense de Historia, 1985), 39. Original Spanish: “eran voluntarios, gentes que buscaban en la lid la defensa de 





women in war; a profile that . . . will be in any case a significant basis so that other people, 
perhaps with more determination and better luck, definitively achieve the rescuing of the lost 
history of Colombian women in the civil wars.”47 He trawls through the memoirs left behind by 
the generals and soldiers to highlight the women who appear within, gesturing toward the 
dangers they shared with their male counterparts and the circumstances of their participation. 
Nonetheless, he is more concerned with the how of their wartime experiences rather than the 
why. His brief summary of the reasons for their participation includes references to politics, 
family, men, and vengeance, but he does not probe deeply for the explanations to these whys.48  
 Gonzalo Sánchez Gómez and Mario Aguilera Peña edited an important volume that was 
produced in time for the centenary of the war, titled Memoria de un país en guerra: los Mil Días, 
1899-1902 (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001). This edited volume compiles chapters 
from sixteen Colombian, American, and British historians (including Bergquist and Jaramillo), 
and is divided into six parts that analyze war, development, and national dismemberment (1), the 
protagonists of the war and their perspectives (2), aesthetic expressions of the war (3), wartime 
laws and the end of the conflict (4), “the war of yesterday and that of today” (5), and a 
compilation of historical documents (6).49 Important chapters include Fernán González’s “De la 
guerra regular de los «generales-caballeros» a la guerra popular de los guerrilleros,” which 
 
47 Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo Castillo, “Mujeres en guerra: Participación de las mujeres en los conflictos civiles,” in 
Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia, tomo II: Mujeres y sociedad (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1995), 360. 
Original Spanish: “el intento de dibujar un perfil de la mujer en la guerra; perfil que . . . será de todas maneras una 
base apreciable para que otras personas, tal vez con más empeño y mejor suerte, logren rescatar definitivamente la 
historia perdida de las mujeres colombianas en las guerras civiles”. 
 
48 Jaramillo, “Mujeres en guerra,” in Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia, 360-363. 
 
49 Sánchez and Aguilera, Memoria de un país en guerra, 7-8. Original Spanish: “Modelo de desarrollo, guerra y 
desmembración nacional; Protagonistas y miradas de la guerra; Expresiones estéticas de la guerra; Leyes de guerra y 





explores the traditional historiographical division of the war into the Gentleman’s War and the 
Guerrillas’ War, and Hermes Tovar Pinzón’s “Tras las huellas del soldado Pablo,” a deeply 
emotional take on the power of memory that considers the pedagogical function of wartime 
memory within the family unit. Nevertheless, even within the book’s second section on the 
protagonists of the war and their perspectives, no scholars devote their attention to the 
motivation of the participants for fighting in the war beyond general explanations of politics or 
economic compulsion. These explanations contain a good deal of truth to them, but nonetheless 
fail to get at the why underlying the symptoms. If indeed a volatile political situation or desperate 
economic circumstances compelled Colombians to fight in the Thousand Days’ War, why was it 
that politics or economics drove them into the most destructive armed conflict that Colombia had 
seen up until that time?  
Another important work from the centenary boom is Ary R. Campo Chicangana’s 
Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones: Yanaconas y Paeces en la guerra de los Mil Días 
(Cali: Secretaría de Cultura y Turismo, Municipio de Santiago de Cali, 2003), an oral history that 
chronicles the overlooked participation of Indigenous Colombians of the Yanacona and Paez 
communities in the department of Cauca. Campo, a Yanacona Colombian, draws from oral 
histories he conducted, as well as local archival material often overlooked by researchers 
concentrated in Bogotá, to examine the experiences of the Indigenous soldiers who fought for 
both Liberals and Conservatives. Like with Jaramillo’s chapter on women in the war, Campo’s 
book sheds valuable light on a group of participants who were overlooked by most earlier works, 
but he too is more concerned with the how of Indigenous participation rather than the why. He 
writes that “it is difficult to define the thinking and feeling of the Indians faced with the war; 




for subsequent investigations.”50 Indeed, his oral histories reveal wartime memories preserved by 
Indigenous Colombian communities that exist outside the privileged realm of the archives. 
René de la Pedraja Tomán’s Wars of Latin América, 1899-1941 (Jefferson: McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 2006) has perhaps one of the best English-language military histories of the 
Thousand Days’ War in its introduction—in fact, it situates the Thousand Days’ War as key to 
understanding all future developments in Latin American military history leading up to 1941. It 
breaks the mold of the usual Gentlemen’s War/Guerrillas’ War dynamic codified by the early 
works of the 1940s and 1950s, emphasizing the military importance of the continued fighting 
post-Palonegro in 1901 and 1902. But it remains at its core a rather traditional “drums and 
bugles” military history with no analysis of the participants. Ex-defense minister of Colombia 
Rafael Pardo Rueda’s La historia de las guerras (Bogotá: Penguin Random House Grupo 
Editorial, 2015) situates the Thousand Days’ War in the context of Colombia’s long history of 
warfare, from independence to the present—a valuable complete volume, but similar to de la 
Pedraja’s book, one without substantial social analysis.  
The major historiographical tendencies of the 2010s leaned toward the cultural analyses 
that the best works of the centenary boom of the early 2000s elevated. These include Víctor 
Guerrero Apráez’s Guerras civiles colombianas. Negociación, regulación y memoria (Bogotá: 
Editorial Pontifica Universidad Javeriana, 2016), Juliana Mojica Sanabria’s Una construcción 
cultural: vida cotidiana en la guerra de los Mil Días (Editorial Académica Española, 2019), and 
Max S. Hering Torres’s and Daniel H. Trujillo’s article “La contrarreloj de la venganza. Regular 
 
50 Ary R. Campo Chicangana, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones: Yanaconas y Paeces en la guerra de 
los Mil Días (Cali: Secretaría de Cultura y Turismo, Municipio de Santiago de Cali, 2003), 27. Original Spanish: “es 
difícil definir el pensamiento y sentimiento de los indios frente a la guerra; no obstante, pensamos que nuestro 





la muerte en Colombia, 1899-1902” (Historia Crítica, no. 78, October 2020). Apráez’s work is a 
sophisticated political history that looks at memory and the regulation of war, violence, and 
peace as key explanatory factors in the development of Colombia’s nineteenth century wars. 
Mojica’s book is a well-intentioned effort to reconstruct daily life in the Thousand Days’ War, 
but she is concerned with the “state of exception” that she hypothesizes was responsible for 
molding daily life rather than the impact that the war had on daily life for its participants. Hering 
and Trujillo’s article considers the role that the Conservative hegemony had in regulating death 
and vengeance through public-facing disciplinary mechanisms of the state apparatus like 
imprisonment and execution. In their own ways, each of these works points toward the 
intersection of violence, culture, and society—through memory, daily life, and even the death 
penalty.  
The historiography of the Thousand Days’ War has matured from the incomplete military 
histories of the early-mid twentieth century, and has seen substantial development in the past two 
decades as historians consider social and cultural questions—questions that point to lived 
experiences, demographic shifts, and what constituted the worldview and logic of those who 
fought and died in the Thousand Days’ War. These are exciting advancements and they suggest 
the extent to which similar such arguments have yet to be developed.  
Yet even these most recent studies still fail to provide us with a fuller understanding of 
the war and an enhanced portrait of its participants as people who lent their efforts to the war for 
deeply personal reasons. By applying the analytic lens of honor, justice, and violence in the 
Thousand Days’ War, I seek to build upon and extend beyond this tradition and contribute to a 
deeper understanding not only of the war, but also of its participants. The questions that I ask 




the whys. The historiographical whys have come a long way from the rude dismissals of the 
1940s and 1950s, but the historiography has produced no satisfactory, comprehensive 
investigation on what the war meant for those who participated. To the extent that such questions 
are asked, they tend to be confined to one particular demographic group (such as women or 
Indigenous people) and consequently remain limited in their scope and explanatory capacity. I 
will not only look at the elusive why of wartime participation, but I will make it comparative. 
The why was not the same for all people, and it depended much on class, race, and gender. But in 
starting with such a question—and centering it on honor and justice—I intend to provide the 
answer that other historians have missed, even when they gesture toward the very evidence that 




CHAPTER 2: MIL DÍAS DE SOLEDAD: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THOUSAND DAYS’ WAR 
 
“En Colombia no existen partidos políticos sino odios heredados.” 
— Miguel Antonio Caro51 
 
The Thousand Days’ War was the product of a half-century of antagonism between the 
Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia. It was the last in a “nearly canonical figure of nine 
confrontations at the national level, and the great number of confrontations at the local, state, or 
department level,” as Guerrero Apráez puts it.52 The 1863 Constitution of Rionegro, which 
transformed the Granadine Confederation into the United States of Colombia, codified the 
polarizing divide between the two parties. A Liberal document, the federalist Rionegro 
constitution divided the country into semi-autonomous states with the ability to raise their own 
armies. The Rionegro constitution also abolished the death penalty, codified the separation of 
church and state, and guaranteed freedoms of press, education, opinion, and trade.53 It 
profoundly antagonized the Conservatives, eventually leading to a failed rebellion against the 
 
51 Miguel Antonio Caro, quoted in Robin Kirk, More Terrible Than Death: Drugs, Violence, and America’s War in 
Colombia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 213. Caro was president of Colombia from 1894 to 1898, and his 
presidency did little to ease political tensions, as he promoted exclusionary and polarizing Regeneration policies that 
triggered the civil war of 1895, a brief prelude to the much more protracted fighting of the Thousand Days’ War. 
 
52 Víctor Guerrero Apráez, Guerras civiles colombianas: negociación, regulación y memoria (Bogotá: Editorial 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2016), 123. Original Spanish: “casi canónica cifra de nueva confrontaciones de 
alcance nacional y el gran número de enfrentamientos locales, estaduales o departamentales”. 
 
53 Abraham Lincoln recognized the importance of the Rionegro Constitution, declaring in his Annual Message to 
Congress in December 1864: “It would be doing injustice to an important South American state not to acknowledge 
the directness, frankness, and cordiality with which the United States of Colombia have entered into intimate 





Liberal government in the civil war of 1876-1877, known as the War of the Schools (la Guerra 
de las Escuelas). 
 After the Conservative defeat in the War of the Schools, Rafael Núñez launched an 
opposition movement known as la Regeneración (the Regeneration). Núñez was a dissident 
independent Liberal who built a coalition with Conservatives against the existing Liberal 
hegemony headed by radicals. He won the presidency in 1880 and had to suppress a Liberal 
uprising in the civil war of 1884-1885. He pushed through the Constitution of 1886, which 
repealed the Constitution of Rionegro. The Regeneration and the Constitution of 1886 
represented a highly reactionary Conservative retaliation to the Liberal hegemony. The new 
constitution transformed the United States of Colombia into the Republic of Colombia, “created 
a unitary, highly centralized political organization with power concentrated in the hands of the 
president,” codified Catholicism as the official state religion, greatly clamped down on civil 
liberties and freedom of the press, restricted suffrage, and excluded the Liberals from meaningful 
participation in public office.54  
The Regeneration and its constitution precipitated a crisis of leadership in the Liberal 
ranks. Although the Conservatives were split between the Nationalist faction, composed of 
supporters of the Regeneration, and the Historical faction, which opposed the more extremist and 
exclusionary tendencies of the Nationalists, the Liberals were themselves split between peace 
 
54 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 15-17. Bergquist notes that the Regeneration “signaled the victory of 
conservative thought and the consolidation of a new regime headed by Conservatives.” For more on the 
Regeneration, see Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002 (trans. 
Richard Stoller) (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Guillermo Plazas Olarte, La guerra civil de los Mil Días: 
Estudio militar (Tunja: Publicaciones de la Academia Boyacense de Historia, 1985); Thomas Fischer, “De la guerra 





and war factions.55 The War Liberals launched a failed rebellion in the Civil War of 1895, 
though it provided them with a blueprint for planning a subsequent uprising.56 In the aftermath of 
their defeat, the Liberals buried large quantities of weapons and munitions, many of which they 
unearthed and repurposed during the Thousand Days’ War.57 After 1895, the War Liberals had 
firmly outmaneuvered the Peace Liberals and the question was no longer if another war would 
decide the country’s political fate, but rather when war would break out. 
The 1898 presidential election saw the Nationalist Conservatives triumph with the ticket 
of Manuel Antonio Sanclemente and José Manuel Marroquín, but theirs was a particularly weak 
administration that gave the War Liberals the opportunity they needed to launch an armed 
revolt.58 Sanclemente, in his eighties, suffered from delicate health and had to live outside of 
Bogotá’s cold climate. This further inflamed Liberal outrage and fanned suspicions of an 
illegitimate government. By July 1898, prominent War Liberal Rafael Uribe Uribe was preparing 
and organizing for the outbreak of war, and in February 1899, the Liberal conspirators formally 
planned to initiate hostilities on October 20 of that year. Because news of the preparations, and 
even of the intended start date, reached Conservative officials in Bogotá, Uribe and other 
Liberals were arrested and jailed in June but released shortly thereafter.59 Consequently, planning 
continued and, against the advice of Uribe and others who wanted to wait until all elements were 
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in place, the War Liberals in the department of Santander launched the rebellion three days ahead 
of schedule, on October 17. The Thousand Days’ War had begun.  
One of the serious problems that the Liberals were never able to truly overcome was the 
question of financing the conflict. Liberal leaders like Uribe took it upon themselves to solicit 
and organize financial and material support for their armies, but these were patchwork efforts at 
best—in spite of the rampant problems of inflation that plagued the government in Bogotá, the 
Liberals were never able to approach the Conservatives’ level of financial security for acquiring 
arms and munitions. The rebels depended heavily on the nominal support from Liberal 
governments in neighboring countries Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala. The Venezuelan government, for instance, permitted the passage of 
3,500 rifles and one million cartridges through Maracaibo into Riohacha in the Department of 
Magdalena.60 Most of the time, however, foreign support amounted to little more than empty 
promises. In desperation, the rebels also turned to “voluntary” contributions from locals in land 
and livestock to house and feed their soldiers.61 
The first seven months of the war comprised what historians have reductively 
characterized the Gentlemen’s War phase of the fighting, where the battles were purportedly 
fought more or less along centralized lines of campaign between traditionally organized armies.62 
The Liberals immediately failed in their attempt to seize control of the Magdalena River, a 
critical waterway that connected the interior of the country to outside trade by way of the 
Caribbean. But the main Liberal forces under Uribe and Benjamín Herrera recovered from a 
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string of defeats in Santander in time to win the Battle of Peralonso in December 1899, where 
Uribe made a name for himself as a heroic general who won the battle after leading a charge 
across a bridge that routed the enemy army.63 The Liberals won another pair of victories at 
Gramalote and Terán in February 1900, but the elderly Gabriel Vargas Santos, named Supreme 
Director of the War by the Liberals (as well as provisional president to challenge Sanclemente), 
failed to capitalize on this momentum and did not organize any serious movement toward Bogotá 
until May. 
This gave Conservatives ample time to organize a blocking force to prevent a Liberal 
advance on the capital. The two armies clashed at the Battle of Palonegro in Santander on May 
11. It was to be the crippling blow that ended all rebel hopes for victory, cementing itself in 
Colombian history as Colombia’s bloody hybrid of Gettysburg and the Somme—lines of 
trenches scarred the earth and heaps of unburied bodies bloated in the relentless sun during two 
weeks of brutal combat. The Conservative lawyer and commissioner Lisímaco Palau estimated 
in October 1900 that 5,000 people died at Palonegro; some historians give slightly lower 
estimates, but Palonegro was indisputably the single most deadly confrontation of the war.64 
Conservative general Próspero Pinzón demonstrated no great tactical flair in his handling of the 
engagement, and only forced a Liberal withdrawal on May 25, after the rebels ran out of 
ammunition and Conservative reinforcements arrived.65 But it was enough. Coupled with a series 
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of setbacks in Panamá, where the Liberals were similarly defeated at the Battle of Calidonia 
Bridge in July, the Liberal armies dispersed, though the war would not end for another two years.  
Historians tend to mark the end of the “Gentlemen’s War” phase and the start of the 
“Guerrillas’ War” phase after Palonegro. The so-called Guerrillas’ War was marked by 
outbreaks of fighting along the Caribbean coast, in the central cordillera around Tolima, and on 
the borders with Venezuela and Ecuador. Some Liberal armies became guerrilla bands led by 
local caudillos, formed “over the wishes of the great [Liberal] leaders” like Uribe, Herrera, and 
Vargas Santos, who protested “for the constitution of regular forces and of true Liberal 
armies.”66 Pardo argues that the “Guerrillas’ War” was identifiable by the preponderance of “a 
variety of commands, of leaders, of groups, of factions, of caudillos, of acronyms that intertwine 
themselves in confrontations in certain cases and zones, and cooperate in others.”67 Nevertheless, 
the war did not simply transform overnight after Palonegro. As the subsequent campaign in 
Panamá would demonstrate, the Liberals maintained standing armies even as guerrillas 
proliferated in the countryside. Nor were the guerrillas dormant before Palonegro. There was no 
clean split between a “gentlemanly” way of war—if one can ever call war gentlemanly, as 
evidenced by the two-week bloodbath at Palonegro, to give just one prominent example—and an 
“ungentlemanly” guerrilla war. Both groups operated alongside one another throughout the war. 
Further aggravating the volatile situation, Vice President Marroquín overthrew President 
Sanclemente in a bloodless coup on July 31, and Aristides Fernández assumed the position of 
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Minister of War in Bogotá. Fernández, former director of the police in Bogotá, was a ruthless 
hardliner who refused to negotiate with the Liberals and strove to exclude them from 
classification as legitimate belligerents—in essence, transforming the Liberals from combatants 
into criminals. On February 18, 1901, he issued a decree that would come to be known as the 
Decreto funesto, the Fatal Decree, which stripped Liberal prisoners of much of the protections 
and rights they had previously enjoyed and expedited executions by firing squad.68 
Disincentivized to fight fairly against a Conservative government that was actively dispensing 
with established wartime norms, the Liberal guerrillas escalated the violence. Guerrero Apráez 
characterizes the resultant fighting as “[a] repertoire of violent actions of very diverse nature, 
duration, intensity, and purpose, consisting of sieges, captures, sackings, entrapments [rodeos 
amenazantes], jailbreaks, . . . ambushes, harassments, persecutions, skirmishes, expulsions, and 
thefts.”69  
Meanwhile, Uribe, Herrera, and Vargas Santos had all left Colombia to solicit financial 
support abroad from sympathetic Liberal governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. 
Uribe found ostensible support in Venezuela’s Liberal president Cipriano Castro, who in reality 
manipulated Uribe for his own gain. Venezuela was experiencing a mirror of Colombia’s 
political crisis, with Venezuelan Conservative rebels mobilizing against Castro’s Liberal 
government. Uribe, leading Venezuelan Liberal troops, won a strange victory over a rebel 
Venezuelan general leading Colombian Conservatives at the battle at San Cristóbal, on 
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Venezuela’s border with Colombia, in July 1901.70 But this victory benefited Castro’s regime 
more than it advanced the Colombian Liberal rebels’ military plans. Castro was unwilling to 
commit Venezuelan forces to the Colombian Liberal cause. It was soon evident that no 
substantial foreign aid was forthcoming, and that the neighboring Liberal administrations were 
content to finance the Colombian Liberals just enough to keep the Conservative government in 
Bogotá destabilized (or, in Venezuela’s case, to take advantage of Colombian Liberal military 
expertise to deal with internal dissent).  
The Liberals’ last hopes lay with Herrera’s forces, which mobilized for a renewed 
offensive in Panamá. Herrera personally purchased a steamship and converted it into a gunboat, 
the Almirante Padilla, and on the Pacific coast assassinated the Conservative governor of 
Panamá, Carlos Albán, sinking his flagship Lautaro on January 20, 1902.71 The Liberal forces in 
Panamá successfully thwarted most Conservative efforts to expel them from the isthmus, but 
they were unable to secure control of Panamá City. What they did accomplish, however, was the 
provocation of the United States, nervous at the growing military activity around the Panama 
Railroad Company’s rail line. In late 1901, U.S. Marines disembarked in Panamá after the 
Liberal victory at the Battle of Aguadulce, and served as ostensible peacekeepers, preventing 
both Liberal and Conservative forces from making use of the railroads and from fighting around 
the port cities of Panamá City and Colón.72  
The war had reached an effective stalemate—the Conservative government was unable to 
stamp out the flames of the Liberal rebellion across all its diverse departments, but the Liberals 
 
70 de la Pedraja, Wars of Latin America, 1899-1941, 29-30. 
 
71 de la Pedraja, Wars of Latin America, 1899-1941, 40. 
 





were too disorganized and lacked the supplies and financial support to ever have a chance at 
overthrowing the Conservatives in Bogotá. The Thousand Days’ War sputtered to an exhausted 
halt after Uribe signed the Treaty of Neerlandia in October 1902 and Herrera signed the Treaty 
of Wisconsin, on board a U.S. battleship of the same name, in November 1902.73 The United 
States capitalized on Colombia’s weakness—hoping to expedite negotiations concerning the 
construction of the Panama Canal—and forced out of each side what their adversaries could not: 
submission before overwhelming military strength. In an ironic turn of fate, Uribe ended up 
witnessing firsthand how the “most progressive and most powerful neighbor” to whom he 
appealed in his letter to Roosevelt provided the “decision of the Isthmian Canal question” that 
the Liberal general solicited. It was not the answer he had been hoping to receive. The “valiant 
deeds of your soldiers” that Uribe envisioned when he wrote to the U.S. president won Colombia 
peace—at the cost of its territorial integrity.74 With American backing, Panamá seceded from 
Colombia in 1903. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE GENERALS 
 
“En Colombia, que es la tierra 
de las cosas singulares, 
dan la paz los militares 
y los civiles la guerra.” 
— Unknown, quoted in Víctor M. Salazar, Memorias de la guerra (1899-1902)75 
 
The Thousand Days’ War was hugely consequential in Colombian history. It purportedly 
killed 100,000 people in a country of four million (an exaggeration, but the real death toll 
remains unknown) and culminated in the secession of Colombia’s department of Panamá in 
1903.76 The collective trauma of the war, combined with the indignity of American 
interventionism and the secession of Panamá, did much to unify Colombians who “perceived 
[the loss of Panamá] as ‘theft’ (by the United States) or as ‘betrayal’ (by the Panamanians).”77 
But three years of war preceded this reconciliation, and from the beginning, it was the generals 
who urged their political coreligionists to fight. 
What did honor look like for the Liberal and Conservative generals in the Thousand 
Days’ War? What kinds of resources did they have at their disposal to defend it? How successful 
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were they in marshalling that honor so that they stood out against both their political opponents 
and their social subordinates? And what did justice look like for the very instigators of the 
violence that started the war in the first place? The answers to these questions largely lie in the 
source base the generals left behind: the pamphlets that they published during the war, and the 
memoirs that they published after. Both source types are full of finger-pointing, name-calling, 
and general vitriol that at once complicated the authenticity of their claims but also made clear 
what the generals had at stake in putting out such publications—their honor. In these works, the 
generals strove to clear their names of any black marks from military defeats and tried to pin the 
blame on their rivals. But they also corralled testimony from political allies and subordinates to 
give additional credibility to their claims. 
This practice was possible because the generals, both Liberal and Conservative, drew 
from a pool of resources that were largely unavailable to the soldiers. The generals tended to 
come from the upper class, and as a result were literate, educated, and had experience as lawyers, 
senators, journalists, businessmen, and other occupations that reflected the overall disparity of 
access to opportunity in late nineteenth-century Colombia. It was in these positions that the 
generals of the Thousand Days’ War exercised power in a Colombia based in “relatively self-
sufficient rural communities” where, “from the wealthiest to the most miserable, one’s place 
depended on blood ties, wealth, and education.”78 Stern argues that “[m]en constructed their 
sense of masculinity on a field of power relations,” and so too did the generals construct their 
honor in relation to power.79 Stern posits that there exist three levels of such social relations: 
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“vertical, horizontal, [or] familial dimensions.”80 Vertical social relations play out between 
different class and power groups (such as between soldiers and their commanders), horizontal 
social relations play out within a class or power group (such as between two soldiers of similar 
rank, though not necessarily of the same faction), and familial social relations blur the lines 
between vertical and horizontal relations between relatives or members of a kin group. All three 
levels of interpersonal relations showcase the importance of honor for Colombians in the 
Thousand Days’ War, and influence what justice could look like as a consequence. 
Gentlemen Generals: Class, Race, and Questions of Life and Death 
For the generals, honor was predicated substantially on “a diffuse cultural claim to 
superior masculinity,” one that “defined poor men [as well as nonwhite men] as inferior men.”81 
Consider the fates suffered by Estanislao Henao—a Conservative Colombian general—and 
Victoriano Lorenzo—a Liberal, Indigenous Panamanian guerrilla leader. When Liberal forces 
commanded by General Lucas Caballero Barrera captured Henao in Panamá in 1902, Henao 
feared that the Liberal soldiers would torture him. He fell to his knees and begged Caballero: 
“Kill me yourself so that the soldiers of your army do not murder me, in who knows what way.” 
Caballero responded curtly. “I do not have the authority to do that, and mine is not an army of 
murderers. You will remain prisoner, with your personhood inviolable, such that you will be 
judged . . . with all the guarantees of a perfect defense.”82  
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Lorenzo, also taken prisoner in Panamá in 1902, though by the Conservatives, received 
no such mercy upon his capture. He did not beg for mercy like Henao, but instead escaped while 
his captors dined “with a distinguished family from the city” for Christmas dinner.83 Recaptured 
the next day, he would be executed by a firing squad in 1903, an act justified by Conservative 
general Víctor M. Salazar, who quoted Minister of War Alfredo Vásquez Cobo’s claim that 
“[s]ince Victoriano had not taken up the peace agreement, and, instead, ignored it, having been 
captured with weapon in hand, the government lawyers deemed him without right to enjoy the 
guarantees stipulated in the peace agreement. . . . The unfortunate Lorenzo, victim of primitive 
passions that he could not control, was swept away to the criminal commission by the storm of 
war.”84  
What was the difference between Estanislao Henao and Victoriano Lorenzo? At least in 
the case of upper-class, urbane commanders (the generals who fought in the so-called 
Gentlemen’s War phase), respectable behavior and fair treatment was the expectation between 
members of the same class. As Stern puts it: “Elite etiquette contrasted the presumed moderation 
and dignity of the well-bred and the well-mannered with the crude excesses of the poor and 
barbaric.”85 In the case of Colombia in the Thousand Days’ War, Villegas and Yunis speak more 
explicitly still to “chivalry above, cruelty below,” a code or a “pact, tacit or explicit, between the 
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landowner-generals [that was] the norm” but to which the common soldiers were not privy.86 It 
would have been dishonorable for Caballero to kill Henao, because it would have violated the 
unspoken rules of the upper classes—politeness, self-control, introspection, what Stern calls a 
common cultural conception of “social decorum” and “strength of will.”87 To violate them 
threatened to upend the delicate balance of this order between “bonding and enmity, challenge 
and response, honor and humiliation.”88 This might explain why Caballero responded so sternly 
to Henao’s terrified pleas for mercy, emphasizing that his was “not an army of murderers.” 
Henao might have insulted Caballero’s honor by presuming that his captor would treat him 
dishonorably, but Caballero remedied the offense easily enough simply by proving Henao 
wrong.  
He placed his captive “under the care of an officer and an escort of utmost honorabilidad 
y confianza.”89 These terms can be translated as “integrity” and “confidence,” but could also 
mean “trustworthiness.” The ambiguities in an English translation of the words honorabilidad y 
confianza belie the multifaceted potential inherent in its Spanish meaning. Caballero’s 
association of honor with trustworthiness or confidence gestured toward the strong class 
implications of dealing with a fellow general as a prisoner of war. Furthermore, Caballero’s 
generosity, steeped in class consciousness as it was, nevertheless was an act that subordinated 
Henao in a profoundly humiliating way. Robinson notes that “in order to show mercy, one first 
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has to have somebody at one’s own mercy.”90 Most of the time, however, it was not this easy to 
bring justice for wounded or threatened honor. 
Lorenzo, on the other hand, was a poor Indigenous man who took up arms and dared to 
call himself a general alongside the literate and wealthy. Marc Becker argues that it was 
Lorenzo’s “sense of solidarity with the concerns of rural Indigenous communities” that drove his 
participation in the Thousand Days’ War on the rebel Liberal side, “in an attempt to advance the 
interests of marginalized communities.”91 Not only was he fighting for a cause alien to either of 
the warring factions based in Bogotá, but also his wartime cause directly threatened the 
“gendered ranking among men within a vastly unequal and polarized color-class order.”92 For the 
Liberal generals, it might have been distasteful but tolerable to collaborate with an Indigenous 
rebel; for the Conservative generals, it was an affront to have to treat him as an equal. Vásquez’s 
racialized language is telling: he described Lorenzo as the “victim of primitive passions that he 
could not control,” subject to the dishonorable excesses of emotion and violence that go against 
elite etiquette. Therefore, unlike with Caballero and Henao, it was not dishonorable for the 
Conservative generals to kill Lorenzo. 
The Conservative generals rejected Lorenzo’s claims to generalship and all the privileges 
it entailed by denying his status not only as a commander, but also as a legal combatant. Stern 
notes that “the superior honor and reputation conferred on men of high rank implied a certain 
shielding from criminal prosecution for rape or other violence charged by degraded subaltern 
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accusers.”93 The Liberal Max Grillo employed such logic when he defended the Conservative 
general Ramón González Valencia in his memoir, Emociones de la guerra, writing that “his 
culture and his valor shielded him against this charge [of killing Liberal prisoners].”94  Valor can 
mean several things in Spanish: bravery and courage—the English meaning of “valor”—but also 
value or validity. González’s valor was what protected him from accusations against atrocities, 
pointing at once to traditional notions of battlefield heroism and to a particular inherent 
legitimacy of action. Honor and class were therefore often intimately linked. 
When the roles were reversed, however, those with high rank used criminal prosecution 
as a way to emphasize the absence of honor, reputation, and legitimacy that would otherwise 
protect the accused. The legalese that condemned Lorenzo came from Articles 4 and 6 of Decree 
No. 933 of 1902 (issued on June 12 of that year), which stipulated certain conditions by which 
Liberal rebels could surrender and receive a pardon: 
  
“Article 4: Those who have figured as leaders or officers of revolutionary forces and 
accept the pardon, will be able to return honorably, as in similar cases they have been 
allowed to do so by the heads of government forces to whom they have laid down their 
arms. 
. . . 
Article 6: Exempt from the pardon are those responsible for common crimes, the 
ringleaders of expeditions organized in foreign countries to invade Colombian territory, 
and those individuals who have been judged and condemned by court martial for having 
taken part in said expeditions.”95 
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Vásquez Cobo’s claim that Lorenzo had “ignored” the peace agreement may have had 
some basis in the attempted escape, but any justification for Lorenzo’s execution could only have 
been based on branding him a criminal, as per article 6—in other words, no real justification at 
all. The only way that Lorenzo could have been disqualified would be if his actions constituted 
“common crimes,” a subjective and vague terminology. At any rate, the Conservative generals 
had significant freedom of interpretation in carrying out these orders. In fact, they had the right 
to ignore them if they wanted to. In November 1902, Minister of War José Joaquín Casas 
telegrammed Conservative general Juan B. Tovar, ordering him to “immediately have [Rafael] 
Uribe Uribe judged by a verbal court martial” and to have the sentence carried out immediately, 
“without any contemplation.”96 Tovar flatly refused. “I have earned the sword that I carry at my 
belt fighting loyally on the battlefield. I prefer to break it over my knee before staining it with 
blood wrongly spilled and debasing it with the violation of the word I have committed in the 
name of the government,” was his terse reply to Casas.97 Uribe would not be condemned and 
returned to the senate after the war. 
The fact that Lorenzo was executed, therefore, went beyond the question of his purported 
violation of the spirit of a peace treaty’s terms of surrender. The Conservative generals chose to 
treat him—an Indigenous Panamanian—as a common criminal even as they treated the Liberal 
Uribe—a white Colombian—like a fellow general. In fact, they went so far as to deny Lorenzo’s 
very humanity. Gray notes that “one opportunity the front-line soldier has to know the enemy as 
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a human being is when he takes prisoners, and this is frequently a crucial experience for soldiers. 
The prisoner of war reveals to his opponent that he, too, cherishes life and that he has at least a 
minimal trust in your humanity, otherwise he would not be surrendering.”98 Lorenzo 
demonstrated his lack of trust in the humanity of the generals when he tried to escape—he had 
not surrendered like Henao. And, unfortunately, his distrustfulness was grounded in reality, as 
the generals would prove with Lorenzo’s execution. 
The generals protected one another because they recognized the honor common to their 
rank and social status. It was something that needed to be jealously guarded from claimants who 
they perceived as their social inferiors. Justice, in this case, meant fidelity to class identity and 
privilege that transformed the legal system into a weapon of the wealthy and powerful. It helps 
explain to what Gray referred when he wrote of his experiences in World War II some forty 
years later, where “love and hatred, tenderness and brutality, succeed each other in many a 
person within moments.”99 Examining their opponents, and one another, through a class-based 
(and therefore racially distorted) lens, the generals could pivot between magnanimity and 
pitilessness without seeming contradiction. As a consequence, not everybody had a place at the 
table in negotiating the generals’ vision of postwar justice. Lorenzo the Indigenous, criminalized 
outlaw, was killed. Henao and Uribe the generals were spared.100 
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asesinados, sin fórmula de juicio” (González, “De la guerra regular de los «generales-caballeros»,” in Memoria de 





Honor and the Army: The Generals’ Expectations for their Soldiers 
During the first Liberal campaign against Panamá, in July 1900, Salazar fought against 
the rebels alongside the Colombian governor of the department of Panamá, Carlos Albán. The 
Liberals had gained significant momentum and threatened to seize Panamá City itself. The 
Conservative forces checked their advance at the Battle of Calidonia, fought between July 24 and 
July 26.101 In his after-action report on the battle, written the next day, Salazar claimed that he 
had counseled Albán: “I consider that the surrender of the plaza [of Panamá City], in these 
conditions, or in any others, would be the protocolization of our dishonor. . . . Let us make an 
effort, let us fight and let us perish if it comes to it, but let us save, above all else, the honor of 
the National Army.”102 Indeed, Salazar’s account indicated that honor was just as much at stake 
in the fighting as was control over the department of Panamá. Though the Conservatives had 
defended their honor in battle that day, Salazar went on to officially single out a colonel who had 
behaved shamefully. “Going down the line of battle, I was very satisfied, finding all the 
commanders, officers, and soldiers of the units that fought there carrying out their duties, with 
the exception of the commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Isthmus, colonel Jesús Parada 
Leal, who abandoned the force that he commanded upon the first shots being fired, such that 
even now his whereabouts are unknown.”103 
 
101 de la Pedraja, Wars of Latin America, 17-18. 
 
102 Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 57. Original Spanish: “Considero que la entrega de la plaza, en esas condiciones, 
o en cualesquiera otras, sería la protocolización de nuestra deshonra. . . . Hagamos un esfuerzo, luchemos y 
perezcamos si llega el caso, pero salvemos, ante todo, el honor del Ejército Nacional.” 
 
103 Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 58-59. Original Spanish: “Al recorrer la línea de batalla, me fue muy 
satisfactorio encontrar cumpliendo su deber a todos los jefes, oficiales y soldados de los cuerpos que allí combatían, 
con excepción del comandante del batallón 1º de infantería del Istmo, coronel Jesús Parada Leal, quien a los 






In his report, Salazar made clear that Colonel Parada’s dishonorable desertion did not 
stain the honor of that battalion. “Fortunately, the second-in-command was there, the valiant 
sergeant major Antonio Holguín, who fought well at the front of his soldiers, who still cry today, 
since after an hour of combat, he fell wounded by a bullet that produced his death some hours 
later.”104 Holguín’s sacrifice atoned for Parada’s desertion (the report did not make clear if 
Parada was ever brought back into the Conservative army’s custody). Salazar’s report was the 
only recourse the general had to punish Parada, still missing and unable to be held accountable 
for his actions the next day. But the message was clear: dishonorable behavior will be catalogued 
and compartmentalized to push that shame onto the individual perpetrator. An honorable 
sacrifice, in contrast, elevated not only the individual, but also the collective—Holguín’s troops 
honored him with their grief.  
Salazar tended to mention subordinates by name in his reports to call them out for 
dishonorable behavior, or to highlight their honorable sacrifice. In a report to Pedro Nel Ospina, 
the Conservative commander of operations on the Atlantic coast, Salazar cited information 
passed along by fellow general Carlos E. Restrepo: “I cannot but mention . . . the death of 
colonel Sebastián Mejía, V., who sacrificed there, for his ideas, his youth, his talent, and his 
family; and the death of captain Carlos E. Gómez, who offered his adolescence and his brilliant 
future, throwing himself in a bold way against an entrenched enemy that was, in those moments, 
ten times superior in number.”105  
 
104 Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 59. Original Spanish: “Aforunadamente, allí estaba el 2º jefe, valeroso sargento 
mayor Antonio Holguín, quien luchaba como bueno al frente de sus soldados y a quien éstos lloran todavía, pues 
pasada una hora de combate cayó herido por una bala que le produjo la muerte algunas horas más tarde.” 
 
105 Carlos E. Restrepo, quoted in Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 106. Original Spanish: “no puedo menos que 
mencionar . . . la muerte del coronel Sebastián Mejía V., quien sacrificó allí, por sus ideas, su juventud, su talento y 
su familia; y la del capitán Carlos E. Gómez, quien ofrendó su adolescencia y su brillante porvenir, arrojándose de 





Salazar was not alone in this preoccupation with the honorable behavior of subordinates. 
Laureano García R., a Conservative general who fought at the Battle of Peralonso, published in 
1900 a pamphlet about his experiences there. His adjutant Captain Antonio J. Gómez was fatally 
wounded by an enemy bullet on the battlefield, and Gómez had time to shout, “Long live the 
Great Conservative Party!” before he died “with calm spirits.”106 García extolled his fallen 
captain: “Happy is he who ends his life soaked in his own blood, fulfilling the sacred oath he 
took to defend a glorious flag, offering everything he has to his cause.”107 What did Gómez’s 
death, and the deaths of García’s other fallen soldiers, accomplish in the face of the ultimate 
Liberal victory at Peralonso? The general suggested that more important than the outcome of the 
battle was the preservation of their honor. Even though “more than 150 of my comrades lay 
stretched out on the battlefield,” García argued that “[w]e also had that which is left to the 
vanquished . . . after losing everything: honor.”108 Those who died “[f]ell gloriously, soaked in 
blood, but not before the revolutionary monster trembled.”109 He suggested that the legacy of the 
fallen at Peralonso was not to be the Conservative defeat, but rather the momentary fear they 
purportedly inspired in the enemy. 
 
106 Laureano García R., Combate de Peralonso (Medellín: Tipografía Mercantil, 1900), 6. Original Spanish: “Viva el 
Gran Partido Conservador,” “con ánimo sereno.”  
 
107 García, Combate de Peralonso, 6. Original Spanish: “Feliz el que termina su vida empapada en su propia sangre, 
cumpliendo el sagrado juramento que hizo de defender una bandera gloriosa, ofrendándole á su causa todo cuanto 
tiene.” 
 
108 García, Combate de Peralonso, 10. Original Spanish: “más de 150 de mis compañeros están tendidos en el 
campo,” “Nos quedaba también aquello que le quedó al vencido . . . después de perderlo todo: el honor.” 
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A Conservative colonel, Julio T. Castillo, echoed such sentiments in his account of the 
Battle of Palonegro, published in June 1900—a mere one month after the battle took place. He 
lamented “such noble blood that was spilled there!” The list of the heroic fallen included: 
 
Jiménez Lopez, the fierce and modest Commander of the Holguín [Battalion], fell pierced 
in the chest by a bullet; Juan Hipólito Alvarado and Alberto Toscano Canal, heroic boys, 
surrendered their lives, admiring [sic] with their valor and daring; Daniel Ortiz receives 
two bullets and continues fighting like a lion; Juan N. Lozano and Ismael Mejia die upon 
taking a flag; Villaveces and Defrancisco stay out of combat, and nonetheless they have 
to be restrained to prevent them from launching themselves once more into the 
battlefield; Rafael Galvis, enthusiastic and noble defender of our flag, in spite of having 
lost a leg naturally, enters with daring, and a bullet makes splinters of his invalid leg; 
General Ángel Córdoba, most prestigious son of Cauca, attacks with uncontainable drive, 
and a bullet scores his cheek; Luis Triana, a boy like Toscano and Alvarado, dies at the 
feet of his father, commander of the Canal [Battalion]; Piamba, Elvira, and Jordán, 
veteran Colonels and persistent in the fight, fall too, when they charge at the head of their 
valiant legionnaires, swords bare and with bravery that gives conviction, and besides 
these, that I remember at this moment, dozens and even hundreds of our fierce youths, 
pride of a generation, surrendered their lives in the dark undergrowth where they made 
the enemy flee, without exhaling a complaint, without releasing a moan, and dying 
satisfied in the knowledge that victory will crown our efforts.110 
 
 
The expectations were obvious: dying an honorable death was a clear way to safeguard the honor 
of those who survive. For the defeated Conservatives at Peralonso, their fallen comrades 
softened the blow of defeat through the memory of their bravery. For the victorious 
 
110 Julio T. Castillo, Palonegro: Narración de un soldado (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1900), 22-24. Original 
Spanish: “¡cuánta sangre noble fue allí derramada! Jiménez Lopez, el bravo y modesto Jefe del Holguín, cayó 
atravesado el pecho de un balazo; Juan Hipólito Alvarado y Alberto Toscano Canal, niños héroes, rindieron sus 
vidas, admirando con su valor y arrojo; Daniel Ortiz recibe dos balazos y sigue peleando como un león; Juan N. 
Lozano é Ismael Mejia mueren al tomar una bandera; Villaveces y Defrancisco quedan fuera de combate, y sin 
embargo hay que sujetarlos para impedirles se lancen nuevamente al campamento; Rafael Galvis, el entusiasta y 
noble defensor de nuestra bandera, á pesar de tener perdida una pierna naturalmente, entra con arrojo, y una bala le 
hace astillas la pierna ya inválida; el General Ángel Córdoba, prestigiosísimo hijo del Cauca, acomete con empuje 
incontenible, y una bala le surca la mejilla; Luis Triana, niño como Toscano y Alvarado, muere al pie de su padre, 
Jefe del Canal; Piamba, Elvira y Jordán, Coroneles augerridos y pertinaces en la lucha, caen también, cuando 
desnudas las espada y con el brío que da la convicción, embujan á la cabeza de sus valientes legionarios, y además 
de éstos, que por el momento recuerdo, decenas y aun centenas de nuestros bravos jóvenes, orgullo de una 
generación, rindieron sus vidas en las oscuras malezas de donde hacían huir al enemigo, sin exhalar una queja, sin 





Conservatives at Palonegro, their fallen comrades consecrated the sacrifice that made victory 
possible. “Societies honor not only the living, but also those who have died in a war,” explains 
Robinson. “Because the dead made the ultimate sacrifice, they acquire a hallowed status. From a 
practical point of view, it is also good for the morale of the living soldiers to know that they will 
be thought of with respect once their lives are over.”111 
The generals certainly demonstrated their concurrence with Robinson’s claim that 
honoring the dead was beneficial for the morale of the survivors. But these lofty appeals to an 
army’s honor did not guarantee that the soldiers, confronted with pain and death on the 
battlefield, were primarily concerned with the honor of their generals and the honor of their 
armies. It fell on the generals to decide how to deal with those who threatened to bring dishonor 
upon their forces through noncompliance. Caballero stepped in to intervene when he felt that his 
superior, Benjamín Herrera, was unfairly punishing a Liberal battalion accused of desertion 
during a march to battle. “General, what are you going to do with these men?” Caballero asked. 
Herrera responded, “Punish them, because they’re miserable deserters in the face of the enemy.” 
Caballero was horrified: “But, by God, that’s an act of cruelty with commanders and officers. . . . 
Those men can purge their shame in some other form. I promise you, and I’m the guarantor that 
they’ll behave like men in the next battle.” Herrera relented: “Fine, with that guarantee, do what 
you like.”112  
Caballero did not let the accused deserters off the hook—he wrote in his memoirs that “I 
rebuked the culprits, before the army, for despicable cowardice, but I told them that I had 
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112 Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 112-113. Original Spanish: “—General, ¿qué va a hacer con 
esos hombres? —A castigarlos, porque son miserables desertores a presencia del enemigo. —Pero por Dios, eso es 
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obtained a postponement of their punishment from the commander, so long as they behaved in 
the battle to which we approached. In that battle, those men fought like lions.”113 The fact that 
the deserters were chastised before the entire army, and had their reputations (as well as their 
masculinity) put on the line in an upcoming battle where all eyes would be on them, seemed to 
have spurred them to behave honorably—at least, according to Caballero’s account. Their 
stained honor was recovered. 
Public challenges to honor, like Caballero’s chastisement of the deserters before the 
whole army, tended to be particularly effective. García explained how he encouraged his 
Conservative troops to attack the enemy during the Battle of Peralonso: “To stimulate the 
soldiers to advance quickly, we threw the blemish of cowards on those who did not [hurry.] . . . 
Their self-esteem wounded, everyone accelerated the march, even though they were weighed 
down by sleep, exhaustion, and hunger, sufficient enemies to defeat an Army.”114 Later on, when 
the Liberals pressured the Conservative line, García noted with pride that his battalion “has 
sworn to triumph or die in the position it defends, and will not abandon it like cowards while it 
has a cartridge to fire against the enemy.”115 García, like Caballero, called his soldiers’ honor 
into question and made clear that their performance on the battlefield was a way to prove him 
wrong. Liberal and Conservative generals alike employed such tactics as a way to urge their 
troops into battle and as a way to coax out daring performances in combat. The soldiers could 
 
113 Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 113. Original Spanish: “les increpé a los culpables, antes el 
ejército, una cobardía que era infame, pero les dije que había obtenido del jefe el aplazamiento del castigo, según se 
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114 García, Combate de Peralonso, 4. Original Spanish: “Para estimulará los soldados á andar aprisa, les echábamos 
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restore their own honor in this way—but they would also enhance the honor of their units and 
their commanders. 
Battlefield Leaders: The Generals’ Expectations for One Another 
On October 5, 1902, over two hundred Liberal officers signed their names to a protest 
against Conservative Minister of War Aristides Fernández, alleging that he was responsible for 
“a system of war” that encouraged “murder at close range and in cold blood,” one that should 
“be equally disgusting to the honest people of the country, without distinction between Liberals 
and Conservatives.”116 The signatories—among them generals like Lucas Caballero and 
Victoriano Lorenzo—declared that, in contrast to the dishonorable conduct encouraged by the 
Conservative Fernández, “Colombia’s honor is our life; for it, we would offer our lives without 
hesitation.”117 Fernández’s Fatal Decree was seen as an outrageous abrogation of justice by the 
Liberals vulnerable to its employment. The civilian minister of war’s dishonorable decree stood 
in stark contrast to the generals’ behavior on the battlefield. Their recollections of combat in their 
memoirs and pamphlets demonstrated the idealized fervor to which an honorable general should 
personally strive. And, like the Liberal protest forcefully declared, a lot of their battlefield 
behavior required a disdain for danger—indeed, a disdain for death and defeat alike—in order to 
safeguard one’s honor.  
Consider Grillo’s account of Uribe’s charge at the Battle of Peralonso—the stuff of 
legend that would elevate Uribe to hero status among the rebel ranks. During this action, Uribe 
crossed La Laja Bridge over the Peralonso River under heavy fire and broke the Conservative 
 
116 Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 174. Original Spanish: “el sistema de guerra seguido por 
Fernández, que hace del asesinato a mansalva y a sangre fría,” “un sistema que repugna por igual a las gentes 
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defenses. It cemented his reputation as a daring and bold leader, and according to Grillo, this act 
was partially to atone for an earlier defeat suffered at Bucaramanga. Grillo quoted Uribe’s call to 
arms during the battle: “I will rid myself of all guilt in the disaster of Bucaramanga, this time 
neither do I want to, nor can I shirk responsibility; and I am not inclined to tolerate the reputation 
of a defeated general and of a bad omen. Consequently, I announce that I am going to cross the 
bridge, at the head of those who want to accompany me. That way, at least, if this always ends 
badly, the revolution will fall with honor, and nobody will have the right to mock the Liberal 
Party.”118 When the first volunteer stood up, “the mulatto Saúl Zuleta, sergeant of the Villar 
Battalion,” Uribe announced to the army: “Soldiers: this is sergeant Saúl Zuleta, who will cross 
the bridge in hand with me. For his feat, I bump him up to captain, whether he lives or dies.”119 
Grillo named the other individuals who followed Zuleta’s example—Neftalí Larreamendi, Carlos 
Ordóñez Jaramillo, Guillermo Páramo, Miguel de la Roche, Arturo Carreño, Alejandro Navas, 
Samuel Pérez, Dionisio Uribe, Carlos Reyes, and Joaquín Vanegas.120 
Grillo credited Uribe and his eleven followers with turning the tide of the Battle of 
Peralonso. Uribe rose to the occasion and declared his intention to charge, whether he succeeded 
or failed, in order to clear his good name from the defeat of Bucaramanga and safeguard the 
Liberal cause from shame and mockery. And, in this instance, he was victorious. But his words 
suggested that his honor was not contingent on the success of his actions—the fact that he was 
 
118 Uribe, quoted in Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 165. Original Spanish: “me libraré de toda culpa en el 
descalabro de Bucaramanga, esta vez ni quiero, ni puedo rehuir la responsabilidad; y lo que es la reputación de 
general derrotado y de mal augurio, no estoy dispuesto a soportarla. Así, a lo menos, si siempre ha de acabar esto 
mal, la revolución caerá con honor, y nadie tendrá derecho a mofarse del partido liberal.” 
 
119 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 168. Original Spanish: “el mulato Saúl Zuleta, sargento del Batallón Villar,” 
“Soldados: este es el sargento Saúl Zuleta, que va a pasar el puente de la mano conmigo. Por su hazaña, lo asciendo 
de un golpe a capitán, quede vivo o quede muerto.” 
 





willing to risk life and limb to restore his honor was enough. The Liberal party’s reputation 
would receive the justice it deserved in the event of Uribe’s death in battle. The Liberal Grillo 
was not the only observer to credit Uribe with such an honorable disposition. Salazar, in his 
memoirs, cited a newspaper article that included a postwar conversation between Uribe and the 
former Conservative Minister of Government Rafael María Palacio. Uribe lamented, “I very 
much regret . . . that the telegram in which you ordered my imprisonment [on the eve of the 
outbreak of war in 1899] arrived in Tunja two hours after I had left said city. Incarcerated, I 
would have been able to avoid going to war against my will, before the agreed time.” (The 
rebellion began a few days earlier than Uribe had agreed with other Liberal leaders.) Palacio 
answered, “That being the case . . . why did you go to Santander [the department where the 
rebellion started]?” Uribe’s response was telling: “Because if I had not gone, I would have been 
branded a coward, disloyal, and a traitor. So I preferred to risk my life, before receiving such 
injuries.”121 Evidently, shame was a powerful motivator for the generals as well as for the 
soldiers, like those rebuked by García at Peralonso. 
Uribe was not the only general with this mindset. For others, the importance of 
maintaining one’s honor similarly drove them to behave in ways that risked their own personal 
safety, as a way to atone for battlefield defeat or some other cause for a sullied reputation. 
Caballero wrote about Gabriel Vargas Santos, the Liberal general named Supreme Director of 
the War by the rebel forces, and his reaction in the aftermath of the crushing Liberal defeat at the 
Battle of Palonegro. “I have always had the idea that on that day, the supreme commander 
 
121 Luis Trigueros, quoted in Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 351. Original Spanish: “—Mucho deploré . . . que el 
telegrama en que usted ordenaba que se me encarcelara, hubise [sic] llegado a Tunja dos horas después de haber 
salido yo de esa ciudad. Preso, me habría evitado ir a una guerra contra mi voluntad y antes del tiempo convenido. 
—Siendo así . . . ¿por qué fue usted a Santander? —Porque si no hubiera ido se me habría tachado de cobarde, 





[Vargas] overflowed with such mortification for such tragic and unfortunate events that he 
desired to have his life taken,” wrote Caballero, “such that in the middle of a rain of bullets he 
opened a white umbrella that sheltered him from the sun’s rays in less risky marches, and he 
neither answered me nor listened to me when I anxiously told him: ‘By God, General, close that 
umbrella that presents such a striking target for the enemy shooters.’”122 Caballero suspected that 
Vargas welcomed the enemy bullets, since at least he would receive an honorable death in 
combat. Vargas would not be struck down, however; the glorious death he sought was not to be 
found, and he would later be saddled with much of the blame for the Liberal defeats. 
For other generals, it was not their honor during battle or during a campaign that was in 
danger of being injured, but rather their honor in the aftermath of a military action. Conservative 
General Habacuc Beltrán experienced this after he withdrew his forces from the town of 
Quetame, southeast of Bogotá, in the face of a Liberal force that advanced on his position in 
January 1902. In February, he published a pamphlet, Abandono de Quetame, in which he laid out 
a defense against accusations surrounding his withdrawal designed to “wound my political and 
military reputation,” a defense based on “my post, as soldier of the Conservative Cause, [which] 
has always, during the wars, since I had the skill to manage a rifle, been on the battlefields and 
not in the capital of the Republic.”123 Of primary importance to Beltrán was to clear up the 
circumstances surrounding his retreat from Quetame, which he insisted was to preserve the 
 
122 Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 51. Original Spanish: “He tenido para mí siempre la idea de 
que en ese día rebosaban en el jefe supremo tantas mortificaciones por sucesos tan trágicos y desgraciados, que 
debió desear él que le quitaran la vida, pues en medio de una lluvia de balas abrió el paraguas blanco con que se 
resguardaba de los rayos del sol en marchas no arriesgadas, y no me respondió ni me hizo caso cuando con angustia 
le dije: ‘Por Dios, general, cierre ese paraguas que presenta un blanco tan llamativo a los tiradores enemigos.’” 
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integrity of a force that would have otherwise been overwhelmed by the Liberals. “Quetame was 
something quite different from a disaster or a cowardly event, since I honorably declare that if I 
did not believe myself capable of defeating my nervous impulses, I would try to serve my Party 
in any way, but not as a soldier,” he wrote.124 
How did Beltrán use this pamphlet to defend his threatened honor? He solicited character 
testimonies from his subordinates and fellow generals, asking them to inform his readers if they 
had ever witnessed anything amounting to cowardice or shameful behavior during his operations 
near Quetame. Beltrán copied and published responses from nine colleagues who replied. Some 
witnesses wrote about Beltrán’s professionalism and loyalty to the cause. Lieutenant Colonel 
Pedro Díaz testified that, at first, Beltrán had not wanted to retreat from the town, but instead 
“openly declared to us his unyielding resolution to hold the plaza until he died alongside 
everyone in it,” and that once the withdrawal was underway, “I saw General Beltrán, all night, 
busied with readying, loading, and dispatching charges of munitions and with hiding those that 
were materially impossible to take with us, so that the enemy could not take them.” 
Consequently, Díaz argued that the withdrawal “should be counted among the honorable retreats 
and not among the shameful defeats.”125 Sergeant Major Ricardo Martínez S. testified that 
“nothing that is cowardice, and much less disinterest in the Cause, should be imputed to him,” 
 
124 Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 4. Original Spanish: “lo de Quetame fue algo muy distinto de un desastre ó de un 
certamen de cobardía, pues honradamente declaro que si no me creyera capaz de vencer los impulsos nerviosos, 
procuraría servir á mi Partido de cualquiera manera, pero no como militar.” 
 
125 Pedro Díaz, quoted in Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 11. Original Spanish: “el General Beltrán nos declaró 
abiertamente su resolución incontrastable de conservar la plaza hasta morir con todos en ella,” “vi toda la noche al 
General Beltrán ocupado en aparejar, cargar y despachar cargas de parque y en ocultar aquel que fue materialmente 






and that in fact, Martínez himself “remained mute, admiring the impressive man, full of valor 
and without fear of death” as he watched Beltrán conduct himself during the withdrawal.126 
Other witnesses spoke about Beltrán’s disregard for danger. Sergeant Major Lázaro M. 
Gaviria C. testified that “[t]here was a moment in which the rain of bullets that fell near the 
General, in company with the undersigned, was so strong, that I had to tell him: ‘My General, 
pull back or duck, because they will kill you’; to which he answered me, laughing, ‘Don’t worry 
about it, Gaviria.’”127 Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Sánchez H. testified that “General Beltrán 
didn’t only travel up and down the line of battle, with that fearlessness of a good Commander, 
but also aroused bravery and liveliness.”128 That martial spirit to which Beltrán’s witnesses 
testified—an inspiring presence, disdain for danger and a professed desire for death before a 
dishonorable defeat—was suggestive of the attitudes expressed by his Liberal counterparts in 
generals like Uribe or Vargas. 
For Beltrán, at least, this appeal to his honor was not merely an appeal to his vanity or a 
self-interested project to protect his image. A verbal court-martial (Consejo de Guerra Verbal de 
Oficiales Generales) was organized, headed by five generals, to judge Beltrán “for the crime of 
cowardice consistent with the abandonment of the plaza of Quetame this past fourth of 
 
126 Ricardo Martínez S., quoted in Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 13-14. Original Spanish: “no debe imputársele 
nada que sea cobardía, ni mucho menos desinterés por la Causa,” “yo permanecía mudo, admirando al hombre 
imponente, lleno de valor y sin temor á la muerte.” 
 
127 Lázaro M. Gaviria C., quoted in Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 19. Original Spanish: “Hubo un momento en 
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decirle: ‘Mi General, retírese ó agáchese, porque lo matan’; á lo cual me contestó riéndose: ‘No hay cuidado, 
Gaviria.’” 
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January.”129 The success or failure of the restoration of his honor therefore had very real 
consequences. Fortunately for Beltrán, the court-martial judged that “the declarations of a plural 
number of witnesses . . . cover him from all suspicion,” and consequently the generals, who, 
“administrating justice in the name of the Republic and by authority of the Law, absolve[d] Mr. 
General Habacuc Beltrán of the crime of cowardice that has been attributed to him for the 
abandonment of the plaza of Quetame on the fourth of last month.”130 For Beltrán, his pamphlet 
Abandono de Quetame was a thorough repudiation of the allegations cast against his honor—
after all, even before a military tribunal, such charges were dropped against him. His honor, and 
his professionalism as a general, remained intact. 
What happened if a general had no wealth of witnesses to call upon, yet his honor was 
still called into question? This was the dilemma that faced Liberal general Carlos A. Muñoz, who 
was the commander of rebel guerrilla forces, the so-called “Revolutionary Army of Northeastern 
Cundinamarca” (Ejército Revolucionario del Noroeste de Cundinamarca). A running feud with a 
local Liberal caudillo meant that his Liberal rivals “took to the task of staining my honor as a 
Liberal, while I made an effort to defeat the political enemy [the Conservatives] on the 
battlefield.”131 The feud started when Muñoz heard that the Liberal caudillo, Melquíades Jiménez 
(nicknamed “Quasimodo,” a pejorative to which Muñoz made repeated reference) was calling 
 
129 Consejo de Guerra Verbal de Oficiales Generales, quoted in Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 38. Original 
Spanish: “por el delito de cobardía consistente en haber abandonado la plaza de Quetame el día 4 de Enero último.” 
 
130 Consejo de Guerra Verbal de Oficiales Generales, quoted in Beltrán, Abandono de Quetame, 39-40. Original 
Spanish: “las declaraciones de un número plural de testigos . . . lo ponen á cubierto de toda sospecha,” 
“administrando justicia en nombre de la República y por autoridad de la Ley, absuelve al Sr. General Habacuc 
Beltrán del delito de cobardía que se le ha atribuído [sic] por el abandono de la plaza de Quetame el día 4 del mes 
próximo pasado.” 
 
131 Carlos A. Muñoz, Por el honor liberal: al señor General D. Rafael Uribe Uribe (Bogotá: Imprenta de la Crónica, 
1903), 3. Original Spanish: “se dieron á la tarea de manchar mi honor de liberal, en tanto que yo me esforzaba por 





him and his troops “thieves” (“ladrones”) after he had plundered six mules from a Conservative 
local in La Palma. Incensed, Muñoz issued a countermarch and returned to the town, where he 
berated Jiménez, informing him that “it was a grave mistake that he committed, for someone 
who called himself a Liberal, to call his own party members thieves, in the middle of the war, for 
the simple act of having taken six mules from a Conservative, out of the sixty that he had, to put 
them, as in effect they were, at the service of the Revolution.”132  
Jiménez’s crime, in Muñoz’s view, was to slander fellow Liberals when all they had done 
was service the Liberal cause at the expense of a Conservative foe. The offense was serious 
enough to warrant the countermarch back to the town they had departed the previous day. But it 
was Jiménez’s turn to react with outrage at being chastised in the sanctity of his own home by 
someone he considered a thief. As soon as Muñoz and his troops departed, Jiménez “undertook a 
march to Bogotá, with the objective, as he had announced beforehand, of arranging with the 
Liberal Directorate in Bogotá that they send another commander to the region of Northeastern 
Cundinamarca, so that I would be disowned by these same Liberals.”133 As a result, the Liberals 
in Bogotá, who beforehand “knew me as an honest and scrupulous man,” now regarded Muñoz 
as “a cannibal” (“antropófago”).134 Jiménez laid out a series of extreme accusations against 
 
132 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 29. Original Spanish: “era una falta grave la que él cometía, como liberla que se 
apellidaba, al calificar de ladrones á sus mismos copartidarios, en medio de la guerra, por el solo hecho de haber 
tomado seis mulas de un conservador, entre sesenta que había, para ponerlas, como en efecto estaban, al servicio de 
la Revolución.” 
 
133 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 29. Original Spanish: “emprendió Jiménez marcha para Bogotá, con el propósito, 
según lo anunció de antemano, de conseguir del Directorio Liberal de Bogotá que se enviara otro jefe para la región 
de Noroeste de Cundinamarca, á fin de que yo fuese desconocido de los mismos liberales.” 
 





Muñoz’s character: “that I was a godo [Conservative], of bad faith, cowardly, without talent, 
very young, and that I had a pact with the Devil” [italics original].135 
 The challenge to his honor having been very seriously laid out, Muñoz directed his 
appeal to the only person he could think to help him: General Rafael Uribe Uribe. Muñoz’s 
pamphlet, Por el honor liberal: al señor General D. Rafael Uribe Uribe, appealed to the Liberal 
hero because, in Muñoz’s words, “[y]our honorable authority as principal Commander, that is of 
the political Community to which I belong, has determined me to submit [my defense] to your 
enlightened judgment.”136 Muñoz laid out his goal in explaining his plight to Uribe: “I only 
aspire that you grade me not as a bad Liberal, and that you convince my fellow party members 
and the Conservatives themselves, that all the actions executed by me, as a revolutionary, were 
aimed toward a military goal: toward the conservation and progress of an Army, which I 
organized with the enemy’s weapons, and which fought against the Despotism until the last 
moment.”137 The idea seemed to be that if Muñoz successfully made his case to Uribe, such a 
celebrated and respected Liberal leader could surely set the record straight and restore Muñoz’s 
reputation. Uribe’s honor could carry over and contribute to Muñoz’s own honor. 
 Muñoz set out to make his case to Uribe by emphasizing the honorable conditions under 
which he conducted his forces during the war. He admitted that he had been arrested in Bogotá 
while conducting clandestine operations and was released on his word of honor that he would not 
 
135 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 44. Original Spanish: “que yo era godo, de mala fe, miedoso, sin talento, muy 
joven, y que tenía pacto con el Diablo.” 
 
136 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 3. Original Spanish: “La honorable autoridad de usted como primer Jefe que es de 
la Comunidad política á la cual pertenezco yo, hame determinado á someterla al ilustrado criterio de usted.” 
 
137 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 4. Original Spanish: “Aspiro únicamente á que no se me califique de mal liberal y á 
que se convenzan mis copartidarios y los mismos conservadores, de que todos los actos ejecutados por mí, como 
revolucionario, encamináronse á un fin militar: á la conservación y progreso de un Ejército, el cual organicé con las 





again take up arms against the government, but insisted he only reneged on that word after the 
Conservatives had first broken theirs. He claimed that he had stayed at home, “devoted to work, 
without mixing myself in political matters, up until the day that Conservative forces under the 
command of General Tobías Vásquez raided and plundered my home, insulted my wife and then 
took the few livestock that I had been able to acquire.”138 As Robinson notes, “[o]ne of the most 
important aspects of honoring one’s opponent is seen in the historical institution of parole, in 
which captured soldiers gave their word . . . that if they were freed, they would not bear arms 
once more against their former captors.”139 Evidently, such notions of honor were indignantly 
discarded when the enemy was perceived to have breached the contract of good faith agreed 
upon between former captors and captive. 
After the feud with Jiménez unfolded, Muñoz proudly informed “my readers that all the 
forces under my command gathered in La Palma, and loudly protested the pretensions that the 
gentlemen Acevedo, Piñeros, and Jiménez (Quasimodo) had, and imposed upon me the 
obligation to continue representing the post that all recognized me to have.”140 Muñoz strove to 
prove that the stains to his honor were not treated seriously by his own troops. They still 
recognized him as their commander in the face of Jiménez and his allies, who had arrived to strip 
Muñoz of his post. As Muñoz argued, “I have not disregarded Mr. Acevedo: those who 
 
138 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 27. Original Spanish: “consagrado al trabajo, sin mezclarme en asuntos políticos, 
hasta el día en que las fuerzas conservadoras al mando del General Tobías Vásquez allanaron y saquearon mi hogar, 
ultrajaron á mi esposa y en seguida tomaron los pocos semovientes que había vuelto á conseguir.” 
 
139 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, 7. 
 
140 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 45. Acevedo and Piñeros were two Liberals from Bogotá who accompanied 
Jiménez back to La Palma in order to confront Muñoz and strip him of his command. Original Spanish: “hago saber 
á mis lectores que todas las fuerzas de mi mando agrupáronse en La Palma y á voz en cuello protestaron de la 
pretensión que tenían los señores Acevedo, Piñeros y Jiménez (Quasimodo), é impusiéronme la obligación de 





disregarded him and his two companions in their campaign against the honor of the Liberals, 
was the Army of Northeastern Cundinamarca” [italics original].141 
 In his final major appeal of the pamphlet, Muñoz reproduced a purported communiqué 
issued by Uribe on August 29, 1902, in which Uribe himself named Muñoz commander of 
operations in southern Magdalena and Bolívar, due to “your renowned patriotism; the merits that 
you have conquered in the glorious campaign of the interior of the Republic, and the integrity 
and unselfishness with which you have always served the Liberal Cause.”142 If the honorable 
Uribe had himself previously recognized Muñoz for his devotion to the Liberal party, and 
Muñoz’s own soldiers had backed him up with their actions and words, then how could the 
accusations from a few Bogotá Liberals hold firm? Por el honor liberal lacked the conclusion 
that Beltrán provided with his formal acquittal of all charges of cowardice—there was no final 
ruling from Uribe on the matter here—but its purpose was much the same. The general had had 
his honor called into question, and so he passionately poured forth a defense on paper in order to 
forcefully repudiate such charges. 
Conclusions 
The generals featured in this analysis demonstrated that those who aspired to command 
armed forces during the Thousand Days’ War were not a monolith. Many of the generals were 
educated, wealthy, elite statesmen from Bogotá or other major cities. But many of the generals 
were local landowners and Indigenous leaders who formed guerrilla armies and aspired to the 
 
141 Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 48. Original Spanish: “Yo no he desconocido al señor Acevedo: quien lo ha 
desconocido á él y á sus dos compañeros de campaña contra la honra de los liberales, ha sido el ejército del 
noroeste de Cundinamarca.” 
 
142 Uribe, quoted in Muñoz, Por el honor liberal, 65. Original Spanish: “su reconocido patriotismo; los méritos que 
usted ha conquistado en la gloriosa campaña del interior de la República, y la probidad y desinterés con que usted ha 





same honorable treatment as their “official” counterparts. Some of the generals published 
memoirs as books. Some could only publish small pamphlets in an effort to defend their 
reputations. Others only appeared in the works of their contemporaries, having themselves died 
or else faded into obscurity after the war’s end. The mediums of publication themselves are 
revealing in terms of the extent to which the authors were willing to invest their own resources to 
pursue such written works, even smaller pamphlets—and in terms of the apparent value they 
placed in such works as a means of safeguarding their honor.  
 The Colombian generals of the Thousand Days’ War left behind imperfect records, rife 
with political biases and personal agendas, vendettas against rivals and obsequious panegyrics of 
friends and allies. But they help us tease out “the grains of truth in a new framework of analysis,” 
as Stern puts it, a “framework [that] asks us not only to count anecdotes and incidents but also to 
explore the profound intersections of masculinity and power,” a framework that speaks to “the 
social logics and the tangibles that drove masculine affirmation and conflict.”143 Sometimes the 
ways that threatened or damaged honor were restored involved deadly violence—Victoriano 
Lorenzo was shot dead and other generals lauded the heroic, bloody sacrifices that their 
subordinates made on the battlefield. Sometimes, honor could be restored more peacefully, 
through appeals to authority and character testimony. As we shall see, the generals offer the most 
straightforward glimpse into what wartime honor meant for Colombians in the Thousand Days’ 
War. Though the clergy and the soldiers do not always speak to its importance in the same direct 
way as the generals did, they nonetheless reveal the importance honor held for a Colombia at 
war. 
 





CHAPTER 4: THE CLERGY 
 
“Elemento civilizador por excelencia cuando se mantiene en las praderas evangélicas, 
anhelamos su ayuda en el empeño de sacar al país de la postración en que lo 
 sumió un imbécil despotismo.” 
- Max Grillo, Emociones de la guerra144 
 
The Catholic Church in Colombia was not an official belligerent in the Thousand Days’ 
War. But its interests were closely aligned with the Conservative Regeneration movement, and it 
cast its lot with the Conservative forces during the Thousand Days’ War. The Church had 
experienced an antagonistic relationship with the Liberal party going back to 1850, when the 
Liberals under José Hilario López expelled the Jesuits from the country due to Liberal concerns 
with the Jesuits’ influence over the country’s education system.145 Historian Germán Colmenares 
argues that the expulsion of the Jesuits “converted the Christian Religion into one of the basic 
points of the delimitation of the parties.”146 Even during that early crisis, rhetoric around honor 
infused the debates between political opponents. R. P. Manuel Gil, Superior of the Jesuits in 
Colombia, published a protest in June 1850, furiously pointing out that “the current President of 
 
144 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 223-224. 
 
145 Fernán E. González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico: reseña histórica 1810-1930 (Bogotá: Editorial 
CINEP, 1977), 98, 108. See also Eduardo Posada-Carbó, “The Catholic Church, Elections, and Democracy in 
Colombia, 1830-1930,” (Working Paper no. 387, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre 
Dame, September 2012), 17. He writes that “the Liberal party saw the presence of the Jesuits in the country as an 
‘imminent threat to public liberties’; to allow its continuity in the republic was to ‘abdicate national sovereignty to 
the Compañía de Jesús.’” 
 
146 Germán Colmenares, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 98. Original Spanish: 





the Republic [of Nueva Granada], among other guarantees, HAS GIVEN HIS WORD OF 
HONOR TO THE JESUITS AND OTHER PEOPLE, THAT DURING HIS 
ADMINISTRATION HE ASSURED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOCIETY [of Jesus] IN THE 
REPUBLIC” (capital letters original).147 In the eyes of the Colombian Church, the Liberals had 
reneged on their word of honor. 
By the time of the Thousand Days’ War some fifty years later, the relationship between 
the Catholic Church and the Liberal party had further deteriorated in Colombia. It went beyond 
the expulsion of the Jesuits. During the years of the Liberal hegemony, the Church and its most 
dedicated adherents felt that “their faith, the education of their families, and their vision of the 
world were all of a sudden being put in question and severely attacked by the state.”148 The 
Liberals enacted measures that banned the clergy from holding office, forced clerics to swear 
fealty to the Constitution of Rionegro, and exiled or imprisoned bishops who did not comply.149 
When the Conservatives established their own hegemony under the Regeneration in 
1886, the Church was quick to champion the Regeneration. The relation between church and 
state represented the “régimen de cristiandad,” regime of Christianity, defined by Pablo Richard 
as one where “the Church procures guarantees of its presence and expands its power in society, 
utilizing above all else the mediation of the State.”150 José David Cortés argues that “the political 
 
147 R. P. Manuel Gil, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 108. Original Spanish: “el actual 
Presidente de la República, entre otras garantías, HABÍA DADO SU PALABRA DE HONOR A LOS JESUITAS Y 
A OTRAS PERSONAS, DE QUE DURANTE SU ADMINISTRACION ASEGURABA LA EXISTENCIA DE LA 
COMPAÑÍA EN LA REPÚBLICA”. 
 
148 Posada-Carbó, “The Catholic Church, Elections, and Democracy in Colombia,” 26. 
 
149 Posada-Carbó, “The Catholic Church, Elections, and Democracy in Colombia,” 21, 22, 24. 
 
150 Pablo Richard, quoted in José David Cortés, “Clero, política y guerra,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 189. 
Original Spanish: “la Iglesia procura asegurar su presencia y expandir su poder en la sociedad utilizando antes de 





participation of the clergy . . . utilizing language better suited to the military and guerrillas than 
to administrators of the sacred, contributed to the heating up of militaristic moods.”151 Eduardo 
Posada-Carbó notes that “an intransigent, ultramontane clergy . . . tended to dominate the 
behavior of the Church.”152 For the Church, nothing less than their influence and relevance in 
Colombian society was at stake, threatened by Liberals who had proven themselves to be 
unapologetically anti-clerical during the years of the Liberal hegemony.  
 Consequently, the rhetoric employed by the Colombian Church and its allies immediately 
before and during the Thousand Days’ War sought to discredit the Liberals as anti-Catholic and 
anti-Christian subversives, superimposing the Church’s insecurities about the secularization 
advocated by the Liberals on top of the Liberals’ grievances with the Regeneration. It provided a 
unique lens through which to bring honor into the political question. Lyman L. Johnson writes 
that “[t]o question a man’s honesty, or his courage or sexual potency, was to question his place 
in male society.”153 Similarly, to question a man’s piety, or his Catholic or Christian faith, was to 
question his place in a deeply Catholic society. Honor in this context did not always carry the 
same explicit connotations of class and status as it did with the generals—but it still gestured 
toward honesty, loyalty, and a sense of belonging. And it provided a point of pride around which 
angry clergymen and defensive Liberals could center their debates. It proved that even the 
Church was not immune from perceiving honor as a valid cause of war, per Robinson: “As 
people, institutions, and nations compete to excel and to gain precedence over one another, some 
 
151 Cortés, “Clero, política y guerra,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 173. Original Spanish: “la participación del 
clero . . . utilizando un lenguaje más propio de militares y de guerreristas que de administradores de lo sagrado, pudo 
contribuir a caldear los ánimos belicistas.” 
 
152 Posada-Carbó, “The Catholic Church, Elections, and Democracy in Colombia,” 33. 
 





will use all means, including force, to achieve their objectives,” he argues. “Those whom they 
subdue will in turn resent their loss of status and use whatever means they can to regain it.”154 To 
the extent that the Church’s political fortunes were linked to the Conservative party, therefore, 
the Church nursed substantial resentment over its humiliation at the hands of the Liberals. 
Catholic (Dis)Honor on the Eve of War 
 In 1897, as the War Liberals prepared for the outbreak of war, Father Baltasar Vélez, 
vicar of the Diocese of Medellín, published a pamphlet entitled Los intransigentes (“The 
Intransigents”), denouncing both Liberals and Conservatives for their refusal to cooperate with 
one another, contributing to the general state of political polarization. He lamented: “Everyone in 
Colombia, Liberals, Conservatives, and priests, are ill with that which is called politics, cancer 
which threatens to devour our souls. We all are more or less blinded by the spirit of the Party, we 
all are partisan, and we are converting the Republic into Agramante’s Camp, into Pandemonium, 
into a true Hell.”155 According to Vélez, the clergy was just as complicit in the deeply polarized 
political state of affairs as were the Liberal and Conservative parties. He never attempted to clear 
the Liberals for the usual blame heaped upon them by the Church, but rather emphasized the 
guilt that the Conservatives shared in corrupting the Church through their political alliance. He 
called for repentance among the clergy: “let us confess that through our fault, through our own 
great fault, that through our intransigence, we have gravely sinned with our thoughts, with our 
 
154 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, 3-4. 
 
155 Baltasar Vélez, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 183. Original Spanish: “Todos en 
Colombia, liberales, conservadores y sacerdotes, estamos enfermos de eso que llaman la política, cancro que 
amenaza devorar nuestras almas. Todos estamos más o menos cegados por el espíritu del partido, todos somos 






words and with our deeds, and for that are we ill.”156 Although his appeal was one toward unity, 
Vélez nonetheless signaled significant shortcomings—indeed, outright failure—in the 
Conservative-allied Church. Its intransigence was not only politically damaging, but actually 
sinful. Such a diagnosis was to be taken very seriously. 
 Indeed, Los intransigentes triggered a massively hostile response from other Church 
officials who were outraged at such allegations. Father Severo González of Cali denounced 
Vélez’s work as “highly contrary to the historical truth and a real insult to good sense.”157 Father 
Cayo Leónidas Peñuela, a priest in Boyacá, had an even stronger retort: “The priest must make 
war against liberalism, because the Church does not have in these times greater enemy facing it; 
it would be a betrayal for a priest to regard the battle with indifference and even more so for him, 
instead of attacking it [liberalism], to take up arms to defend it.”158 Peñuela’s rhetoric is striking 
in its militaristic language, though he was hardly unique in this way. But he also drew clear lines 
that a good Catholic should not overstep—Peñuela accused Vélez of betrayal and of defection to 
the Liberal cause, antithetical to the loyalty and steadfastness before the enemy associated with 
honorable behavior. Vélez, notes Cortés, “was designated as enemy.”159 
 
156 Vélez, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 183. Original Spanish: “confesamos que por 
nuestra culpa, por nuestra grandísima culpa, que por nuestra intransigencia, hemos pecado gravemente con los 
pensamientos, con las palabras y con las obras, y que por eso estamos enfermos.” 
 
157 Severo González, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 187-188. Original Spanish: 
“altamente contraria a la verdad histórica y un verdadero ultraje el bueno sentido”. 
 
158 Cayo Leónidas Peñuela, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 190. Original Spanish: 
“Tiene el sacerdote que hacer guerra al liberalismo, porque la Iglesia no tiene en los tiempos actuales mayor 
enemigo al frente; sería una traición el que un sacerdote mirara con indiferencia el combate y mucho más si en vez 
de atacarlo tomara las armas para defenderlo.” 
 
159 Cortés, “Clero, política y guerra,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 178. Original Spanish: “Vélez quedó 





 What were the consequences of this backlash against Vélez? Most visibly, perhaps, was 
the fact that Los intransigentes was placed on the Church’s Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 
official list of prohibited books.160 Such a public and formal rebuke was a powerful statement to 
make against a priest who, in reality, was not actually siding with the Liberals but instead 
pointing out the problems inherent in the Conservative mindset. Other Colombian priests loudly 
shamed and marginalized Vélez for daring to suggest that their political alliance with 
Conservatism was a sin that required repentance. In a sense, Los intransigentes was so 
threatening to the Colombian Church because it questioned its members’ piety and the validity of 
their religious and political convictions—that is, their honesty and their integrity. Honor had the 
power to “order society . . . [or] to disrupt it.”161 For the Church that felt particularly vulnerable 
and tethered to the Conservative party on the eve of the Thousand Days’ War, it was extremely 
important to make sure that its Catholic control was not called into question—that its society was 
not disrupted. 
 Vélez’s case was unique in that it represented an instance of the Church turning its fury 
inward on one of its own clergy members. Far more common was the use of similar rhetoric 
against prominent Liberals and their followers. An argument that resurfaced with frequency in 
anti-Liberal polemics was that to be Liberal was antithetical to being Catholic, with all the 
implications of exclusion and the dishonor that this entailed. In 1896, a group of Catholics in 
Cúcuta published a broadside (signed at the bottom “Various Catholics,” varios católicos) 
entitled “Protesta” (Protest), railing against the Liberals and demanding that the clergy carry out 
its duty against liberalism. Some of their exhortations that the clergy do its vaguely-defined anti-
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Liberal duty employed similar language to Peñuela’s rebuke of Los intransigentes: “For the 
Catholic clergy, to today impugn the liberal doctrines condemned by the Church ‘is now not just 
a legitimate right, but ineludible duty’” (italics original).162 The clergy had a clearly-defined duty 
to unequivocally oppose the Liberals. Why did the clergy have to oppose the Liberals? Because 
“one cannot be liberal without being enemy of the Catholic Church,” the “various Catholic” 
authors explained. Furthermore, they wrote that “‘He who is liberal is not a good Catholic’; and 
since nobody wants to bear the bad mark of a bad Catholic, the corollary is this: one should not 
be liberal” (italics original).163 
 The “Protesta” helps explain some of the implications underpinning the Conservative 
clergy’s assault on Vélez. When Peñuela accused Vélez of betrayal and of taking up arms to 
defend liberalism, he accused him of being a bad Catholic and of failing his “ineludible duty” to 
oppose the Liberals. For a Catholic priest, but also for a Colombian in a majority Catholic nation, 
such shortcomings should have been shameful. Stern writes about “explicit verbal taunting and 
ritual humiliation” as part of what regulated honor and social status among men, and we can see 
a particularly Catholic form of that dynamic at play through these publications and the rhetoric 
contained within.164 The taunting and humiliation, in this case, were meant to keep Conservatives 
in line. Good Conservatives should not be bad Catholics, because the Liberals were bad 
Catholics.  
 
162 Varios católicos, Protesta (Cúcuta: Imprenta de el trabajo, 1896). Original Spanish: “"para el clero católico, 
impugnar hoy las doctrinas liberales condenadas por la Iglesia, 'es no ya un derecho legítimo, sino deber 
ineludible.'" 
 
163 Varios católicos, Protesta. Original Spanish: “no se puede ser liberal sin ser enemigo de la Iglesia Católica”, “‘El 
que es liberal no es buen católico’; y como nadie querrá llevar la nota fea de mal católico, el corolario es éste: no 
debe ser liberal.” 
 





But what about when such rhetoric was turned against self-identified Liberals, for whom 
the label of “Liberal” was not itself an insult? Bernardo Herrera Restrepo, Archbishop of Bogotá, 
attempted such a maneuver in a polemic published as part of an ongoing debate with Rafael 
Uribe in November and December 1898. Archbishop Herrera declared that “the Catholic Church 
. . . declares in a precise and decisive way . . . that the liberal doctrine is anti-Catholic” (italics 
original).165 This declaration comprised the overall theme of his 56-page letter to Uribe, laid out 
in an effort to prove that “it is not possible to be a true Catholic and a true liberal at the same 
time; either true liberal and false Catholic, or true Catholic and false liberal.”166 He laid out a 
Conservative, Catholic worldview in which “Deeply logical men, at least, proceed in a very 
different way on this [matter] about Catholicism and Liberalism . . . because they honestly know 
that, besides having an absolute impossibility in [being both Liberal and Catholic], it is 
exceedingly dishonorable for those who cannot deceive themselves nor try to deceive others, 
much less the Church and God.”167 In other words, true Catholics regarded those who tried to 
pass themselves off as both Catholic and Liberal as dishonorable. There were only two possible 
explanations for someone who claims to be Catholic and Liberal: “that amalgamation can only 
be possible either through ignorance or through malice, never in reality.”168 
 
165 Bernardo Herrera Restrepo, Los dos últimos folletos sobre el liberalismo (Bogotá: Escuela Tipográfica Salesiana, 
1899), 6. Original Spanish: “la Iglesia Católica . . . declara de manera precisa y decisiva . . . que la doctrina liberal 
es anticatólica”. 
 
166 Herrera Restrepo, Los dos últimos folletos, 17. Original Spanish: “no es posible ser católico verdadero y liberal 
verdadero al mismo tiempo; ó liberal verdadero y católico falso, ó católico verdadero y falso liberal”. 
 
167  Herrera Restrepo, Los dos últimos folletos, 10. Original Spanish: “Los hombres honradamente lógicos al menos, 
proceden de muy distinta manera en esto de Catolicismo y Liberalismo. . . . porque honradamente conocen que, á 
más de haber en eso un imposible absoluto, es sobremanera desdoroso para quien no puede engañarse á sí mismo ni 
intenta engañar á los demás y mucho menos á la Iglesia y á Dios.” 
 
168 Herrera Restrepo, Los dos últimos folletos, 18. Original Spanish: “esa amalgama sólo puede caber ó en la 





Catholic (Dis)Honor during the War 
The highly-charged rhetoric surrounding Liberals and their honor as honest, sincere 
Catholics only intensified when the Thousand Days’ War finally erupted. The intellectual 
polemics of 1896, 1897 and 1898 gave way to bitter accusations of atrocity levelled against the 
Liberals by the clergy and its allies, and forceful assertions to the contrary by the rebels, who 
sought to depict themselves as honorable Catholics. The Conservative press during the Thousand 
Days’ War was a key ally of the Church, active participants in the regime of Christianity, and 
functioned as a mouthpiece to disseminate the anti-Liberal rhetoric employed by clergy 
members. Cortés explains that, for the Conservative press as much as for the Church, this 
“exclusionary model was expressed in these variations of this same dichotomy [‘he who is not 
with Me is against Me’]: good-evil, truth-error, Catholicism-Liberalism, salvation-hell, within-
without.”169 
The Conservative newspaper La Lucha (“The Fight” or “The Struggle”) demonstrated the 
close relation between the Conservative press and the Colombian Church in its May 19, 1900 
issue, which imitated official Church anti-Liberal rhetoric: 
 
When we talk about Liberals, we refer to modern liberalism as has been defined by the 
Church, and as has been condemned a thousand and one times; that is, as an impious sect, 
antireligious; even when many call themselves Catholic-Liberals, the Church does not 
recognize such an amalgamation for being absurd and impossible. . . . [I]t would be like 
trying to mix water with oil, Heaven with Hell. 
 
 
169 Cortés, “Clero, política y guerra,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 175. Original Spanish: “El model excluyente 
se expresa en estas variantes de la misma dicotomía [quien no está conmigo está contra mí]: bondad-maldad, 





Those Catholic-Liberals are wolves in sheep’s skin, whited sepulchers. Such a mixture is 
not possible; yes or no; with Jesus Christ or against Jesus Christ; with the Church or 
against it. Jesus Christ has said: “He who is not with Me, is against Me.”170 
 
 
La Lucha did not break new ground in its article, repeating the same stock phrases that to be 
Liberal is antithetical to being Catholic. But it demonstrated the sticking power of these 
accusations, even during the war—and pointed to the extent to which the Conservative press 
turned to Church rhetoric for inspiration. 
In his 1898 debates with Uribe, Archbishop Herrera gestured to the Constitution of 
Rionegro as having “sanctioned . . . the plunder of the Church,” and these accusations took on a 
literal meaning in newspaper publications issued during the war.171 The Conservative newspaper 
El Conservador (“The Conservative”) illustrated this plunder in no uncertain terms in its 
December 18, 1900 issue. The article “El saqueo de Gramalote, ó la reivindicación del derecho” 
(“The Sack of Gramalote, or the Vindication of Right”) reported on the Liberal victory at 
Gramalote in Santander in a way that foregrounded alleged acts that profaned the local church. 
 
They entered the temple. . . . A bullet-hole on a column and a trickle of blood, signal a 
crime! . . . They broke into the donations and took around 300 pesos . . . they stripped off 
their silver votive offerings, the effigy of Saint Roque and other images; they took all the 
carved wax and twenty liters of holy wine; a golden cincture, gifted by the late presbyter 
 
170 “Los dos grandes partidos políticos,” La Lucha, May 19, 1900. Original Spanish: Al hablar de liberales, nos 
referimos al liberalismo moderno tal como lo ha definido la Iglesia y tal como lo ha condenado una y mil veces; es 
decir, como una secta impía, antirreligiosa; pues aun cuando muchos se llaman católico-liberales, la Iglesia no 
admite semejante amalgama por ser absurda e imposible. . . . [S]ería tanto como pretender unir el agua con el aceite, 
el Cielo con el Infierno. Esos católico-liberales son lobos con piel de oveja, sepulcros blanqueados. No es posible 
semejante mezcla; sí o no; con Jesucristo o contra Jesucristo; con la Iglesia o fuera de ella. Jesucristo ha dicho: ‘El 
que no está conmigo, contra mí está.’” 
 
171 Herrera Restrepo, Carta del Ilustrísimo señor arzobispo de Bogotá al señor doctor D. Rafael Uribe Uribe 
(Bogotá: Imprenta de Luis M. Holguín, 1898), 7. Original Spanish: “se sancionó por la Constitución de Rionegro el 





Eustasio Mantilla, served as reins for a mule; the carpeting, for horse blankets . . . they 
danced in the temple with the whores, and these criminals slept in the choir.172 
 
 
 Now the abstract accusations previously issued by Archbishop Herrera took on a deadly 
serious context. Among the crimes allegedly committed by the Liberals against the Church were 
implied murder, theft, debauchery, and adultery. The institutional plunder of prestige and 
influence endured by the Church at the hands of the Liberal hegemony in the 1850s and 1860s 
was mirrored in the actual plunder of the local church in Gramalote. The authors of El 
Conservador defended the accusations, claiming that even “the liberals who live in Gramalote, 
like don José Antonio Hernández, the family of don Felipe Bermúdez, [and] Juan Ignacio Vivas” 
were “witnesses to this.”173  
This alleged episode of Liberal violence against the Church at once painted the Liberals 
in a bad light—certainly as bad Catholics—and made the Church and its Conservative followers 
into victims whose honor had been injured. Sarah C. Chambers notes that “[t]o be insulted in 
one’s own home had always been considered a particularly serious affront.”174 It was as true for 
the Church as it was for individual Colombians. In the case of the purported plunder of the 
church at Gramalote, the Church’s home in that town, El Conservador made the case against the 
 
172 “El Saqueo de Gramalote, ó la reivindicación del derecho,” El Conservador, December 18, 1900. Original 
Spanish: “Entraron al Templo. . . . ¡Un balazo que hay en una columna y un reguero de sangre, delatan un crimen!    
. . . Rompieron las arquillas de limosnas y se llevaron cosa de 300 pesos moneda . . . despojaron de sus ex-votos de 
plata, a la efigie de San Roque y demás imágenes; se llevaron toda la cera labrada y veinte litros de vino para 
consagrar; un cíngulo de hilo de oro regalado por el finado Presbítero Eustasio Mantilla, sirvió para riendas de mula; 
el alfombrado, sirvió para gualdrapas . . . bailaron en el templo con las rameras, y dormían en el coro dichas 
criminales.” 
 
173 “El Saqueo de Gramalote,” El Conservador, December 18, 1900. Original Spanish: “Son testigos de esto . . . los 
liberales que viven en Gramalote, como don José Antonio Hernández, la familia de don Felipe Bermúdez, Juan 
Ignacio Vivas”. 
 
174 Sarah C. Chambers, “Private Crimes, Public Order: Honor, Gender and the Law in Early Republican Peru,” in 





Liberal plunderers, asking its readers: “If today, the Conservatives go too far with something, 
wouldn’t they be entirely excusable?”175 It was a dangerous question that suggested future 
Conservative atrocities could be justified because of the precedent allegedly established by the 
Liberals. 
Of course, such deadly serious questions were not posed exclusively by the press on 
behalf of the Church during the war. As was the case with the prewar rhetoric, clergy members 
themselves continued to agitate against the Liberals during the war, employing rhetorical 
strategies that cast good Conservatives’ obligations through the lens of duty, loyalty, and bravery 
before a godless enemy. They attached Catholic honor to faithfulness to the cause in a holy war 
of religion. One of the most militant Conservative clergy members was Monsignor Ezequiel 
Moreno, bishop of Pasto, who “distinguished himself through his combativeness in this aspect,” 
as Fernán E. González puts it.176 In a pastoral letter dated January 20, 1900, Moreno wrote to the 
members of his diocese:  
 
[The people’s] Catholic consciousness has told [them] that the current war is a war that is 
waged, not so much against the government of the Republic, as against the Religion of 
Jesus Christ, and for that reason numerous groups present themselves asking for 
weapons, ready to shed up to the last drops of their blood in defense of the Religion. . . . 
From this affinity for the Catholic truth and this aversion to the disastrous error of 
Liberalism, is born that beautiful cry of our good Catholics: Let’s go defend the Religion! 
Yes, valiant soldiers of Christ: this current war is a religious war, and you all wish to 
fight the battles of the Lord. 177 
 
175 “El Saqueo de Gramalote,” El Conservador, December 18, 1900. Original Spanish: “Si hoy, los conservadores se 
extralimitaran en algo, ¿no serían en extremo excusables?” 
176 González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 160. Original Spanish: “se distinguió por su combatividad en 
este aspecto.” 
 
177 Ezequiel Moreno, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 160-161. Original Spanish: “Su 
sentido católico le ha dicho que la guerra actual es guerra que se hace, no tanto el gobierno de la República, cuando 
a la Religión de Jesucristo, y por eso se presentan en grupos numerosos pidiendo armas, y dispuestos a derramar, 
hasta la última gota de su sangre en defensa de la Religión. . . . De ese gusto a la verdad católica y de esa aversión al 
error funesto del liberalismo, nace ese grito hermoso de nuestros buenos católicos: ¡Vamos a defender la Religión! 






Moreno exhorted fanatical devotion to the cause, transforming the war between Liberal and 
Conservative into a war between heretics and good Catholic defenders of the faith. On February 
10, he wrote again: 
 
If liberalism, then, makes war against God, the duty of all Catholics is to fight to the 
extent of their strengths. We have infallible certainty of victory, because against God one 
can fight but one does not vanquish Him, and with Him we will remain victorious, even 
when we all fall on the battlefield. Let us fight, then, with determination, each one in his 
land and with his own weapons. . . . Let us all be encouraged, considering that although 




Again, Moreno invoked the recurring concept of “duty” to the Catholic Conservative cause. For 
him, it was a duty so important that all Catholics must answer the call, to the extent that they 
were capable. His incendiary rhetoric demanded that adherents to the faith take up arms and 
transform their homes into bastions against the Liberal enemy. What, then, would happen if his 
calls to duty were not heeded? On July 25, he made clear the dishonorable consequences of 
failure in another letter: 
 
In this case, to be with arms crossed, while the enemies, pillory in hand, destroy the 
house of God in the political sphere, would be cowardice and an offense, because the 
enemies of the Church need nothing more to triumph and to achieve their intentions of 
snatching souls from Catholicism and heaven to deliver them to their Leader Lucifer and 
to hell . . . Let us not allow an exaggerated love of peace and kindness to seduce us, to 
make us real deserters to the beautiful Catholic flag. Sometimes “peace” is used to 
describe what is not real peace, but complicity with hell . . . No: there is no peace 
possible: peace in this case is betrayal and apostasy.179 
 
178 Ezequiel Moreno, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 161. Original Spanish: “Si el 
liberalismo, pues, hace la guerra a Dios, deber de todo católico es luchar a la medida de sus fuerzas. Tenemos 
seguridad infalible de la victoria, porque a Dios se le podrá combatir pero no se le vence, y con Él quedaremos 
victoriosos, aun cuando todos caigamos en el campo de batalla. Luchamos, pues, con decisión, cada uno en su 
terreno y con sus propias armas. . . . Alentémonos todos considerando que aunque el infierno brame de furor, será 
eternamente una verdad que Cristo vence, Cristo impera, Cristo reina.” 
 
179 Ezequiel Moreno, quoted in González, Partidos políticos y poder eclesiástico, 162. Original Spanish: “Estar en 





“Cowardice” and “betrayal” made clear that Moreno’s appeal was not a benevolent call to rally 
around the faith as a community, but a demand to fall in line and fight the Liberals. From a 
spiritual and even from an eschatological perspective, the stakes in honorable behavior were 
extremely high. Dishonorable behavior—cowardice, betrayal, dereliction of the duty laid out in 
his earlier letters—put one in league with Lucifer and hell. Moreno demonstrated striking 
similarity to the “crusader soldier” that Gray would describe in his World War II experiences, for 
whom, “[l]ike all devils, the enemy is deceiving and deceitful. He can feign mercy or fairness in 
order to catch the foolish and innocent off guard. Since his actions are never to be taken at face 
value, trust cannot be accorded him. Only eternal suspicion and vigilance are pathways to 
safety.”180 
On the surface, this image of war had very little in common with the debates over 
political participation and national constitutions that split the Liberals and Conservatives in 
Bogotá. The Liberal Constitution of Rionegro and the Conservative Constitution of 1886 
suddenly seem very small indeed compared to the daunting task of saving souls from Liberal 
damnation. But nevertheless, the recurring thread of honor appeared in the Catholic wartime 
consciousness. To that end, Moreno’s epistolary rhetoric—and that expressed by other prominent 
Church officials like Archbishop Herrera—did not exist in a vacuum. It made its way to the 
battlefield where clergy members participated as chaplains and even as armed combatants.  
 
político, sería una cobardía y una falta, porque nada más necesitarían los enemigos de la Iglesia para triunfar y 
conseguir sus intentos de arrebatar almas al Catolicismo y al cielo entregarlas a su Jefe Lucifer y al infierno . . . No 
nos dejemos seducir de un exagerado amor a la paz y a las condescendencias, hasta hacernos verdaderos desertores 
de la hermosa bandera católica. Se llama paz a veces lo que no es tal paz, sino complicidad con el infierno . . . No: 
no hay paz posible: la paz en este caso es traición y apostasía.” 
 





Consider the following exchanges recorded by the Liberal soldier Max Grillo in his 
novel-memoir hybrid181 Emociones de la guerra (Emotions of the War), published in 1938. 
Grillo wrote about his experiences through the lens of Jorge Peralta, a fictional character used as 
a stand-in for the actual Grillo and his encounters with actual people. Right after the battle of 
Peralonso, the Conservative priest Father Pineda fell into Liberal captivity and had a heated 
exchange with Peralta about the spiritual significance of the Liberal victory and Uribe’s daring 
charge across La Laja Bridge. 
 
Jorge Peralta: Providence was on our side, and Uribe triumphed without dying in the 
process. 
Fr. Pineda: How is God going to be on your side. Enough with such nonsense. 
Jorge Peralta: God is with us, convince yourself of that. Nature, too, has manifested itself 
in our favor. . . . Were you not surprised by the lunar eclipse that happened during the 
battle?  
Fr. Pineda: These rojos [a pejorative nickname for Liberals, equivalent to godos for 
Conservatives] have their omens, too! Now they’ll see if the devil doesn’t help them 
moving forward. 
Jorge Peralta: Don’t mess with the devil, Father, because right now he must be sad . . . 182 
 
Pineda repeated a lot of the same rhetoric expressed by other clergy members and in the 
Conservative press. In the immediate aftermath of the shocking Liberal victory at Peralonso, 
though, the Catholic anti-Liberal rhetoric seemed to be a coping mechanism to process the 
Conservative defeat.  
 
181 See Deas, “Las memorias de los generales,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 138, where in a footnote he 
explains that Emociones de la guerra “empieza con la pretensión de ser una novela, pero abandona pronto la 
intención, que no recuerda sino muy de vez en cuando; es en su esencia un libro de memorias.”  
 
182 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 181. Original Spanish: “Jorge Peralta: [L]a Providencia se hallaba de nuestra 
parte, y triunfó Uribe sin morir en la demanda. 
P. Pineda: Qué va a estar Dios con ustedes. Déjate de semejantes disparates. 
Jorge Peralta: Dios está con nosotros, convénzase de ello. La naturaleza también se manifiesta en nuestro favor. . . . 
¿No se sorprendió usted con el eclipse de luna sucedido durante la batalla? 
P. Pineda: ¡Si también tienen sus agüeros estos rojos! Allá verán como el diablo no les ayuda de ahora en adelante. 





Pineda, like Moreno, suggested that the devil was responsible for the Liberals’ victory, 
challenging the honorable and glorious legitimacy of Uribe’s triumph and the Liberal success. 
The insult seemed not to be particularly damaging to Peralta’s honor, though, since he effectively 
turned the accusation back on the Conservatives—that the devil was sad because of their defeat. 
It seemed that, as a triumphant captor, Peralta did not feel the need to seriously defend his good 
Catholic honor when challenged by a bitter but defeated Conservative prisoner of war. 
Additionally, the insult was not directed at Peralta as an individual, and so was not particularly 
personal. For Pineda, like Gray’s “crusader soldiers” of World War II, “[t]he enemy is not 
regarded as an individual, but as a representative of a principle of evil, and he is only an 
embodiment of this principle.”183 In this case, the Liberals were rojos in league with the devil. 
 Father Pineda doubled down on his holy war rhetoric in relation to three other 
Conservative clergy members, similarly taken prisoner by the Liberals: Fathers Sánchez, 
Ordóñez, and Ortega. Jorge Peralta asked Father Pineda about the other priests and their mettle 
as holy warriors—good Catholic clergy members who lived up to their duty to fight the Liberal 
enemy.  
Jorge Peralta: They tell me, Father, that you conduct yourself in battle with much bravery 
[arrojo: also, daring, valor, courage]: at least you will be a general…. 
Fr. Pineda: Nothing, my son, I don’t serve for that. I carry out my evangelical mission 
without inserting myself in those things. 
Jorge Peralta: What of Father Sánchez and Father Ordóñez? 
Fr. Pineda: Yes, they are real guapos [brave guys]. They load their carbines and lead 
from the head of their squadrons. Father Sánchez is hot-headed. But this one [Ortega] . . . 
is terribly afraid. I saw him hiding. 
Jorge Peralta: Do you usually carry machetes?  
Fr. Pineda: No; they look very lackluster on our cassocks. [“The ironic Father laughs.”] 
Jorge Peralta: Fervent Catholics . . . should be bothered by the spectacle of armed priests. 
Fr. Pineda: No way! That is talk, pure talk. We men are men; some of us like money; 
 





others love, or war. . . Father Ortega doesn’t like any of that, but just likes preaching his 
little mass [misita].184 
 
 
Father Pineda portrayed himself, Sánchez, and Ordóñez as holy warriors who fulfill their duty as 
Catholics—he with his “evangelical mission” and they as “hot-headed” individuals who “lead 
from the head of their squadrons.” There was no room for doubt that their conduct as Catholics 
was honorable. But like Baltasar Vélez, Father Ortega was shamed for failing to embrace the war 
against Liberalism with full vigor. It did not suffice for Ortega to preach his “little mass.” A 
good Catholic—and, indeed, good men, Pineda suggested—took their duty and their mission 
beyond proselytizing, into the realm of armed combat. Therein lay one’s claim to honor. 
Catholic Liberals: The Rebels Defend their Honor 
 As Max Grillo demonstrated through the character of Jorge Peralta, the Liberals were not 
passive bystanders who simply absorbed Conservative attacks on their honor as good Catholics. 
In Peralta’s case, the affront from Father Pineda was dismissed fairly easily, aided by the Liberal 
victory at Peralonso. Normally, though, Conservative efforts to paint the Liberals as anti-
Catholic required a more substantive defense from Liberals seeking to counter such character 
assassination. “We Colombian liberals are not enemies of the Church, nor of its priests,” Grillo 
wrote later in his memoir. “Our respect for the ministers of the [Christian] Religion has been 
 
184 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 179-180. Original Spanish: “Jorge Peralta: Me cuentan, padre, que usted se 
condujo en la batalla con muchísimo arrojo: por lo menos será general…. 
P. Pineda: Nada, hijo, yo no sirvo para eso. Cumplo mi misión evangélica sin meterme en esos dibujos. 
Jorge Peralta: ¿Y el padre Sánchez y el padre Ordóñez?  
P. Pineda: Ellos sí son guapos. Cargan sus carabinas y van a la cabeza de sus escuadrones. El padre Sánchez es un 
caliente. Pero a éste [Ortega] . . . le da un miedo horroroso. Yo lo vi escondido. 
Peralta: ¿Acostumbran llevar machetes? 
P. Pineda: No; quedan muy deslucidos sobre las sotanas. [‘Y se reía el irónico padre.’] 
Peralta: A los católicos fervientes . . . el espectáculo de los sacerdotes armados deberá causarles un mal efecto. 
P. Pineda: ¡Quia! Eso es verso, purito verso. Los hombres somos hombres; a unos nos gusta el dinero; a otros el 





made visible in the days of this fierce struggle. Wherever the revolutionaries found a priest in the 
exercise of the duties of his ministry, they attended him with clear good will, they showed him 
the considerations owed him. We remain thankful to the many priests who offered us their roofs 
and proved to us that the humble ministers of the villages encourage generous virtues difficult to 
find in palaces.”185 
 Rafael Uribe made a similarly impassioned defense of Liberal Catholicism in a speech to 
the inhabitants of Pamplona (Santander) on December 23, 1899. “The rumor has been spread that 
in Cúcuta we took icons from the church and burned them in the plaza. This is despicable 
slander,” Uribe declared. “The vast majority of our Army is Catholic, and in its name I can 
promise that the Ministers of said religion will be respected, the temples will not be the object of 
any desecration, nor will any religious ceremonies be interrupted.”186 He gave his speech a year 
before El Conservador published its piece alleging the Liberal plunder of the church at 
Gramalote, but Uribe nonetheless displayed particular sensitivity to the “despicable slander” that 
his forces would loot a church. His postulation might well have been partially informed by a 
desire to maintain friendly relations with local populations—important for a rebel army that 
lacked the same supply lines as the government forces—but it must also be understood in the 
 
185 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 223-224. Original Spanish: “Los liberales colombianos no somos enemigos de la 
Iglesia ni de sus sacerdotes. . . . Nuestro respeto por los ministros de la Religión se ha hecho visible en los días de 
esta brava contienda. Dondequiera que los revolucionarios hallaron un cura en ejercicio de los deberes de su 
ministerio, le atendieron con manifiesta buena voluntad, le tuvieron las consideraciones debidas. Agradecidos 
quedamos de muchass acerdotes [sic] que nos ofrecieron su techo y nos probaron que alientan en los humildes 
pastores de las aldeas generosas virtudes difíciles de encontrár [sic] en los palacios.” 
 
186 Rafael Uribe Uribe, Documentos militares y políticos relativos a las campañas del general Rafael Uribe Uribe 
(Bogotá: Imprenta de Vapor, 1904): 35. Original Spanish: “Se ha propalado la especie de que en Cúcuta sacamos las 
imágenes de la iglesia y las quemamos en la plaza. Esa es una infame calumnia. La gran mayoría de nuestro Ejército 
es católica, y en su nombre puedo prometer que los Ministros de esa religión serán respetados, los templos no serán 





wider context of the ongoing religious rhetoric and its implications for the Liberals’ honor. 
Uribe, after all, had been the target of broadsides by the Archbishop of Bogotá before the war.  
 Other prominent Liberals issued their own defenses of Liberal Catholicism. In January 
1900, Gabriel Vargas Santos published a manifesto titled “A la nación” (“To the Nation”), where 
he promised to “[r]espect and guarantee . . . religious sentiment, naturally Catholic, of the 
Colombian people,” and to “grant priests all the consideration they deserve, as long as they do 
not turn their august mission of peace into a bastion and propaganda of the war.” 187 Vargas at 
once defended Liberals as respectful and observant of the Catholic faith, but he also suggested a 
subtle line that the clergy should not cross, should they want to enjoy said respect. For Vargas, 
the duty of the clergy should be an “august mission of peace,” not the calls for holy war coming 
from bishops and priests across the country. Those who did not heed Vargas’ warning—those 
who corrupted their peaceful duties, perhaps in the ways that Baltasar Vélez decried in Los 
intransigentes—ran the risk of losing the “considerations” that the Liberal forces would 
otherwise offer them. Vargas’ conditional profession of respect maintained Liberal Catholic 
honor while subtly criticizing the warlike tendencies of the Church. 
 Benjamín Herrera was even more forthright in his criticism of the Church. On December 
3, 1901, on board his gunboat the Almirante Padilla, Herrera issued a proclamation that read, in 
part: “There is common national interest in returning the clergy to the Christian spirit so poorly 
worn during this conflict, in which so many representatives of the sublime martyr fulfill their 
 
187 Gabriel Vargas Santos, quoted in Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los mil días, 26. Original Spanish: 
“Respeta y garantiza . . . el sentimiento religioso, naturalmente católico, del pueblo colombiano, y otorga a los 
sacerdotes toda la consideración que se merecen, en cuanto no tornen su augusta misión de paz en baluarte y 





evangelical mission by cultivating the religion of hatred!”188 Herrera took to the 
counteroffensive, accusing the clergy themselves of being the anti-Christian subversives failing 
in their honorable duty. Attempting to take the moral high ground, he declared that “[t]he 
religious question will neither be motive for antagonisms nor for disputes.”189 Herrera’s assistant 
general Lucas Caballero declared in Article 2 of the General Order dated May 3, 1902:  
 
It is urged that commanders make known to their officers, and make their troops obey, 
the utmost respect for the religious worship that has been reestablished [in Panamá] in 
these days. To be a believer or not is a matter of internal jurisdiction, which neither 
debases nor confirms the liberal character; but to be respectful of the rights of the other 
just as much as one’s own rights is indeed an essential characteristic of liberalism and 
part of the most important of the principles that forms this political school. Now, the 
Christian religion has been and is respectable and respected by the highest civilizations of 
different races and across all times. Consequently, members of the Army can attend or 
not attend religious functions as these satisfy or not their own beliefs; but believers or 
skeptics, upon presenting themselves in the church should do so with the respect that the 
proper culture and consideration of others imposes.190  
 
Caballero made clear in his order that to respect the Church and especially the Christian faith 
was of paramount importance in upholding Liberal honor. It was a question of good culture and 
civilized behavior. The order did not evoke the same histrionic and self-righteous tone of the 
more polemical declarations, the ones meant to be read by the wider public or directed at 
 
188 Benjamín Herrera, quoted in Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 76. Original Spanish: “Hay 
interés nacional común en volver al clero al espíritu cristiano tan mal traído durante esta contienda en que tantos 
representantes del sublime mártir cumplen su misión evangélica haciendo cultivo de la religión del odio!” 
 
189 Herrera, quoted in Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 76. Original Spanish: “La cuestión 
religiosa tampoco será motivo ni de antagonismo ni de querellas.” 
 
190 Caballero, Memorias de la guerra de los Mil Días, 168. Original Spanish: “Ser o no ser creyente es cuestión de 
fuero interno, que no desdice ni confirma el carácter liberal; pero ser respetuoso del derecho ajeno tanto como del 
propio sí es carácter esencial del liberalismo y parte la más importante de los principios que forman esa escuela 
política. Ahora bien, el culto cristiano ha sido y es respetable y respetado por las más altas civilizaciones de las 
distintas razas y de todos los tiempos. De consiguiente, pueden los miembros del ejército asistir o no a las funciones 
religiosas si con ello dan satisfacción o no a sus propias creencias; pero practicantes o incrédulos al presentarse en la 





political opponents in debate. Meant to be distributed within the rebel army, Caballero’s order 
demonstrated the seriousness with which Liberal commanders regarded the accusations against 
their honor, and the honor of their troops, as good Catholics. 
 For the Liberals who fought as guerrillas in small groups, the rhetoric on Catholicism 
seemed to have played a smaller role than with the Liberals who fought under the rebel armies of 
generals such as Uribe and Herrera. Gonzalo París Lozano wrote about the bishop Esteban Rojas, 
a Conservative who preached in the department of Tolima against the Liberal cause, and the fate 
he suffered at the hands of a group of guerrillas. The episode offered a rare glimpse into a 
moment where the Catholic rhetoric confronted the extreme brutality of the guerrilla fighting. 
París described Rojas as a rugged priest that Father Pineda might have admired: “The most 
active of the guerrillas did not demonstrate the strength as a rider that characterized Bishop 
Rojas, nor did they equal in their adventures the leagues he burned in his travels.” The bishop 
“had an obsessive idea and preached it without rest and without attenuation: Liberalism is a sin” 
(italics original).191 Rojas was unusual in that he “went to the place where a fight was developing 
and with a supreme disdain for the bullets, with a fearlessness that could only come from a 
profound sense of duty, he traversed, imperturbable, along the line of fire, giving aid to the 
wounded of both factions.”192 
Guided by his duty and merciful even to the Liberal enemy, Rojas was to discover that 
Catholic honor meant little in a guerrilla war where the rules of engagement were not observed 
 
191 París, Guerilleros del Tolima, 97-98. Original Spanish: “El más activo de los guerrilleros no demostró la fortaleza 
de jinete que caracterizó al Obispo Rojas ni sumó en sus andanzas las leguas que éste quemó en sus correrías.” 
“tenía una idea obsesionante y la predicaba sin tregua y sin atenuación: El liberalismo es pecado.” 
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soberano desprecio de balas, con una impavidez que sólo podía venirle de un profundo sentimiento del deber, 





with any regularity. París wrote that one day the bishop “fell . . . under the control of a liberal 
guerrilla band. They forced him to dismount and to continue with them on foot. Upon arriving at 
the banks of the Ortega River, the commander of the guerrillas wanted to compel him to also 
cross the fast-flowing current on foot; and since the Bishop asked for time to freshen up before 
launching himself into the water, the heartless guerrilla unloaded several lashes on him and 
pushed him in the river.”193 París ended the history there—it is unclear whether Bishop Rojas 
survived, but what is clear is that the guerrillas had little respect for a man they whipped. If 
Catholic honor served as fuel for divisive polemics among the clergy, the gentleman generals, 
and the regular soldiers, evidently it meant relatively little for the guerrilla bands that visited 
atrocities on one another in the mountains. 
Conclusions 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Colombian Church and its clergy played a significant role in the 
development of the Thousand Days’ War, both in terms of fanning the flames of polarization on 
the eve of war and in terms of active participation during the fighting. The clergy saw in the 
Liberal party—and later, in the Liberal rebels—a mortal foe whose values and goals were 
completely antithetical to the well-being and social stability of the Church in Colombia. They 
had a substantially different set of motivations for political participation, and later for wartime 
participation, than did the generals or the soldiers. But we can still see in their writings, 
discourses, and actions the traces of honor, represented as duty and loyalty to Church and to 
God.  
 
193 París, Guerilleros del Tolima, 98. Original Spanish: “cayó . . . en poder de una guerrilla liberal. Obligáronlo a 
desmontarse y a seguir con ellos el viaje a pie. Llegados a la orilla del río Ortega, el jefe de la guerrilla quiso 
obligarlo a que atravesara también a pie la caudalosa corriente; y como el Obispo le pidiera tiempo para refrescarse 





For the clergy, honor meant a secure place in a hierarchical society, but it also meant 
security for the tenuous order underpinning that society, threatened by a disruptive Liberal 
enemy. Liberal Colombians and the danger they posed to the Church’s self-imagined role in 
Colombian society had to be preemptively attacked, sometimes to exaggerated extremes—
associating them with Lucifer and the theft of Christian souls. As Geoffrey Spurling notes, 
anything that was “an offense against God and the ‘natural order of things’” was “a reviled act” 
that “could bring infamy.”194 Consequently, dishonorable behavior was not only that which 
threatened to upend the natural order (one which, naturally, favored the Church’s interests) but 
also that which demonstrated indifference to others threatening the natural order. 
This helps us understand the mutually exclusive nature of much of the Conservative 
rhetoric surrounding Catholic honor. Either Liberal or Catholic, but never both. Either an active 
defender of the Christian faith or a dishonest subversive, but never something in between. Either 
a fanatical holy warrior defending the Church or a coward shamefully abandoning it. The 
intransigence that Baltasar Vélez spoke out against meant that it was very easy to accuse the 
enemy of being a dishonorable, bad Catholic—but it made it a lot more difficult to reconcile 
differences and restore wounded honor. Here we find no blueprint for peace. 
But as the Liberals forcefully attested, this Catholic-Liberal dichotomy was not reflective 
of how the rebels perceived themselves. In reality, many Liberals saw themselves as honorable 
Catholics. They pushed back, vocally, against the Conservative attacks on their piety or 
allegations about their treatment of the church and its officials. They made it clear that they did 
not intend to challenge the spiritual fabric of Colombian society—“naturally Catholic,” as 
Vargas Santos put it. Rather, they sought to challenge the relationship between the Church as an 
 





institution and the Colombian state. This political position, from the Liberal perspective, was not 
contradictory for practicing Catholics. For them, Liberalism was not a sin, and it did not 




CHAPTER 5: THE SOLDIERS 
 
La verdad es que peleaban por costumbre, porque no sabían hacer nada más, porque a lo mejor 
tanta sangre vista y tanto retumbar de cañón les habían aturdido las entendederas, lo cual 
explicaba ese aire de orfandad común a la mayoría, esas miradas que siempre parecían fijas en 
algún punto más allá de la realidad. 
- Rafael Baena, Tanta sangre vista195 
 
Cantalicio Reyes, the pacifist from Tolima who took up arms against the Conservatives 
after they killed his family, was like so many of the soldiers of the Thousand Days’ War. He was 
not politically invested in the security of the Church or in proving himself to be a good Catholic, 
nor did he survive to leave behind memoirs like the generals. “Hatred ignited its voracious 
flames in the soul of that peasant,” as París put it, and on the surface, Reyes’ wartime journey 
demonstrated no explicit concern for valor or loyalty to the cause.196 He started a relationship 
with a woman who owned a shop in the town of Ambalema, and one day came across the Liberal 
general Sandalio Delgado flirting with her. According to París, Reyes “told him off [Delgado] 
and before Delgado . . . managed to put up his guard, he [Reyes] unloaded his machete on top of 
him.”197 Delgado pulled his head out of the blade’s path, but Reyes nevertheless grievously 
wounded the general. Called before a verbal court martial, Reyes was pulled from jail the 
following day when it became apparent that his legal representative was going “to talk and to 
 
195 Rafael Baena, Tanta sangre vista (Bogotá: Rey Naranjo Editores, 2015), 16. 
 
196 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 94. Original Spanish: “En el alma de aquel campesino prendió el odio sus voraces 
llamas.” 
 
197 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 95. Original Spanish: “Lo riñe brevemente de palabra y antes de que Delgado . . . 





talk without ceasing until the court grew tired, to prevent that Cantalicio would pass before the 
firing squad.”198 Reyes was then shot dead alongside two deserters. 
What did honor mean for Cantalicio Reyes and for the Colombian soldiers who found 
themselves the semi-willing participants of the Thousand Days’ War? What compelled them to 
fight and to defend their insulted honor? What did restoring their wounded honor look like? And 
what imagined peace did this restoration look like, especially for those who lost family members, 
homes, and livelihoods, for whom there was nothing left when the fighting ended? Finding the 
answers to these questions requires deep compassion and patience when considering the 
astounding episodes of violence that the soldiers wreaked upon one another and the civilians that 
surrounded them. Robinson rightly points to the complications of assuming too much about the 
motivations of soldiers, particularly when it comes to honor: 
 
Some [soldiers] will [fight] for purely negative reasons: those in authority have forced 
them to do so; to flee is too dangerous; and personal survival dictates that they kill their 
enemy before he kills them. Positive motivations may be mercenary – the pay, or the 
prospect of plunder and booty. A few men may fight because they enjoy it. Some will 
believe in the cause for which they are fighting. Others still will be driven by motives of 
personal or group honor. Most will respond to a mixture of some or all of the above.199  
 
 
But while “[t]he honor ideal has served as justification for the rich and mighty to dominate 
others,” as Wyatt-Brown suggests, it was also very much understood and valued by the soldiers 
and their communities.200 Confronted with humiliations from commanders, opponents, and even 
comrades, the soldiers recognized and protected their honor in complex and sometimes 
 
198 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 95. Original Spanish: “el defensor de oficio anunciara que hablaría y hablaría sin 
tregua hasta cansar al consejo, para impedir que Cantalicio fuera pasado por las armas.” 
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contradictory ways. As we shall see, sometimes there was no satisfactory conclusion readily 
available for these soldiers who had their honor challenged, and the tragic reality is that the war 
took everything from those that survived—not just their honor and pride, but their communities 
and their loved ones. 
The soldiers rarely left behind memoirs or pamphlets like the generals and clergy. But 
Colombian historians have accumulated oral histories of soldiers and their descendants, and 
some of the soldiers’ testimonies survived in appeals for pensions decades after the war, where 
they had to provide proof of their wartime service to the Comisión del Escalafón de Antiguos 
Militares in order to qualify. Historian Hermes Tovar Pinzón notes that this “history is not 
oblivion but rather the life and agony of those who made the battles.”201 It is through this lens of 
profound trauma that any notion of wartime honor must be understood. Stern writes of “actions 
[that] defined a terrain of manliness that constituted a counterpoint to humiliation,” and this 
provides a useful point of departure in reckoning with the brutality experienced by the soldiers 
on a level that was simply alien to the generals and the clergy.202 
Cantalicio Reyes was not alone in his experiences that compelled him to join a war that 
he had previously tried to avoid. An Indigenous Colombian of the Paez community named 
Vecoche was conscripted into the Conservative army in the department of Cauca, and when he 
returned to his home, he found his wife and children dead. He was informed that Liberal 
guerrillas were responsible for the act, and consequently took up arms for the same Conservative 
government that had forcibly conscripted him, “transformed into the terror of the Liberals and 
 
201 Hermes Tovar Pinzón, “Tras las huellas del soldado Pablo,” in Memoria de un país en guerra, 146. Original 
Spanish: “la historia no es el olvido sino la vida y la agonía de quienes han hecho las batallas.” 
 





finally even of the Conservatives themselves who opposed his cruel actions.”203 Vecoche’s 
experience signaled the two primary ways that a soldier would find his way into the ranks of 
either army: either forcibly conscripted (as was especially the case for poor urban men who did 
not have the option to hide out in the wilderness when army columns came by) or else driven to 
take up arms in pursuit of vengeance. The soldiers who volunteered out of a sense of patriotic 
duty, genuinely uncompelled in any other way to serve other than through genuine political 
conviction, fade into the background among poorly-armed men seeking revenge. As Stern puts 
it: “certain types of extreme aggression by men not only justified serious and even homicidal 
assaults. They virtually demanded it. These challenges were those that explicitly violated one’s 
manhood, personal reputation, or protection of family.”204 
In essence, whether it was to avenge slain family members or to react against abuses 
committed against home and livelihood, many soldiers found a way to deal with the humiliation 
endured at the hands of other soldiers by taking up arms themselves. Honor was especially 
touchy because what made the violence deeply personal for the soldiers was their proximity to 
their communities, unlike with the generals and clergy who wrote polemics and accused each 
other of dishonorable behavior. This was the case for Proto Ramírez and his Liberal community. 
Ramírez, a Liberal from the department of Cundinamarca, fought with the Liberal forces in the 
civil wars of 1885 and 1895, and his father had been murdered by Conservatives. His political 
affiliation forced him to flee his hometown of Susa, but he returned sometime around 1899 to 
dispute a land claim with the Pinilla brothers, who were Conservatives. They shot Ramírez on 
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the contested piece of land and brutally finished him off, as the Liberal newspaper El 
Autonomista (“The Autonomist”) alleged. The article also cast doubt on the prospects of justice 
being delivered to the Pinilla brothers. Consequently, the Liberals in the cundinamarqués 
(demonym for Cundinamarca) province of Ubaté, where Susa was situated, transformed it into 
“one of the major foci. . . of the Liberal uprising” in the Thousand Days’ War.205 Two 
generations of Liberals—Ramírez and his father—murdered at the hands of Conservative 
enemies and perceptions of legal injustice delivered in the courts served as more than enough to 
galvanize local Liberals against the Conservatives once war broke out. Memory was a powerful 
and dangerous weapon. 
Family, Humiliation, And Masculine Competence 
Hermes Tovar Pinzón writes about the power of memory, especially in a familial context. 
“Familial histories are like boxes of memories, like testaments never opened, like judicial 
processes unresolved or like documentary deposits,” he notes. “One day, upon opening this time 
capsule, truths are revealed and the documents are abysses full of questions, of goings-on, and 
nostalgia. . . . In familial history, every testimony, every anecdote has a pedagogical function.”206 
For the Liberals of Ubaté, the injustices committed against one of their own made the Thousand 
Days’ War a very personal—and a very local—conflict. What was the pedagogical function of 
memorializing Ramírez’s murder in El Autonomista? And what was its impact in a province that 
 
205 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 98-99. The authors of El Autonomista (none others than Max Grillo 
and Rafael Uribe Uribe) were quick to point out that “the judge in charge of the case had as his secretary one 
Ahumada, son-in-law of Delfín Medina,” an uncle of the Pinilla brothers. 
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rose up in arms against the broader community of perpetrators seen as responsible for the 
killing? Stern offers an intriguing interpretation that suggests “successful manhood implied 
competence and courage amidst adversity.”207 
In other words, competence and courage took precedence over all else in protecting honor 
or repairing it once damaged. Sometimes this came at the expense of other hallmarks of honor 
seen with the generals and the clergy, like loyalty to the cause, service to the army, or 
faithfulness to the Church. Desertion or retreating, for instance, were less of a threat to the honor 
of guerrillas who were willing to disband or fold before an advancing hostile force if it meant 
they could strike back later against the hated enemy. Other times, even family loyalties would be 
secondary to proving masculine competency if relatives were the ones provoking challenges to 
one’s honor. París wrote about the multi-generational history of violence triggered by the killing 
of Conservative general Lucas Gallo, which demonstrated precisely what competence meant and 
how it was recognized by others in the community. 
While en route from Ibagué, the capital of Tolima, to encircle and destroy Liberal 
guerrillas, Gallo came across a fidgety-looking man with a shotgun. His troops raised their 
weapons as the man darted off into the brush. París wrote that Gallo told his men “not to bother 
[the man], since, no doubt, that poor farmer is the owner of this field.”208 The retinue advanced, 
but then a gunshot sounded from the thicket—Gallo jerked from the impact of the shotgun blast 
and tumbled from his horse, killed instantly. The bewildered Conservative troops searched for 
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208 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 91. The author has converted París’ account of Gallo’s death into narrative style 
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the assassin, but the man, having “run like a deer or hidden like a borugo [a type of rodent found 
in Colombia], had disappeared.”209 
 It did not take long, however, for the killer to be discovered, a Liberal guerrilla named 
Joaquín Rojas. Having fled to Quindío (approximately 90 kilometers to the west of Ibagué), 
Rojas was hunted down by Colonel Carlos Mejía, seeking to avenge the death of General Gallo. 
After a manhunt that lasted several months, Mejía “decapitated him, and stringing his bearded 
head on a flagpole, brought it back to Ibagué and, in front of his battalion, exhibited it along the 
main streets.”210 It was a profoundly humiliating act, one that subordinated the slain Rojas to the 
victorious Mejía, his body exhibited as a trophy of war. It might have also served as a warning. 
Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera note that such claims to honor are “necessarily an attempt to place 
others in a position of inferiority.”211 But this violent act of shaming went beyond the two 
belligerents involved. Like Tovar suggests with other familial histories, this moment was not 
consigned to oblivion—it lived on in the heart of Rojas’ son. 
 Avenging his father took thirteen years—well after the Thousand Days’ War had ended. 
Carlos Mejía had settled in the tolimense (demonym for Tolima) province of Chilí, where he 
made his living on his hacienda with the support of a government stipend for his wartime deeds. 
But his killing of Joaquín Rojas left him deeply unpopular with his neighbors, who remembered 
the Conservative only for his “brutalities” and consequently “hated him to death.”212 One day 
 
209 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 91. Original Spanish: “corriendo como venado o enterrándose como borugo, había 
desparecido.” 
 
210 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 92. Original Spanish: “decapitólo, y ensartando la barbuda cabeza en una asta, 
trájola a Ibagué y, al frente de su batallón, la exhibió por las principales calles.”   
 
211 Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera, The Faces of Honor, 3. 
 
212 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 93. Original Spanish: “sus procedimientos brutales hicieron que llegara a ser 





Rojas’ son tucked himself into the thicket and set up two shotguns mounted side-by-side on a 
makeshift wooden support, right before his father’s killer traveled down the road, accompanied 
by a friend. Mejía’s friend passed by first—he failed to notice the assassin perched just off the 
beaten path. 
 Mejía followed mere moments later—he turned his head as a sharp whisper hissed his 
name, “Carlos!”—and then a loud bang tore through the tranquility of the day and “Mejía 
collapsed from his horse, his body riddled with buckshot.”213 The neighbors all knew who had 
committed the murder, but more importantly, they also understood why, evidenced by the 
response of seventy men from Chilí who were brought in to Ibagué for questioning. They were 
subjected to several months of provisional detention, but “nobody denounced anyone; nobody 
testified against anyone.”214 París did not explore the rationale behind the solidarity he described; 
perhaps perceived as legitimate a killing to avenge a wrong done against one’s family, perhaps 
they understood the unforgivable element of Rojas’s killer being a Conservative. Joaquín Rojas’s 
son, for his part, had long since fled, like his father so many years before him, though this time 
he would be successful in getting away with the killing.215 
 Rojas’s son did not present himself in the same honorable, gentlemanly way as the 
generals—he ambushed Mejía and then he fled immediately afterward. But the response from the 
community indicated the legitimacy of the deed, as well as the difficulty the soldiers faced in 
restoring honor and constructing a satisfactory justice to put an end to the violence. Rojas’s 
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honor was restored, and París ended the history there, but the violence could well have continued 
if one of Mejía’s descendants decided to take up the mantle of vengeance. Honor wounded by 
violent acts, and competence predicated on violent acts, made for a vicious cycle that made any 
satisfactory conclusion to the fighting elusive. 
 Consider another familial history presented by París, this one between cousins on 
opposite sides of the war, and the pedagogical function of humiliation and honor. Alí Villanueva 
was a Liberal rebel in the Columna Ibagué and his cousin, Marcelo Sánchez, was the standard-
bearer in the Conservative army for the squadron Vigías de Gualanday. One day, when the men 
of Vigías de Gualanday passed through the town of Cortadero, Tolima, where Villanueva’s 
family lived, Sánchez stopped by to see his aunt. The visit quickly turned sour, and “after 
uttering some insults against his absent relative [Villanueva], he [Sánchez] dared to whip his 
cousin’s mother.”216 Tovar explains that family members absent during war, like so many other 
wartime disruptions to rural life, “created familial crises, disagreements, harshness, rapid 
disaffections.”217 The crisis here was the humiliation experienced by Villanueva, a man unable to 
protect his mother from the violence of other men (París had nothing to say on the subject of how 
Villanueva’s mother felt about the matter, or about how she regarded her own family’s honor).  
Like with Joaquín Rojas’ son, this familial history continued after the end of the war. 
Villanueva, who refused to lay down arms when the peace treaties were signed in 1902, went one 
day to Sánchez’s house. He found Marcelo sitting on a stool, leaning back against the wall. París 
related that Villanueva warned his cousin “to stand up like a man, because he was going to kill 
 
216 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 102. Original Spanish: “tras de proferir algunos insultos contra el pariente ausente 
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him,” and Villanueva did exactly that.218 Stern writes that “unjustified killings or other violence 
against male or female kin all demanded retribution, an effort to destroy or punish the 
transgressor and thereby redeem the masculinity of the avenger.”219 While Villanueva’s mother 
apparently survived her ordeal—more than could be said for the families of other soldiers like 
Cantalicio Reyes—the violence was nonetheless unjustified in the eyes of her son and 
transformed his cousin Sánchez into the target of deadly violence. Once again, París ended the 
history here, but he related enough to demonstrate that, honor restored or not, Villanueva’s 
family was one permanent casualty of the war. 
Honorable Behavior: Self-Image And Expectations For Allies 
The familial dynamic for soldiers meant that the violence was particularly traumatic and 
honor especially sensitive. But it was far from the only element that comprised honor for the 
soldiers in the Thousand Days’ War. Even though certain concepts, like loyalty to a cause, were 
more malleable for the soldiers than they might have been for the generals, there were still 
shared expectations for honorable conduct among the soldiers. Competence in the face of 
adversity remained paramount, even when adversity did not mean the loss of loved ones or the 
destruction of one’s home. Max Grillo observed a Liberal soldier who was wounded by a stray 
shot that was accidentally fired by a comrade while marching. The injured man began to weep 
and, evidently, produced such a racket that his commanding officer sharply chastised him, trying 
to get him to “toughen up” and stop crying: “If everyone who received a bullet lamented like 
that, then the battle you are preparing for would be horrible. Whining would fill the air.” When 
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this failed to calm the wounded man, his comrades chimed in, clearly irritated: “Shut him up! 
Send him home! Silence him!” After hearing this response from his fellow soldiers, the wounded 
man grew pale in the face and looked at his injury with clear consternation, but was silenced by 
their admonitions. 220 He did not complain after that. Like the clergy members who loudly 
censured Baltasar Vélez, the injured soldiers’ comrades shamed the man for his behavior. Their 
humiliating rebukes apparently produced the desired result. 
Grillo wrote of another exchange between Eduardo del Valle, a 16-year-old Liberal 
soldier, and some older, more experienced veterans. “What will a battle be like?” asked del 
Valle. “Is it very scary seeing the dead?” The response was sobering: “Quite, quite,” the veterans 
answered. “All of us are gripped by fear . . . but one stiffens up in a fight and does not run 
because the others do not run.”221 Honorable behavior was something of a consensus. It was 
usually pragmatic—competence before adversity. One did not run in a fight because the others 
did not run, so one’s honor remained intact—but it also protected the integrity of the fighting 
force and encouraged soldiers to stay firm under fire. Similarly, an experienced Liberal soldier 
justified the plundering of livestock by guerrilla forces: “Poor devils . . . they suffer so much, 
have such fatigue and are so selfless, that one can well allow them that offense. They give their 
blood, so that others, although innocent, give their chickens. Such is war!”222 In the soldier’s 
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mind, the taking of livestock from local civilians was an unfortunate byproduct of the exigencies 
of war, but a fair and valid exchange for the sacrifice the soldiers offered with their lives. For 
that reason, it could not be dishonorable theft. 
For soldiers who upheld the norms and expectations of their peers, the reward was 
respect from the group. Grillo wrote about the Liberal soldier Gabriel Heredia, a “youth, barely a 
boy, similar to Euryalus, celebrated in the Aeneid,” who went into battle unarmed at 
Bucaramanga in 1899 and fell under fire. “His comrades called him ‘the hero,’ because his 
features were like a reflection of Marshal Sucre [one of Simón Bolívar’s generals].”223 The 
soldiers perceived Heredia’s steadfastness under fire as a type of courage worthy of the great 
liberators who helped secure Colombia’s independence. Jesús Hormiga was an Indigenous 
Colombian of the Yanacona community who was similarly remembered almost a century later 
for his mettle in battle. In 1997, Jorge Paz, a Yanacona descendant of guerrillas who fought in 
Cauca during the Thousand Days’ War, spoke about Hormiga’s legacy and the actions for which 
he was still remembered: 
 
. . . in Los Robles there was a great battle, he was, I don’t know if he was a captain or a 
colonel, but it was the late Jesús Hormiga, so there was the battle there, and he was shot 
and fell there and the people who were with him, seeing that he had fallen, started to run 
up [the hill], so then seeing him fallen, the enemy came rapidly upon him and he didn’t 
do anything but ready his rifle and fire there, so that in view . . . that the wounded man 
was facing the enemy, they [his allies] returned to defend him, if not they would have 
killed him, but he didn’t surrender . . .”224  
 
223 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 107. Original Spanish: “Un joven, un niño apenas, semejante al Euríalo 
celebrado en la Eneida, penetró inerme a la matanza . . . Sus compañeros le decían «el héroe», porque tenía en sus 
facciones uno como reflejo del Mariscal Sucre.” 
 
224 Jorge Paz, quoted in Campo, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones, 138-139. Original Spanish: “. . . en 
los Robles ha habido un combate grande, él pues, ha sido, no sé si Capitán o Coronel, ha sido el fina’o Jesús 
Hormiga, entonces ha habido el combate allí y en esas le pegaron un balazo y cayó allí y la gente que iba con él, en 
vista de que él cayó, pegaron a correr de p’arriba, ya viéndolo caído es que se vino el enemigo rápido encima de él y 
él no es que hizo sino desaseguró el fusil y eche bala allí, entonces en vista . . . de que el herido les estaba haciendo 





Hormiga was remembered for his tenacity, his competence in the face of adversity. Although he 
was wounded, he set an example for his comrades who had fled, compelling them to rally around 
him. Importantly, Paz said that Hormiga was remembered for the fact that he did not surrender. 
Facing the enemy and refusing to concede before superior strength was a good way for a soldier 
to demonstrate bravery and earn respect. 
 Francisco Arcilas, a Liberal soldier who was captured by Conservative authorities in the 
department of Cauca after being defeated at the Battle of Flautas in December 1899, refused to 
concede verbally after he had been taken prisoner. In an interview or interrogation, his captors 
asked him: “Is it true that you were defeated in the battle that took place in the Municipality of 
Sotará in which the Conservative forces triumphed?” Arcilas replied: “It is not true that the scant 
forces that were in Sotará would have been defeated by the government forces, since what 
happened was, with the last munitions that there were, a withdrawal to the heights of Flautas was 
carried out, at the far end of our encampment, where the Liberal force stayed without a single 
munition and, in spite of our terrible situation at this point (Flautas) during the day and night of 
the battle, the government forces could not reach this point.”225 Here, what was important for the 
captured Liberal was to emphasize that it was the scarcity of munitions and not the government 
forces themselves that caused the rebel defeat. In fact, in spite of the logistical challenges that 
plagued the Liberal forces, according to Arcilas, they were able to resist the Conservatives for a 
 
225 Francisco Arcilas, quoted in Campo, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones, 77-78. Original Spanish: 
“¿Es verdad que usted fue derrotado en el combate que se celebró en el Municipio de Sotará en el que vencieron las 
fuerzas conservadoras?” “No es verdad que las escasas fuerzas que había en Sotará hubieran sido derrotadas por las 
fuerzas del gobierno, pues lo que hubo fue, que con las últimas municiones que había se efectuó la retirada al alto de 
Flautas, extremo de nuestro campamento, quedando allí la fuerza liberal sin una sola munición y que a pesar de 
nuestra pésima situación a este punto (Flautas) durante el día del combate y su noche, las fuerzas del gobierno al 





whole day and night of fighting. Under these circumstances of adversity, Arcilas strove to 
portray his participation in the Battle of Flautas as competently as possible. 
 The soldiers had certain expectations for their commanders as well. Generals or guerrilla 
leaders who abused their subordinates—either verbally or through physical violence—ran the 
risk of being challenged by their troops. For example, Rafael Uribe faced such a situation after 
the Liberal defeat at Bucaramanga in 1899, before their great victory at Peralonso. He ordered 
his soldiers to remain in their barracks in order to prevent desertions, and when some individuals 
tried to ignore his command, Uribe “unsheathed his steel and distributed blows with the flat of 
the sword,” according to Grillo. Enraged, the soldiers “fit their rifles and aim[ed] at Uribe’s 
chest, who contented himself with fixing his glare on them as if he tried, with the mere force of 
his glares, full of indignation and ire, to make them lower their barrels stretched out toward 
him.”226 Uribe was a particularly talented commander who had a forceful and charismatic 
personality, so if a leader like Uribe could suddenly find his own troops aiming their rifles at him 
in frustration, weaker commanders would find themselves in more explosive situations still. 
 Such was the case with Paulino Vidal, a guerrilla leader in Cauca who sorely lacked the 
same kind of people skills that Uribe had. He antagonized his Yanacona subordinates until things 
escalated, as Abraham Chicangana recalled about his father, Colonel Manuel de Jesús 
Chicangana, one of Vidal’s officers. The elder Chicangana told his son that “Paulino Vidal was a 
goddamned lout [muérgano del carajo] . . . who wanted to do whatever he felt like with the 
Indigenous people.”227 After Vidal beat some Indigenous soldiers and approached Colonel 
 
226 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 117. Original Spanish: “desenvainó el acero y repartió cintarazos,” “calzan los 
fusiles y apuntan al pecho de Uribe, el cual se contentó con mirarlos fijamente como si pretendiese, con la sola 
fuerza de sus miradas, llenas de indicación y de ira, hacer bajar los cañones tendidos hacia él.” 
 
227 Abraham Chicangana, quoted in Campo, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones, 33. Original Spanish: 





Chicangana with the same intent, the Yanacona colonel “drew his sword, put himself before the 
general [Vidal] and launched a slash at his head, taking off the brim of his hat with a cut, and 
that’s when both groups readied their rifles and stretched out [in the prone position], and a 
shootout was about to erupt between Vidal’s forces and the Chicanganas,” according to Jorge 
Paz.228 Chicangana lashed out against Vidal both in the context of an attempt at his own personal 
honor—Vidal was about to strike him in punishment—and in the wider context of Vidal’s 
disrespect for the Indigenous troops under his command. 
 Vidal’s reputation did not appear tainted in prominent memoirs, nor was he censured by 
the Church. But his legacy, in the custody of the descendants of those soldiers he mistreated, 
showed the sensitivity and gravity with which the soldiers regarded the respect (or lack thereof) 
afforded them by their commanders. The enduring wartime memories of the Yanacona 
community proved that what Liberal guerrilla Benjamín Apráez claimed in 1900 would remain 
true almost one hundred years later in the 1990s: “Paulino’s excessive ambitions, his desire to 
subordinate all others and the harshness of this leader were causes for the desertion of the vast 
majority of his troops, to which can be added the selfishness that he carried to such an extreme 
that there was no officer, what’s more, not even a soldier, who gave a damn about him [a quienes 
les diera un centavo].”229 Their competence and honor challenged by an abusive officer, the 
Indigenous soldiers preserved the memory of outrage at his injustices. At least in this case, their 
 
228 Jorge Paz, quoted in Campo, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones, 56. Original Spanish: “desenfundó 
su sable, se le puso de frente al general y le lanzó a cortarle la cabeza, bajándole de un tajo el ala del sombrero y 
entonces es que ambos bandos desaseguraron los fusiles y se tendieron, es que se iba a prender la balacera entre las 
fuerzas de Vidal y los Chicangana. . .” 
 
229 Benjamín Apráez, quoted in Campo, Montoneras, deserciones e insubordinaciones, 102. Original Spanish: “Las 
ambiciones desmesuradas de Paulino, su anhelo de supeditar a todos y el rigor del mismo jefe fue motivo para que 
desertara la mayor parte de la tropa, a lo que se agrega el egoísmo que lo llevo a tal extremo que no hubo un oficial, 





wounded honor was restored by carefully guarding their side of the history until it became 
canonical. Paulino Vidal was to be remembered as the abusive muérgano del carajo. 
Honorable Behavior: Expectations For The Enemy And The Racialized Other 
Vidal made himself the enemy of his own soldiers through his violent disciplinarian 
tendencies. He failed where Uribe succeeded in winning the respect of his subordinates. But 
subordinates were not the only audiences from whom soldiers tried to win respect. One of the 
most difficult challenges for soldiers on both sides of the fighting was to earn the respect of the 
enemy and their begrudging acceptance of the validity of their wartime violence. What some 
soldiers perceived as heroic resistance or battlefield daring, their opponents saw as deplorable 
obstinacy or barbaric brutality. When the soldiers did interact with their enemies—especially in 
the context of combat and its aftermath—expectations for honorable behavior were nearly 
nonexistent. Outrage fueled vengeance, seen as necessary to restore damaged honor, and this 
priority allowed soldiers to shed the veneers of honorable behavior that they expected of one 
another when it came to taking on the hated enemy. 
Sabas S. Socarrás experienced this during his time fighting alongside the Liberal 
guerrillas in the department of Magdalena. Yyé Pinto was a fellow guerrilla who led a successful 
delaying action at San Francisco, slowing down a Conservative advance long enough for other 
Liberals to regroup elsewhere. His tenacity would cost him his life, and Socarrás chronicled the 
treatment that Pinto’s corpse received at the hands of the enemy he had frustrated. “His body was 
burned by the Conservatives,” wrote Socarrás, “and days later we found his charred bones, that 




Pinto. No longer will he murder Conservatives in ambush.’”230 As far as Socarrás’ account was 
concerned, Pinto’s actions were legitimate tactics in a wartime engagement between belligerents, 
and consequently Socarrás expressed his displeasure at the character assassination inflicted upon 
his fallen comrade. “It was an impassioned error to brand him as such, to contradict his heroic 
end,” he protested in his memoirs, “he, who with half a hundred companions rushes against 
2,000 entrenched men, neither ambushes nor murders.”231 Was it that Pinto had actually 
committed murders against Conservatives in the area, or was it that the Conservatives were upset 
that his small force had been a significant obstacle, challenging their competence in the face of 
adversity? No corresponding Conservative account of the event exists, but at any rate the 
Conservatives did not regard Pinto’s behavior as honorable enough to warrant a dignified burial. 
His corpse burned and marked by an epitaph branding him a criminal, Pinto’s fate suggested that 
the Conservatives did not consider themselves bound to any norms of honorability against a foe 
they perceived to possess none himself. 
An abundance of rumors fueled these attitudes that permitted soldiers to regard their 
counterparts as dishonorable criminals. Scandalous whispers of atrocities painted opponents as 
cruel bandits and thugs, like the allegations that Liberal general Tulio Varón had a secret hideout 
named Montefrío where, according to París, he used hooks nailed to cave walls “to hang from 
these, skewered underneath their lower jaw, pro-government prisoners,” where these victims 
 
230 Sabas S. Socarrás, Recuerdos de la guerra de los Mil Días: En las provincias de Padilla y Valledupar en el 
Departamento del Magdalena, 1899 a 1902 (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1977), 62. Original Spanish: “su 
cadáver fue quemado por los conservadores, y días más tarde encontramos sus huesos calcinados, que identificamos 
por la leyenda de una tablilla puesta a su lado que rezaba: ‘Este es el bandido de Yyé Pinto. Ya no asesinará más 
conservadores emboscado.’” 
 
231 Socarrás, Recuerdos de la guerra de los Mil Días, 62. Original Spanish: “Error apasionado motejarlo así, que 






would be tortured by drunken rebels with machetes.232 The Liberal guerrillas, learning of these 
rumors, adopted “Montefrío” as a “stamp of honor,” reclaiming the insult and wearing it as a 
badge of pride.233 They would speak of fallen comrades with reverence as having “gone to 
Montefrío,” and they would terrify Conservative captives by informing them with “a wink or 
with a sardonic smile . . . ‘You are going to Montefrío’” [italics original].234 Such mean-spirited 
pranks played on Conservative prisoners were the product of mean-spirited rumors circulated 
against the Liberals in the first place. They indicated the low regard the soldiers had for their 
enemies, and the lack of norms which constrained their attacks on them. But they were also 
indicative of the strains that a prolonged civil war placed on the link between honor and wartime 
conduct. As Robinson argues, when “a war continues for a long time, demands for victory will 
cause tactics, weapons, and targets which were once considered out of bounds to gradually 
become acceptable.”235 The vitriolic discourse evolved alongside the tactics, weapons, and 
targets. 
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian soldiers were especially targeted by these accusations in 
highly racialized ways. For white or mestizo soldiers depicted as criminals, the character 
assassinations tended to focus more on the purported outrages than the perpetrators themselves. 
But Indigenous and Afro-Colombian men—especially those in the Liberal guerrilla forces—were 
often excised from the wider community of honorable soldiers and painted as opportunistic 
 
232 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 82. Original Spanish: “para colgar de ellos, ensartándolos por debajo de la 
mandíbula inferior, a los prisioneros gobiernistas.” 
 
233 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 83. Original Spanish: “timbre de honor.” 
 
234 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 82. Original Spanish: “se fue para Montefrío,” “un guiño o una sonrisa sardónica . 
. . ‘Usted va para Montefrío.’” 
 





bandits or murderous thugs. Victoriano Lorenzo’s fate, shot after being classified as a criminal 
exempted from the general pardon given to other Liberals at the end of the war, demonstrated 
how pervasive these racial tropes were, reaching all the way up to the realm of the generals. For 
soldiers who could not aspire to generalship like Lorenzo, though, the situation was far worse. 
Afro-Colombian troops had a reputation as skilled machete fighters, fearsome opponents 
in hand-to-hand combat. Perhaps in a different context, this might have meant that they were 
respected as soldiers and valued as warriors, representative of the military virtue of prowess: “a 
combination of physical strength and skill with a weapon,” as Robinson defines it. He adds an 
important corollary: “To be of use, though, prowess must be coupled with courage and with 
loyalty.”236 It was these virtues that contemporaries often refused to recognize in Afro-
Colombian soldiers. Their reputation as skilled machete fighters therefore spoke more generally 
to perceptions of Afro-Colombians as violent and impulsive, capable of transforming their 
instincts into sheer momentum in a machete charge but little else. This reproduced the tropes of 
the “savage” nature of Africans and their use of inferior weaponry. Conservative general Rubén 
Ferrer did so when he wrote to General Víctor M. Salazar, praising 1st Sergeant Roberto Niño for 
“giving instant death, with a magnificent blow, to a black who, surging out from the shadows, 
machete raised high, charged at your person with determined energy to make you the prey of his 
savage ferocity.”237 The language was clearly racially charged—the Afro-Colombian machetero 
sprang from the shadows with “savage ferocity,” making him out to be a dangerous beast from 
whom Salazar was saved by a valiant sergeant. What might have been perceived as foolhardiness 
 
236 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, 3. 
 
237 Rubén Ferrer, quoted in Salazar, Memorias de la guerra, 122. Original Spanish: “dio muerte instantánea, en lance 
soberbio, a un negro que surgiendo de entre las sombras, con machete en alto, arremetió contra vuestra persona con 





or recklessness if done by a white opponent—or if the generals were feeling particularly 
charitable to a downed foe, bravery and daring—was transformed into a threatening advance by 
an ill-intentioned predator.  
José Monroy Sánchez, an Afro-Colombian guerrilla based in the department of 
Cundinamarca, was similarly subjected to a racist portrayal after his death in a failed attack on 
La Chica, a town in the municipality of Anapoima. In 1901, Rafael Puyo published a pamphlet 
titled “El guerrillero Monroy” (“Monroy the Guerrilla”) where he accused Monroy of “deeds and 
atrocities, as black as his ebony skin, [which] are the terror of all who travel the route from 
Anapoima to Tocaima, theater of his evil deeds.”238 Puyo’s language coded Monroy’s 
“blackness” with criminality: he described how, upon capturing a young impressionable traveler 
uninvolved in the war, “[t]he black man with rolled-up nose, thick lips, and raven’s eyes, of 
medium height and broad shoulders, came forward, wielding a large sword.”239 Monroy 
immediately held the unnamed protagonist hostage, robbing him, equal parts duplicitous and 
violent. Puyo represented the guerrilla as little better than a highwayman: according to Puyo, 
Monroy initially cloaked his robbery as a donation to the Liberal cause: “Well, gentleman, I am 
very happy to have found a Liberal as enthusiastic as yourself, who naturally will be interested in 
the cause and these poor soldiers, giving us the five hundred pesos we need.”240 When the 
protagonist of the pamphlet protested that he did not have that money, Puyo depicted Monroy as 
 
238 Rafael Puyo, El guerrillero Monroy (Bogotá: Imprenta de la Luz, 1901), 1. Orignal Spanish: “Sus hazañas y 
atrocidades, tan negras como su piel de ébano, son el espanto de cuantos recorren el trayecto de Anapoima á 
Tocaima, teatro de sus maldades.” 
 
239 Puyo, El guerrillero Monroy, 2. Original Spanish: “Adelantóse el negro de nariz arremangada, labios gruesos y 
ojos de cuervo, de mediana estatura y espaldas anchas; empuñando un sable de grandes dimensiones.” 
 
240 Puyo, El guerrillero Monroy, 2. Original Spanish: “Bien, caballero, me he alegrado mucho de encontrar un 
liberal tan entusiasta como usted, que naturalmente se interesará por la causa y por estos pobres soldados, dándonos 





shifting from deceitful to coercive. “Look, traitorous godo, I’m a little sensitive, and when I raise 
the crupper [to strike], even the devil is scared of me. So you choose: you give me five hundred 
pesos, or instead I’ll give you five hundred blows, one blow per peso.”241 
Puyo’s pamphlet did not relate any of Monroy’s wartime actions, but instead focused on 
the treatment suffered by the unnamed protagonist taken prisoner by Monroy’s brigands. The 
Afro-Colombian Monroy had his physical appearance extensively detailed immediately before 
his criminal deeds were chronicled. Not only was he pointedly and purposefully excluded from 
the category of legitimate belligerent—much in the same way as Victoriano Lorenzo was, coded 
as criminal—but his exclusion was done in a way that emphasized his “blackness.” The laurels 
of honor were made available neither for him nor others who could be similarly classified as 
violent, impulsive, threatening, and dangerous. The racial associations with these negative 
attributes resonated in such racist depictions of Afro-Colombian soldiers.  
Even those who were on the same side as Afro-Colombian soldiers tended to overlook 
them and treat them as an anonymous collective. Grillo wrote about an incident where Liberal 
forces trying to cross the Zulia River, on the border with Colombia and Venezuela, ran into 
struggles with the powerful current. There, “the black soldiers, from Cauca, upon seeing some of 
their comrades perishing, throw themselves into the current and fought with it in the shadows of 
the night, eager to save them, [and] managed to save several after repeated efforts.” This time, 
the association with shadows did not seem to be explicitly racially charged, but Grillo 
nevertheless treated the Afro-Colombian soldiers as less than when he continued, “The names of 
those noble blacks deserve to be conserved . . . Heroes without names! They had no more reward 
 
241 Puyo, El guerrillero Monroy, 2. Original Spanish: “Mire, godo traidor, yo soy un poco delicado, y cuando se me 
alza la arretranca, hasta el diablo me tiene miedo. De modo que usted escoja: me da quinientos pesos, ó recibe en 





than the embrace of their General, moved before the generous virtues of his soldiers.”242 Grillo 
certainly regarded their actions as heroic and noted that the general regarded them as such—but 
they remained nameless, an Afro-Colombian collective. Across the many memoirs about the 
Thousand Days’ War, written by generals and soldiers alike, one finds no shortage of individual 
soldiers of the lowest rank singled out by name to be recognized for a heroic deed or sacrifice. 
Yet even though Grillo noted that these soldiers deserve to have their names conserved, he still 
did not do it! He may well not have known their names, and his intention was certainly far more 
benevolent than Ferrer’s or Puyo’s, but Grillo nevertheless consigned the Afro-Colombian 
soldiers to an obscurity that the laurels of honor could not penetrate.  
Feminine Honor and Women Soldiers 
Colombian women were just as ready to contribute to their preferred political cause 
during the Thousand Days’ War as Colombian men. Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo Castillo estimates 
that between six and twenty-two percent of all forces on campaign were women.243 They were 
not just soldiers, but also cooks, seamstresses, nurses, spies, and even just civilians who 
accompanied male family members on campaign. There remains much work to be done on the 
nature of the Colombian woman’s experience in the Thousand Days’ War, and many of the usual 
sources, like memoirs and pamphlets, pushed them to the periphery. The presence of women in 
Colombian warfare was not exceptional, but their presence in the literature about it was certainly 
less frequent.  
 
242 Grillo, Emociones de la guerra, 269-270. Original Spanish: “los soldados negros, de origen caucano, quienes al 
ver pereciendo a algunos de sus compañeros se arrojan a la corriente y lucharon con ella entre las sombras de la 
noche, deseosos de salvarlos, logran sacar a varios después de repetidos esfuerzos,” “Bien merecería conservar los 
nombres de los nobles negros . . . ¡Héroes sin nombre! No tuvieron más recompensa que el abrazo de su General, 
conmovido ante las virtudes generosas de sus soldados.” 
 





What can be inferred about what honor meant for the Colombian women who acted as 
soldiers alongside the men? Did a particularly distinct gendered element become apparent when 
it came to female participation in wartime? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions must 
remain tentative and frustratingly tethered to the perspectives of men who wrote about their 
female companions. Yet the Colombian women who lent their efforts to the Thousand Days’ 
War frequently lived up to the expectations of their male counterparts, serving with the same 
soldiers’ honor as the men. 
During the 1895 civil war that served as an immediate predecessor to the Thousand Days’ 
War, a Liberal woman identified only as “Elisa” by the soldier Bernardo Rodríguez embodied 
that same honorable virtue of competence in the face of adversity. She may have initially joined 
the Liberal forces as the lover of a captain, who she witnessed shot and killed in an attack on a 
Conservative position. Elisa immediately sprang into action. She grabbed the fallen captain’s 
machete, revolver, and carbine off his corpse and shouted, “Boys, help me avenge the captain! 
We charge here!” She led the assault up over the conservative trenches and opened fire first with 
the revolver, then with the carbine, yelling, “Boys, over the trenches!” Having driven the 
Conservatives out from their defensive works, she congratulated her comrades, proclaiming, 
“Boys, the captain’s blood has been avenged.”244 Elisa’s skill in combat and in leading armed 
men amply testified to her skill under adversity. And, to top it off, she had exacted vengeance on 
her captain’s killers by triumphing, demonstrating the Conservatives’ incompetence before her 
frontal assault.  
 
244 Bernardo Rodríguez, quoted in Jaramillo, “Mujeres en guerra,” in Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia, 378. 
Original Spanish: “¡Muchachos ayúdenme a vengar al capitán! Carguemos por aquí.” “¡Muchachos, sobre la 





Laureano García R., the Conservative general who wrote about his experience at the 
Battle of Peralonso, emphasized the participation of María de Jesús Ortiz. García argued it would 
be “black ingratitude to not record her name and her deeds in this writing.”245 He described her 
as a person with “manly impressiveness” and as a “rough woman of the town,” but these 
descriptions seem to be intended as compliments.246 During the midst of the fierce firefight 
between the Conservative and Liberal forces, Ortiz “resolutely takes a bucket, crosses the trench, 
descends to the river exposed to the bullets of both combatants, fills the vessel, and when we 
thought she had died, we see her ascend the trench with an air of triumph . . . to offer the liquid 
acquired with imminent risk to her life.”247 García’s laudatory language bestowed Ortiz with the 
same kind of honor that other generals bestowed on subordinates who they mentioned by name 
in their writings—but interestingly, García coded Ortiz’s honor as very masculine.  
Most women appeared in the literature tethered to the men with whom they lived. Liberal 
guerrilla general Ramón “El Negro” Marín, nicknamed for his skin color, was famous for his 
enjoyment “of feminine company,” as París described it: “it so happened that his temperament 
was that of those who get depressed on contact with women, and in those depressions he 
committed more than one stupid thing.”248 París blamed one of Marín’s women for Marín’s 
defeat at Bermejal in October 1901, alleging that upon seeing his “concubine” flee the battle he, 
 
245 García, Combate de Peralonso, 6. Original Spanish: “ingratitud negra sería dejar de consignar su nombre y su 
hazaña en este escrito.” 
 
246 García, Combate de Peralonso, 7. Original Spanish: “varonil imponencia,” “una tosca mujer del pueblo.” 
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too, abandoned the field and took off at a gallop to save her.249 Marín’s destruction of the church 
of Santo Domingo was similarly attributed to his overreaction upon learning of the death of Ester 
Quintero de Guataquí, who fell at the battle of La Cuesta del Rosario.250 But Quintero’s death 
also inspired “la negra Petronila,” a woman who “became the standard-bearer of her force, and 
proudly wore the wounds she received in battle.”251 Women inspired other women to courageous 
deeds in battle just as much as men inspired other men. The fact that these women were lovers or 
mistresses of soldiers often did not detract from the combat readiness of a unit, but instead 
amplified it. During the battle of Soacha in 1902, for instance, an “old lover of the [Liberal] 
general Juan MacAllister dedicated herself to stabbing the Conservative sharpshooters who, 
perched on the rooftops of the town, impeded the Liberal advance.”252  
It is unfortunate that Colombian women appear so peripherally in the writings about the 
Thousand Days’ War. A lot of research remains to be done about their participation in the 
Thousand Days’ War and about their motivations, perspectives, and attitudes surrounding the 
wartime triumphs and tragedies that drew them in to the fight just as much as their male 
counterparts. As Jaramillo notes, many Colombian women who fought in the Thousand Days’ 
War “became trapped by the hatreds incubated by the war and that, loaded with bitterness, they 
 
249 París, Guerrilleros del Tolima, 87. Original Spanish: “Marín, impresionado por el miedo que acogotó a la 
barragana al arreciar el combate, abandonaba el campo y, aparejado a la mujer, huía al galope para salvarla.” 
 
250 Jaramillo, “Mujeres en guerra,” in Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia, 373. 
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flag made one an easy target for enemy sharpshooters. 
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amante del general Juan MacAllister, se dedicó a acuchillar a los tiradores conservadores que, parapetados en las 





set out on the road to the battlefields, in the hopes that the blades of their machetes would allow 
them to avenge loved ones who had been killed in this, or in previous, conflicts.”253 
Conclusions 
The soldiers of the Thousand Days’ War easily comprised the most diverse group of the 
three analyzed in this thesis. They encompassed the racialized, gendered, and class-based 
diversity of Colombian society in a way not seen with the generals or the clergy. They were 
usually excluded from the conceptions of honor as designed and implemented by the upper 
classes, but this did not mean that they were uninterested in their own particular visions of what 
constituted honor and justice during the war.  
Perhaps most tragically, their visions of justice were the ones that went most ignored in 
the aftermath of the war, and the soldiers were the ones saddled with the trauma of destroyed 
livelihoods and murdered families. Justice for a soldier who had his honor wounded through the 
killing of his family or the destruction of his home often meant a reprisal in kind, and as a 
consequence, encouraged a cycle of violence that could become a deadly feud. The generals and 
the clergy who spoke over the heads of the soldiers at each other fanned the flames of the 
destruction that had far more devastating consequences for the people beholden to their orders.  
The racial component made this deadly situation even more dangerous for Indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian soldiers, subject to a double standard meant to codify them as criminal and 
therefore undeserving of fair treatment as legitimate combatants. It also meant they were usually 
ignored when it came to recognition for honorable service. Indigenous communities in Colombia 
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nevertheless laid claim to their own justice through memory, rehabilitating the reputations of 
community members who were mistreated by white commanders.  
Honor for the soldiers was just as transactional as it was for the generals or the clergy. 
Honor taken at a soldier’s expense was usually done to demonstrate the superiority of the 
transgressor. But while for the generals and clergy, the transactions over reputation could be 
resolved through bitter polemics and histrionic publications, for the soldiers the transactions 
were exchanged in lives and livelihoods. For the soldiers, the violence of the Thousand Days’ 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
“Cobarde, ¡vive!” 
– ¿Para qué? 
“Para combatir.” 
– ¿Qué importa el combate sin el triunfo? 
“Todo. La frescura de los ideales es lo que importa.” 
– ¿Quién eres, que así me increpas? 
“La Vida. Soy la vida, que sólo pide a los hombres que la amen. ¡Yo no inventé las palabras!” 
— Max Grillo, Emociones de la guerra254 
 
Robin Kirk asks a troubling question about Colombia’s history of violence in her 2003 
book More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia. Even 
though she refers to Colombia’s recent history, it warrants application to the Thousand Days’ 
War and the nation’s tumultuous transition into the twentieth century. “If Colombians could not 
even agree on why they fought,” she asks, “how could any of us trying to understand the conflict 
tell what was the real and absolute truth about any story?”255 It should be noted—pointedly—that 
this is not a problem unique to Colombia, nor are Colombians endemically struck with a 
mercurial sensitivity to honor and prone to violence in a way that defines them as a people. 
Given the tragic circumstances of the profound political polarization that made the Thousand 
Days’ War possible, compassion and sensitivity are the first tools required for any historian—for 
any investigator of any specialization—interested in the wartime violence experienced by 
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Colombia between 1899 and 1902. Nonetheless, even if Colombians did not agree on why they 
fought—for personal honor, for the honor of the Church, or the honor of their family and their 
community at large, the future of their country, civil liberties—the evidence points to the 
prevalence of honor in the wartime context of the Thousand Days’ War. This is not a mystery or 
a surprise for Colombians today. Iván D. Gaona’s 2019 miniseries Adiós al amigo, set at the end 
of the Thousand Days’ War in and around the Chicamocha Canyon in Santander, speaks to the 
enduring legacy this bitter truth continues to hold in Colombia’s historical memory. 
Photographer Benito Pardo (Cristián “Beco” Hernández) is on the hunt for a Conservative officer 
who killed his father; Liberal soldier Alfredo Duarte Amado (Willington Gordillo Duarte) is 
looking for his brother. Unbeknownst to the pair, they are looking for the same man. Amado asks 
Pardo what he will do when he finds the man who killed his father. The photographer’s response 
reveals what Hermes Tovar meant when he wrote that “history is not oblivion”: “Without doubt, 
I’ll kill him two times over, that scoundrel son of a bitch. It can’t be possible that my dad is 
buried in a tomb, and he’s still out there as if nothing happened.”256 Much more than mere honor, 
what Colombians were fighting for was justice. 
But that justice was frequently an elusive target, made all the more ephemeral by the 
complications that arose from the overlapping elements of honor and war. This, too, is no 
surprise for Colombians today. A fictionalized version of Rafael Uribe Uribe, played by 
Suetonio Hernández in Adiós al amigo, declares to Pardo and Amado: “Hatred, resentment, and 
vengeance do not exist in the world. They exist in the heads of men, and that is where they must 
 
256 Iván D. Gaona (dir.), Adiós al amigo, Ep. 6, “El hermano y el asesino,” (La ContraBanda Films, 2019). Original 
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be resolved!”257 This fictional Uribe proclaims a noble appeal to move beyond the violence, but 
the causes of such violence existed just as much in the real world as it did in the minds of people. 
“Honor was a public phenomenon and constantly subject to challenge, for it could be threatened, 
lost, gained, and regained,” as Twinam explains.258 In the drastically altered social parameters of 
a civil war, the public challenges and contestations over honor were far deadlier than in 
peacetime. Robinson argues that, for many individuals, in order “[t]o restore one’s sense of self, 
it can be worth risking death in a test of arms.”259 With so many senses of self dragged into the 
tumult of the Thousand Days’ War, from generals, clergy members, and soldiers, the tests of 
arms to validate and restore honor were numerous and could be self-perpetuating. 
It was easier to wound somebody’s honor—to call them a coward, a traitor, a bad 
Catholic, a liar, a weakling, to question their reputation and identity—than it was to see that 
damaged honor repaired or restored. It was even more difficult to find a satisfactory justice for 
wounded honor in a wartime context, when such offenses tended to be transactional. Wyatt-
Brown warns of “how honor, race, and humiliation have tragic, perhaps irreversible, 
consequences unless the national mood is somehow amended toward more peaceful 
decisions.”260 This was the great problem of the Thousand Days’ War, and it meant that disparate 
elements of Colombian society—the generals, the clergy, and the soldiers—all agreed on the 
symptoms of political violence, wounded honor, but not necessarily the cause or the treatment. 
How the generals, clergy, and soldiers recognized and defended their honor differed substantially 
and was impacted by race, gender, and class, among other markers of identity. It was to be a 
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problem that prevented Conservatives and Liberals from finding satisfactory conclusions to 
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